

Université de Montréal

Julius Caesar in Gaul and Germania: Strategy, tactics, and the use of aggressive diplomacy as a
tool for war

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Résumé

Alors que César et ses écrits ont fait l'objet d'une étude approfondie au cours des deux derniers siècles, comment étudier ses commentaires de manière différente? En utilisant une nouvelle approche mise au point par Arthur M. Eckstein dans son œuvre *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* qui soutient que Rome a conquis de manière opportuniste l'Italie et la Méditerranée orientale à travers une série de guerres défensives ou « d'invitations ». La nouveauté de cette approche est son utilisation des paradigmes de la science politique misant surtout sur le concept de l'anarchie réaliste. En tant que telle, cette thèse utilisera le cadre d'Eckstein et l'appliquera au *Bellum Gallicum* de César pour montrer que, contrairement à l'historiographie traditionnelle, César n'a pas conquis la Gaule par bellicosité et ambition personnelle, mais plutôt à la suite d'invitation directe de ses alliés gaulois le poussant à intervenir défensivement au nom du *bellum iustum*. Pour ce faire, un état d'anarchie en Gaule doit être démontré en adhérant au système méditerranéen d'Eckstein. Après quoi, une analyse détaillée du *De Bello Gallico* de César décrira les cas spécifiques durant lesquels il utilisa de manière opportuniste l'anarchie préexistante à son avantage, avant de finalement se plonger dans les spécificités des « invitations » ainsi que de son utilisation de la diplomatie agressive. Pour y parvenir, nous avons utilisé les commentaires de César comme sources principales, tandis que les travaux susmentionnés d'Eckstein nous ont donné les concepts interprétatifs et la base théorique dont nous avons besoin ; en outre, nous nous sommes appuyés sur plusieurs sources primaires supplémentaires ainsi que sur des études historiques pertinentes. La Gaule ayant été démontrée comme un système anarchique, le modèle d'Eckstein fut appliqué avec succès, et ses résultats mettent en évidence que la bellicosité des Gaulois les uns envers les autres les aveugla du danger romain, chose que César utilisa pour systématiquement intervenir militairement, tout en remplissant les vides de pouvoir qu'il laissa derrière lui. Ce modèle fait preuve d'importance car il nous fournit une explication alternative à la conquête romaine de la Gaule, en se penchant sur la science politique, ouvrant la porte à de vastes autres études, en suivant ce modèle qui reste encore largement inexploré.

Mots-clés : Anarchisme, relations diplomatiques, Rome Relations extérieures (510-30 av.J.-C.), César. Jules, De Bello Gallico (58-51 av.J.-C.), Gaule Politique et gouvernement

Abstract

While Caesar and his writings have been thoroughly studied for the past two centuries, it is time to make use of a new approach pioneered by Arthur M. Eckstein to study him. In his *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* Eckstein argues that Rome opportunistically conquered Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean through a series of defensive wars or “invitations”. What is novel about this approach is its use of political science paradigms, with a heavy emphasis on the concept of the realist anarchy. As such, using Eckstein’s framework and applying it to Caesar’s *Bellum Gallicum* this thesis shows that Caesar, contrarily to traditional historiography, did not conquer Gaul out of sheer bellicosity and personal ambition, but rather, as a result of a direct invitation from Rome’s Gallic allies to defensively interfere on their behalf in an act of *bellum iustum*. To do so, we will demonstrate that a state of anarchy exists in Gaul in accordance to Eckstein’s wider Mediterranean system. After which, a detailed analysis of Caesar’s *De Bello Gallico* will outline the specific instances in which Caesar opportunistically used this pre-existing anarchy to his advantage, before finally delving into the specificities of the “invitations” along with an analysis of Caesar’s use of aggressive diplomacy. To achieve this, we used first and foremost, Caesar’s commentaries as the primary sources, while Eckstein’s aforementioned work gave us the interpretative concepts and theoretical basis we needed; additionally, we drew on multiple supplementary primary sources and the surrounding relevant scholarship. After we demonstrated that Gaul was an anarchic system, we successfully applied Eckstein’s model, and its results clearly showed that the Gauls’ bellicosity against each other blinded them to the Roman danger, which Caesar used to systematically intervene, filling the power vacua left behind in his wake. This model is important because it provides us with an alternate explanation to the Roman conquest of Gaul, using one of history’s sister disciplines, political science. With this approach’s viability proven, it opens the door for vast other studies, in this as of yet, unexplored direction.

Keywords: Anarchism, Diplomatic relations, Rome Foreign relations (510-30 B.C.), Caesar. Julius, De Bello Gallico (58-51 B.C), Gaul Politics and government

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*I dedicate this thesis to my family, who have always encouraged and supported me throughout
my academic journey.*

List of Abbreviations

BG : *Bellum Gallicum*

BCE : Before Current Era

CE : Current Era

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Introduction

Throughout the ages, scholars have analyzed Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*, be it for military, political, ethnographical, or scholarly purposes. From 58 BCE to 51 BCE, Caesar led campaigns to subjugate one of Rome's oldest and greatest rivals: the Gauls. And although Caesar's works have been at the heart of countless prior studies, this does not mean that there are no longer any facets to his conquests, and writings, that cannot be further explored under a new light.

Caesar's Gallic Wars are considered a prime example of Rome's bellicosity and thirst for conquest. With certain historians attributing the latter to Caesar's own selfish ambitions, and as a means for him to gain vast riches to pay off his crippling debts.¹ While this argument is certainly a key aspect of any study revolving around Caesar, a point could be made that he was merely following contemporary conventions and was by no means an outlier, as it was not uncommon for Roman statesmen to use their political and military *potestas* towards personal financial gain.²

War had always been a great source of riches and fame for successful *Imperatores*.³ A fact that was exacerbated by the Marian so-called reforms of 107 BCE which saw the allegiance of the Roman army shift more and more exclusively towards its generals.⁴ For a long time, Rome had been plagued by social problems due to the lack of available lands in the *ager publicus*.⁵ These problems split the Roman senate into two distinct factions, between the *populares* who sought to redistribute land, and the *optimates* who sought to defend the rights of the rich agrarian elite.⁶

¹ For this tendency see Christian Meier, *Caesar* (United States: Fontana Press, 1996).

² Israel Shatzman, "The Roman General's Authority over Booty," *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte* 21, no. 2 (1972): 177–205. p. 177. All citations in this thesis will follow the "Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition (full note)" as a template.

³ Shatzman. p. 177.

⁴ Meier, *Caesar*. p. 29.

⁵ Saskia T. Roselaar, *Public Land in the Roman Republic: A Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396-89 BCE*, Oxford Studies in Roman Society and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). p. 288-289.

⁶ There exists a debate that this binary division of republican politics was created by Theodor Mommsen and reflects anachronisms of his contemporary politics. Nevertheless, this model remains pervasive throughout current scholarship. For more on this topic see: Henrik Mouritsen, "Chapter 3 - Consensus and Competition," in *Politics in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 105–72.

Indeed, large landowners had managed to create immense estates for themselves, to be worked on by their slaves, thus, stripping the land away from the poorer peasants.⁷ In turn, this caused a massive rural exodus which saw the city of Rome drastically grow in size, and its population increase by several hundred thousands. While the Gracchi brothers had attempted to solve this growing societal problem, and were subsequently killed for it, Marius had seemingly found a solution by waiving property qualifications for recruitment and rewarded loyal legionaries for their service by granting them lands in newly conquered territories.⁸ While these measures certainly helped alleviate the land crises in Rome, it created an entirely new problem by giving individual generals arguably more power than the Senate.⁹ This change of dynamic triggered the events and crises of the second and first centuries BCE and finally culminated with Sulla's march on Rome in 88 BCE.¹⁰ The republic's tenuous situation in this time period helped set the stage for Caesar's Gallic Wars and his rise to power.¹¹ Indeed, during his consulship, Caesar passed many *popularis* laws which many of the *optimates* considered illegal. As such, in order to avoid prosecution after his term as consul, Caesar was forced to seek a governorship in Gaul. It is from this political exile, caused by the political strife in Rome from which stem the events analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, throughout these campaigns, Caesar tied his legions to himself in a series of interpersonal relationships which the Roman Republic was no longer able to control,¹² eventually leading to years of civil strife that would lead to its downfall and see the Empire be born.

Ever since the sacking of Rome in 390 BC by the Senones, the Romans maintained a constant fear of the Celts (and Gauls), a fear that was so systemically entrenched that both Cicero and Sallust saw Caesar's wars with the Celts as inevitable wars of survival, rather than wars for power or

⁷ Roselaar, *Public Land in the Roman Republic*. p. 11, 27, and 64.

⁸ It is important to note, that more recent scholarships have challenged these aspects of the "marian reforms", with Gauthier referring to them as a "myth of modern historiography". For these tendencies see: François Gauthier, "The Changing Composition of the Roman Army in the Late Republic and the So-Called 'Marian-Reforms,'" *The Ancient History Bulletin* 30 (2016): 103–20. And Michael J. Taylor, "Tactical Reform in the Late Roman Republic: The View from Italy : Tactical Reform in the Late Roman Republic: The View from Italy," *Historia* 68, no. 1 (2019): 76–94..

⁹ Meier, *Caesar*. p.29-30.

¹⁰ Meier. p. 73.

¹¹ Meier. p. 19.

¹² Louis Rawlings, "Caesar's Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors," in *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments*, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), 171–92. p. 186.

conquest.¹³ And while certain historical scholarships that analyze Caesar's writings tend to focus on the man himself, interpreting his psychology, thoughts, actions, and state of mind.¹⁴ Without denying any of these traditional aspects of Caesarian historiography, this thesis will add to these works by approaching the *Bellum Gallicum* from a different perspective. My approach will be based on a reimagined application of one of Arthur M. Eckstein's theories found in his 2009 work entitled *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. In the latter, Eckstein offers a completely new approach to Roman imperialism by systematically applying Political Science arguments into his analysis and into his understanding of ancient interstate relations. Specifically, Eckstein draws his arguments from the "realist" school of thought of international relations and challenges traditionally held views on Roman imperialism.¹⁵ To that effect, Eckstein analyses interstate behavior by using three fundamental arguments from the realist approach:

- The prevalence of anarchy in interstate affairs (i.e., the lack of international law).
- That all states account for themselves in a "self-help regime" imposed on them by system.
- And lastly, the importance of the balance of power as an agent of stability or instability.¹⁶

By using Eckstein's theoretical framework, and applying it as a reading guide to Caesar's Gallic Wars, I will show that Caesar's conquest of Gaul, was not merely an act of Roman imperialistic aggression, but rather a complex ebb and flow of geopolitical motivations after Caesar was invited into Gaul. After receiving requests from his Gallic allies to intervene at their behest, Caesar slowly, and progressively acted against rising threats to the system's stability. Each time he interfered, Caesar eliminated a powerful actor, irreversibly affecting the system's balance of power, while also prompting power transition crises, to be filled by the system's slowly rising new hegemon: Rome.

¹³ Arthur M Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* (Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2009). p. 133.

¹⁴ For this tendency see authors such as Andrew M Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), Rawlings, "Caesar's Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors.", Kimberly Kagan, *The Eye of Command* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), Christina S. Kraus, "Bellum Gallicum," in *A Companion to Julius Caesar* (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2009), 157–74, and J. E. Lendon, "The Rhetoric of Combat: Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius Caesar's Battle Descriptions," *Classical Antiquity* 18, no. 2 (1999): 273–329.

¹⁵ Eckstein cites William Vernon Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome : 327-70 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), S. P. Oakley, "Single Combat in the Roman Republic," *The Classical Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1985): 392–410, and Th. Wiedemann, "Single Combat and Being Roman," *Ancient Society* 27 (1996): 91–104 as the main proponents of these traditional views. See Eckstein. p. 3 and 197.

¹⁶ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 12.

1. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome:

Due to the importance of Eckstein's theory for this thesis, it is imperative that his book should be thoroughly analyzed to properly grasp his theoretical framework which is at the centre of my own work. It is important to note that Eckstein throughout his book, uses key principles found in political science to argue his historical theory. Above all else, Eckstein's arguments are based on the Realist school of thought,¹⁷ and he was the first to apply political science theories to the study of Roman imperialism and expansionism. The latter attributes this new approach to the fact that most scholars of the ancient world are not familiar enough with realist theoretical literature to use it in their own studies; while, on the other hand, Realist political scientists lack sufficient historical knowledge to provide adequate interpretations of history.¹⁸

Realism, as was mentioned, is a school of thought in political science¹⁹, and is one of the predominant theoretical approach towards understanding international relations.²⁰ The realist approach's underlying argument is its claim that no centralized political entity exists at the international level to help ensure its orderly conduct. This inherent state of international "anarchy" forces state actors to behave on the international level solely based on their own national interests, in a logic that differs greatly from that of the domestic level due to the lack of regulation brought about by a sovereign power.²¹ Indeed, the only constraints on state behavior in the realist system, is the system itself. All States are acting in their own self-interest, to the degree that they can and are constrained only by the pressure exuded from the other states within the system. As such, all states in the system are considered unitary and rational actors. However, critics have mentioned

¹⁷ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 6.

¹⁸ Eckstein. p. 7.

¹⁹ It is important to note that some political scientist such as Barbara Kuntz, don't believe realism to be a school of thought.

²⁰ Barbara Kunz, 'Hans J. Morgenthau's Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power', *Max Weber Studies*, 10.2 (2010), p. 190.

²¹ Duncan Bell, "Realism | Definition, Theories, & Facts," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed March 26, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/realism-political-and-social-science>.

that the realist approach results in an overall pessimistic view of international relations with a premise that human nature does not change.²²

1.1 Political Realism

The realist school of thought can be divided into two subcategories: Classical realism and Neorealism. The former, takes its roots with the Greek historian Thucydides (460 to 400 BCE) , author of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, whose work was the first known recorded text which analyzes the political and moral natures of a nation's wartime policies.²³ Indeed, although Eckstein affirms that Thucydides is widely considered amongst realist academics to be the discipline's founding father²⁴; he emphasizes that Thucydides's views on the harsh Greek interstate world was not unique, despite the superior quality and clarity of his explanations. In fact, his views were shared by many other prominent Greek historians such as: Herodotus, Xenophon, and Plato, who all recognized the brutality of the world around them.²⁵ Nevertheless, Thucydides was the first to conceptualize, and expand upon, three main principles of contemporary realist theory²⁶:

- 1) That all states in a militarized interstate anarchy act in a similar fashion based solely on their own self-interest. Thus, making the systemic anarchy extremely dangerous for all parties.

²² Kunz, "Hans J. Morgenthau's Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power." p. 191. As for historians, this premise is familiar: for if human nature were to change, it would be far more difficult for us to extrapolate human lives and actions from historical sources. Thus, historians sometimes operate under the assumption that human nature remains unchanging to be able to write history. But what do we mean by "human nature"? For that, we refer to the works of David Hume and his *A treatise of Human Nature*. When discussing cause and effect Hume argues that "all reasoning concerning cause and effect are founded on experience, and that all reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition that the course of nature will continue uniformly the same". Therefore, concluding that similar causes, with similar circumstances, will produce similar effects. However, for this to hold true, a uniformity that the future must be conformable with the past must be present. "All probable arguments are built on the supposition that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the past" a conformity which is a "matter of fact". Thus, according to Hume, for modern historians to be able to interpret causality in the past, they must draw from their own experiences in order to draw conclusions. To do so, we must accept that human experience transcends time, with humans sharing similar, relatable, experiences throughout the ages.

²³ Bell, "Realism | Definition, Theories, & Facts." See also Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) for further reading.

²⁴ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 48.

²⁵ Eckstein. p. 49.

²⁶ Eckstein. p. 49, 50, and 54.

- 2) Due to the conditions set about by the first principle, fear dominates the decision-making of the States.
- 3) Lastly, Thucydides sought to explain the Greek interstate political anarchy as a system. A system that guided its units' (Greek City States in Eckstein's case) actions.

Unfortunately, classical realism was not a cohesive school of thought, but rather an amalgam of several important scholars (like Carr and Morgenthau) each drawing from various sources, united in their opposition for the optimistic liberal internationalist movement.²⁷

Nevertheless, since this thesis's approach will be based on Eckstein's own methodology, it is therefore imperative to understand Political Realism as explained by him. Firstly, Eckstein helps identify three critical paradigms of realist thought: Anarchy, the self-help regime, and the balance of power.

Starting with the first paradigm, Eckstein defines anarchy as "the absence of international law/and or of a central authority or effective mechanisms to enforce such law" and due to this lack of international law, or central authority, states are pressured to compete with each other in the pursuit of security.²⁸ Furthermore, states do not exist in isolation, but rather in systems which forces states to take into consideration the actions (or potential actions) of others with regards to their own security.²⁹ This anarchy leads to competition among the independent states in the system and pushes them to develop the "arts and instruments of force" since they are the primary means of ensuring survival and security under this system. Indeed, resorting to force is the sole imperative of the individual state, as they can only really control their own behavior and not that of others. As such, this behavior is demanded by the structure of international relations under anarchy.³⁰

The constant pursuit of security by states leads Eckstein to the second paradigm of realist thought: the self-help regime. Because anarchy forces a permanent state of war, the actions of a state are aimed at how to best achieve, and ensure, their short-term self-preservation. However, in order to survive, this means that a state must have enough power to preserve both its physical and politically

²⁷ Bell, "Realism | Definition, Theories, & Facts."

²⁸ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 12.

²⁹ Eckstein citing Hedley (1932-1985) Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). p. I. defining "system" as "groups of states where the behavior of each state is a necessary factor in the calculations of all others – and vice versa".

³⁰ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 14.

independent existences. Thus, if power is needed to preserve the existence of a state, the goal of each state is then to acquire as much power as possible and in that regard, all states act selfishly seeking their own self-interest, in order to maximize their power gain.³¹ In essence, interstate politics are aimed mostly at survival, “as polities are forced to confront the potential threat of violence against them constituted by the very existence of the other polities”.³² Nevertheless, because all the states within a system act selfishly in the search for power, this triggers a “security dilemma” whereby this search of increased power by one state undermines the security of all the other states resulting in ever increasing levels of tension and distrust.³³ Moreover, the security dilemma “leads to a perpetual tragedy of relations between and among states, encouraging increased militarization and mutual hostility, yet not necessarily leading to increased security”.³⁴

As such, while the anarchy promotes states to ensure their safety through the constant search for more power, this “security dilemma” decreases the stability of the overall system and leads to the third and final paradigm of realist thought: the balance of power.

Indeed, realists argue that it is the balance of power between the various states in the system that ultimately determines the prevalence of war (or the absence of it). The balance of power comes in several static forms, the most prevalent of which being: multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. The latter is the most stable form of balance of power with the least amount of armed conflict. Bipolarity is its second most stable form, with multipolarity being the least stable and most violent of its static forms.³⁵ When sudden shifts occur in the system’s balance of power, it instigates conflict and triggers what is referred to as a “hegemonic war”. In other words, it causes an armed conflict between states in order to determine a new balance of power. This approach is closely linked with the concept of the “power-transition” crisis which highlights that relations among states constantly fluctuate, and that when sudden and large fluctuations in power relations occur it intensifies the normal conflict and insecurity which is inherent in an anarchic system. That being said, the “emergence of a power-transition crisis greatly increases the possibility of large system

³¹ Eckstein. p. 14-15.

³² Eckstein citing Raymond Aron, *Peace and War : A Theory of International Relations* (New York, 1973). p. 7.

³³ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 21.

³⁴ Eckstein citing George. Liska, *The Ways of Power : Pattern and Meaning in World Politics* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1990). p. 482 and others.

³⁵ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 23.

wide war, because the issues involved are so important for all states and for the system as a whole”.³⁶

Be that as it may, the restructuring of a system’s balance of power forces its states (or units/polities) to be classified between status-quo and revisionist states. Status-quo states are satisfied with the existing distribution of resources, power, and their overall status in the interstate system. On the other hand, revisionist states are dissatisfied and wish to change the system towards their advantage, sometimes through diplomacy, but most often time through violence.³⁷ However, it is important to note that these classifications are not an intrinsic part of a state’s character, but is instead situational. Indeed, even status-quo states will adopt certain revisionist policies when it best suits their purposes (and vice-versa), a fact which shall be further examined in chapter 2 of this thesis with regards to the classification of the Gallic polities. Lastly, there exists certain states which are classified as “unlimited revisionist states”. These states are extremely dissatisfied with the system and their position in it and seek to overthrow it completely. They are usually, exceptionally militaristic (even by the standards of an anarchic system) and will cause widespread systemic destruction regardless of whether they succeed or fail.³⁸

Eckstein’s study uses these paradigms to emphasize the severe pressure that the Mediterranean system was imposing on all ancient states (including Rome) that lived within it (Underlining, that “every major power, second-rank power, and small insignificant polities” were all highly militarized³⁹). And while his study argues that the ancient Mediterranean system was pushing all states to behave in an incredibly bellicose, expansionist, and diplomatically aggressive way, prompting states to resolve their disputes in a “normal” way by resorting to war. Here, Eckstein stresses that what made Rome exceptional was not that it was more violent, or more bellicose, or more militarized than others, but rather its unique unit-specific characteristics to form alliances and assimilate non-roman peoples, highlighting Rome’s social flexibility and evolving identity, which he accounts for most of their success. Therefore, it was not Rome’s exceptional military skill, but rather their exceptional diplomatic and political skills that allowed them to become the system’s

³⁶ Eckstein. p. 24.

³⁷ Eckstein. p. 25.

³⁸ Eckstein. p. 26.

³⁹ Eckstein. p. 28.

hegemonic power.⁴⁰ In other words, these abilities meant that Rome was able to leverage a competitive advantage over the other units in the otherwise ferocious system-wide struggle to achieve power and security.⁴¹

Ultimately, Eckstein distinguishes between two separate phenomena in his study: The prevalence of war fostered by the anarchic Mediterranean system and the causes of Roman success. His approach then interweaves system-level factors with unit-level factors to help explain Rome's military success.⁴²

1.2 Establishing the framework

Using these principles of political science, Eckstein goes on to study the motivations behind Roman expansion, as well as, the reasons for their success.⁴³ He advances his main thesis that the Mediterranean interstate system was in a state of multipolar anarchy, that had little to no international law to order it. Instead, he argues that the system was regulated solely by complex balances of power (based on military power) that compelled bellicosity on all its units in its exceptionally harsh environment.⁴⁴ From there, Eckstein highlights that the most dominant theory in modern scholarship attributes Rome's success to its exceptional warlike, aggressive, and violent behavior.⁴⁵ As such, while these claims are true, Eckstein does not attribute them uniquely to Rome, but rather states that all the units within the system were subject to similar behavior due to the harshness of the interstate anarchy they lived in.⁴⁶ Instead, Eckstein attributes Rome's success to the qualities that were uniquely theirs such as their exceptional military organisation, discipline⁴⁷, and diplomacy.⁴⁸

⁴⁰ Eckstein. p. 33-34.

⁴¹ Rome was able to achieve this by mobilizing "very large-scale social resources at a great level of intensity". Eckstein. p. 34.

⁴² Eckstein. p. 35.

⁴³ Eckstein. p. 2.

⁴⁴ Eckstein. p. 4.

⁴⁵ Eckstein. p. 3. Here, Eckstein is citing Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome : 327-70 B.C.* as the most influential work on this theory.

⁴⁶ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 4.

⁴⁷ Eckstein. p. 205.

⁴⁸ Eckstein. p. 248.

After having established the political science framework for his analysis, but prior to analyzing the whole of the Mediterranean as a single system⁴⁹, Eckstein focuses the earlier parts of his book expanding on the various regional state systems. Starting with Classical Greece and the Aegean, followed by the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean, then Italy, and finally the western Mediterranean.⁵⁰ Eckstein argues that the anarchic state of the Mediterranean is due to the combination of the anarchy found in these regional state systems. However, in this state of anarchy, something must have prompted the Romans to intervene in the Greek east, the catalyst for the latter, according to Eckstein, hinges on the steady decline of Ptolemaic Egypt. Since early antiquity, Egypt has been a bedrock of regional stability, a fact exacerbated by Alexander's conquest. Per Eckstein, Alexander's death and the fragmentation of his empire, led to the creation of a multipolar Hellenistic system which hinged on a delicate balance of power between its units. A balance that collapsed after 207 BCE with the steady decline of Ptolemaic Egypt, prompting a "power-transition crisis". Citing Theodore Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*, Eckstein explains that the decline of Egypt led to increased bellicosity from Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III, the Seleucid king, against Egypt, culminating in a systemwide crisis that saw increased bellicosity from all its units; subsequently, prompting Greek city states to send embassies to Rome pleading for its intervention.⁵¹

Thus, herein lies a fundamental facet for my own work: the balance of power in Gaul, shifted throughout Caesar's campaigns, resulting in the collapse of the pre-existing system, and prompting a power-transition crisis.

In addition, the concepts of "Balancing" and "Bandwagoning" are tied to that of the balance of power. Eckstein explains that "Smaller states when confronted with the growing power of a potential hegemon have historically acted in one of two ways. Either such states have banded together, in the hope their combined power would create a new equilibrium of power against the larger state (classical balancing), or individual states have joined forces with the threatening hegemon, hoping to survive, or even to gain geopolitical advantage (political scientists term this

⁴⁹ which Eckstein does in Chapter 7 of his book thanks to Polybius.

⁵⁰ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 4.

⁵¹ Eckstein. p. 5.

“bandwagoning”)⁵². While this concept is important for this thesis, it is important to note that Political scientists analyze these concepts with modern states in mind. Thus, as is the case with many of these modern concepts of political science, they will need to be adapted and used with more flexibility in our study of ancient history.

Another key concept touched upon by Eckstein in his study, is the “permanence of war”. Having established that the realist approach believes in the pessimistic and unchanging nature of man, as well as its acknowledgements of the existence of a harsh interstate anarchy, war has remained a constant throughout human history. Indeed, Eckstein (by citing Waltz) argues that “war is normal” and appears as a natural consequence of the interstate anarchic system.⁵³ Moreover, Hannah Arendt, in her 1970 work *On Violence* explains that the principal reason for the permanence of war, is not due to the violent (or bellicose) nature of man, but rather simply because no alternative exists in international relations that could replace it as a final arbiter.⁵⁴ Thus, although warfare is a natural consequence of the anarchic nature of the international system, its importance as an unrivalled tool for the resolution of interstate disputes has made it a ubiquitous part of human and state interactions. Subsequently, Eckstein highlights the importance of warfare as a means for conflict resolution by arguing that Antiquity was devoid of forms of international law.⁵⁵

Despite the lack of international law in the ancient world, there existed informal customs that served to regulate interstate actions and diplomacy. The latter being especially true with regards to the Greek polities.⁵⁶ However, it is important to remember that informal customs are just that ... informal. Thus, implying that there are no means to enforce or assert these customs unto the units in the system. Furthermore, since the basis of these informal customs lies within a specific nation’s culture, no two nations possess the same protocols for war. What may seem barbaric to the Greeks,

⁵² Eckstein. p. 65-66. These concepts will be used throughout Chapter 2 and 3 when appropriate to help classify the Gallic tribes into these two categories with respect to Caesar’s interventions and the shifts in balance of power that followed.

⁵³ Eckstein. p. 22.

⁵⁴ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970). p. 5 and 8.

⁵⁵ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 37. Although our contemporary world has several means of conflict resolution without turning to the use of violence, the Roman interstate system lacked the sophisticated supranational organizations (like the United Nations) that enforce order (even if partially) on the systemic anarchy. However, it is important to note that in contempt of these modern means of pacific conflict resolution, Arendt’s claim regarding war as the ultimate arbiter remains true. Especially since, realists disregard these supranational organisations as being irrelevant since they have no real means of enforcing order to begin with.

⁵⁶ Eckstein. p. 39.

could be completely normal to the Assyrians. For example, Erskine (by citing Polybius⁵⁷) in his review of Eckstein's work highlights an instance where Greek interstate customs, were completely foreign to the unknowing Romans. When the Romans captured Aegina, the Greek prisoners subsequently requested that they might send ambassadors to friendly states in order to raise the traditionally required ransom money. However, this was met with complete confusion from the Romans. The Greeks had waged war against the Romans following their own customs, without understanding the consequences of surrendering to them. Having finally understood the conditions of the Roman *fides* (*deditio in fidem*) the Greek ambassadors explained that it was "neither just nor Greek".⁵⁸ In this instance, Erskine is referencing the events that took place in 191 BCE when the Romans conquered the Aetolian league, events that were reported to us thanks to the writings of Livy and Polybius.⁵⁹ This event is regularly cited when trying to demonstrate the differences in war customs between the Greeks and the Romans. Polybius himself used the incident between the Roman commander Glabrio and the Greek ambassadors to warn his fellow countrymen that *deditio in fidem* (surrender to faith) was the same in the eyes of the Romans as a complete and unconditional surrender.⁶⁰

Although some historians such as Erskine and Eckstein use this incident to strengthen the realist paradigm over the ancient Mediterranean, other authors such as Burton argue the exact opposite. The latter advances that the Roman rituals of surrender (*deditio in fidem*, *deditio in potestatem*, and *deditio in dicionem*) serve as evidence for the existence of normative international law.⁶¹ While the Aetolian incident certainly shows the nature of an unconditional surrender to Rome and is a prime example of the possible severity with which Roman commanders could exercise their power (referring to Glabrio almost enslaving the Greek delegation) Burton believes that we should focus

⁵⁷ Erskine is citing Polybius, *The Histories*, Book 9. 42. and 20. 10.

⁵⁸ Andrew Erskine, review of *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*, by A. M. Eckstein, *The Journal of Roman Studies* 98 (2008): 187–88.

⁵⁹ Titus Livius and Benjamin O. Foster, *Livy: In Fourteen Volumes. 10: Books 35 -37*, Reprinted, The Loeb Classical Library 172 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002). Book 36 and Polybius et al., *The Histories*, Second edition, vol. IV and V, Loeb Classical Library 128, 137, 138, 159, 160, 161 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010). Books 20. 9, 10, 11. and Book 21. 4, 5.

⁶⁰ Arthur M Eckstein, "Glabrio and the Aetolians: A Note on Deditio," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (1974-) 125 (1995): 271–89, <https://doi.org/10.2307/284356>. p. 271.

⁶¹ Paul J. Burton, 'Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman Republic: A Constructivist View', *The International History Review*, 31.2 (2009), p. 237.

on the mercy shown, rather than the punishment that could have occurred. Thus, using the latter as a case study to show the existence of a form of normative international law.

Since this thesis leans heavily on Eckstein's work, it is his and Erskine's points of view regarding this incident that will be used. Nevertheless, Burton's argument will be used to help strengthen Eckstein's own case that the Romans were not particularly bellicose or aggressive. Thus, indirectly reinforcing one of the main staples of Eckstein's argument: that Rome was "non-exceptional"⁶², that it was not an overly aggressive or bellicose state, and that it owed its success to its ability to adapt and assimilate other states into its own, rather than solely due to its warmongering. As a matter of fact, throughout Chapter 6 of his book, Eckstein demonstrates how Rome was a highly militarized state that existed in a highly militarized (and anarchic) environment. As a result, Rome was not exceptional in its militarism.⁶³

Why then did so many scholars emphasize Rome's brutality?⁶⁴ To that effect Eckstein argues that in the absence of international law, and without any means to enforce it, a reputation for bellicosity and brutality would help protect and enforce a unit's interests and survival in the system. Having a fierce reputation would work as a deterrent in the face of external aggression, serving an important political and strategic purpose by ensuring security. However, reputation can be a double-edged sword; due to its utility as a deterrent, an affront on a unit's honour or reputation would require immediate retaliation to preserve the latter's integrity and efficacy.⁶⁵ Thus, it is possible that the Romans cultivated their brutal reputation to give them an advantage in interstate affairs. Nevertheless, it will be important for me to observe the interactions during the surrender rituals between Caesar and the Gallic tribes he conquers as an additional means of demonstrating the viability of Eckstein's theory in Gaul. To that effect, while some Gallic war rites described throughout Caesar's commentaries were foreign to the Romans, and even exotic,⁶⁶ these rituals were unique to the Celts, and do not serve as the general rule. In fact, generally speaking, neither

⁶² Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 244.

⁶³ Eckstein. p. 244.

⁶⁴ See Eckstein. p. 197.

⁶⁵ Eckstein. p. 63.

⁶⁶ Enrique Garcia Riaza, "Le protocole diplomatique entre particularisme romain et universalisme: quelques réflexions sur l'Occident républicain," in *La diplomatie romaine sous la République: réflexions sur une pratique ; actes des rencontres de Paris (21 - 22 juin 2013) et Genève (31 octobre - 1er novembre 2013)*, ed. Barthélémy Grass, Ghislaine Stouder, and Institut des sciences et techniques de l'Antiquité, Institut des sciences et techniques de l'Antiquité (Rencontre, Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2015), 15–41. p. 23.

the Romans nor Greeks ever faced insurmountable obstacles during their diplomatic negotiations with the Celts. Thus, the unique symbolisms found in Celtic diplomatic rituals, although foreign to Caesar, should not have affected negotiations between the various parties. Quite to the contrary, most customs be it Celtic, Roman, or Greek, were shared between all the Mediterranean peoples, to the point of being culturally identifiable.⁶⁷

Moreover, the Roman rituals of surrender are essential for the scope of this study due to their importance in Roman interstate affairs. Indeed, Caesar mentions the words *fides* and *deditio* several times throughout his commentaries⁶⁸ highlighting the importance of these concepts. According to Bellini the concept of *fides* is founded on the concept of preeminent strength. The latter explains the relations between a superior entity and its subordinate, not as a result of judicial norms or abstract concepts, but rather because of a direct, physical superiority of the strong, and his ability to impose subordination unto the weak.⁶⁹ Although we often think of *fides* with regards to Roman international affairs, Bellini stresses the importance of this concept by showing Roman clientelism, one of Rome's most important institutions, as a direct consequence of one of the earliest forms of conceptualized *fides*.⁷⁰ These relations between patron and client that came to dominate Roman civil life and laws, was applied at an international level when Rome entered into *deditio* contracts (not necessarily *in fidem*) with other states. Thus, at its cores the *deditio* rituals maintain the strict relationships of subjugation between the superior and inferior parties, even when the surrender contracts were entered upon on a basis of equality. Per Bellini, cities would enter in a clientelist relationship with Rome and would therefore submit to Rome's orders as its patron but would receive in exchange two important guarantees: firstly, that the orders from the *patronus* would not be excessive or intolerable (*fraus*); secondly, that the client could rely on its patron's full protection.⁷¹ Furthermore, for the purposes of this thesis, Anthony-Marc Sanz's definition of the ritual whereby "any *deditio* which implies the surrender of a community and the whole of its elements (peoples, towns, territory, sacred goods) to the indiscriminate power of the conqueror

⁶⁷ Riaza. p. 37.

⁶⁸ Caesar mentions the word "*fides*" 38 times, and the word "*deditio*" 21 times in his commentaries.

⁶⁹ V. Bellini, "Deditio in Fidem," *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger* (1922-) 42 (1964): p. 449.

⁷⁰ Bellini. p. 450.

⁷¹ Bellini. p. 453-454.

must be understood as *in fide[m]*⁷² will be used as the *de facto* surrender ritual found throughout the *Bellum Gallicum*. A key characteristic of which is the requirement of the one being submitted to give out hostages and lay out their arms⁷³; which is something that occurs throughout the entirety of Caesar's commentaries subsequently allowing us to make these claims. Lastly, if the harshness of these rituals seems overbearing, it stands to mind that jurists equivocate the *deditio* rituals as a "self-destruction of rights"⁷⁴ helping to explain Rome's domination during these negotiations.

Although Burton disagrees with Eckstein's position regarding the Aetolian incident, both historians agree that ancient interstate behaviour was guided by common ground rules, taboos, and customs, which were embedded in sacred religious rituals to ensure their divine enforcement.⁷⁵ Even the concept of *fides* had "magical" origins that represented it as a "*flux de puissance*" which manifested itself on those who were submitted to it.⁷⁶ The magical, of course, being intimately correlated with religious practices in ancient antiquity, gives the latter an irrevocable religious binding nature. Indeed, both politics and religion are modern concepts that the Romans did not distinguish as separate entities. In fact, both were intertwined in the ancient world to the point where they were one and the same: the "*mos maiorum*". Thus, it is not surprising that ancient states regularly turned to the divine to enforce some form of international law. Simply put, the lack of any overarching authority to judge and mediate disputes between polities, requires the presence of divine safeguards.⁷⁷ To that effect the Romans could not break the *pax deorum* (peace of the gods) by waging an unjust war, lest they incur the wrath of the gods, stripping Rome of their protection.⁷⁸ Therefore, the Romans always took great care to ensure a *casus belli* was present to lead the proper waging of war: the *bellum iustum* (just war). Ironically, the Romans could justify all their wars thanks to their success. They argued that if their wars were unjust, the gods would not have allowed

⁷² Anthony-Marc Sanz, "La deditio: un acte diplomatique au coeur de la conquete romaine (fin du IIIe - fin du IIe siecle avant J.-C.)," in *La diplomatie romaine sous la République: réflexions sur une pratique ; actes des rencontres de Paris (21 - 22 juin 2013) et Genève (31 octobre - 1er novembre 2013)*, ed. Barthélémy Grass, Ghislaine Stouder, and Institut des sciences et techniques de l'Antiquité, Institut des sciences et techniques de l'Antiquité (Rencontre, Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2015), 87–105. p. 90.

⁷³ Sanz. p. 96.

⁷⁴ Sanz. p. 90.

⁷⁵ Burton, "Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman Republic." p. 240. and Eckstein. *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 40.

⁷⁶ Bellini, "Deditio in Fidem." p. 449.

⁷⁷ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 40.

⁷⁸ Burton, "Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman Republic." p. 241.

Rome to win so often. Thus, due to their cumulative success in battle, the Romans believed their own carefully crafted narrative of divine favour and the “just war”.⁷⁹

For Rome, war was a means to maintain the *status quo*, and ensure order was restored against those who had disrupted it.⁸⁰ However, war was not Rome’s first resort; the *rerum repetitio* was a means for Rome to seek peaceful resolutions to grievances they believed had been inflicted upon them (or their allies). Burton sees the *rerum repetitio* as a means of self-imposed self-restraint, granting the offending party thirty to thirty-three days to make amends, effectively acting as a “cooling-off” period designed to reduce the likelihood of war. However, if grievances were not remediated within the allocated time period, Rome would have a *casus belli* for its *bellum iustum* without breaching the *pax deorum*.⁸¹

For Burton, the *rerum repetitio* is an example of Roman mercy and self-restraint to help demonstrate the existence of normative international law, while on the other hand, for Eckstein the *rerum repetitio* is a clear example of what political scientists refer to as “compellence diplomacy”. The latter, as defined in international relations, pertains to the ability of a state to coerce another by giving it an ultimatum and threatening punishment.⁸² According to Eckstein, the *rerum repetitio* was usually rejected by the other state giving the Romans a sought-out pretext for their *bellum iustum*.⁸³

The concept of the “just war” is integral to my study, knowing that Roman generals could not wage an unjust war without incurring the wrath of the gods, or exposing themselves to criticism in Rome⁸⁴, it was thus imperative for them to justify their conquests and actions. Caesar was no exception; his political positions as a staunch *popularis*⁸⁵ during his consulship of 59 to 58 BCE had made him extremely unpopular in Rome. Despite his numerous military victories over the

⁷⁹ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 167.

⁸⁰ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 216.

⁸¹ Burton, “Ancient International Law, the Aetolian League, and the Ritual of Surrender during the Roman Republic.” p. 241.

⁸² Brian Duignan, “Compellence | International Relations,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 17, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/compellence>.

⁸³ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 217.

⁸⁴ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 163-164, and Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome : 327-70 B.C.* p. 166-175. Here, Harris delves into the history and evolutions of the Roman war declaration rituals.

⁸⁵ Meier, *Caesar*. p. 149, 185 and 206-207.

Gauls, his enemies in Rome regularly demanded he atoned for his “unjust war”; with some in the Senate even offering him up to the Germans for justice.⁸⁶ Despite vigorous opposition to his Gallic conquests in the Senate, Cicero regularly defended Caesar’s actions and established a precedent for preemptive or preventive wars as “just wars”.⁸⁷ As was mentioned earlier in this study, Rome had a systemic fear of the Gauls because of the trauma they had inflicted on her during their raid in 390 BCE. Over three hundred years later, this systemic fear was still prevalent in Rome, and was made obvious in Cicero’s *De Provinciis Consularibus* pronounced to the senate in 56 BCE, two years after the start of the *Bellum Gallicum*, which states:

“Gaius Caesar’s plans, I observe, have been far different. For he did not think that he ought to fight only against those whom he saw already in arms against the Roman People, but that the whole of Gaul should be brought under our sway, and so he has, with brilliant success, crushed in battle the fiercest and greatest tribes of Germania and Helvetia; the rest he has terrified, checked and subdued, and taught them to submit to the rule

of the Roman People. Over these regions and races, which no writings, no spoken word, no report had before made known to us, over them have our general, our soldiers, and the arms of the Roman People made their way. A mere path, Conscript Fathers, was the only part of Gaul that we held before; the rest was peopled by tribes who were either enemies of our rule or rebels against it, or by men unknown to us or known only as wild, savage and warlike—tribes which no one who ever lived would not wish to see crushed and subdued. From the very beginning of our Empire we have had no wise statesman who did not regard Gaul as the greatest danger to our Empire. But, owing to the might and numbers of those peoples, never before have we engaged in conflict with them as a whole. We have always withstood them whenever we have been challenged. Now at length we have reached the consummation that the limits of our Empire and of those lands are one and the same.

The Alps, not without the favour of heaven, were once raised high by nature as a rampart to Italy. For if that approach to our country had lain open to savage hordes of Gauls, never would this city have provided a home and chosen seat for sovereign rule. Let the Alps now sink in the earth! For there is nothing beyond those mountain peaks as far as the Ocean, of which Italy need stand in dread. Yet one or two summers, and fear or hope, punishment or rewards, arms or laws can bind the whole of Gaul to us with eternal fetters. But if we leave this work not

⁸⁶ Meier. p. 282.

⁸⁷ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 159-160.

rounded-off and in the rough, the power of Gaul, cut back though it may have been, will some day revive and burst forth anew into war."⁸⁸

In this passage Cicero explains that the Gauls, from the very earliest days of the Roman state, had been their greatest threat. The Alps had provided Rome with much needed protection against their aggression and barbarity; a protection, according to Cicero, that Rome no longer needed thanks to Caesar's subjugation of the Gauls. Although Cicero mentions Caesar's Gallic conquests, he does not attribute any aggressive or imperialistic terminology to it.⁸⁹ Quite to the contrary, Cicero justifies the *Bellum Gallicum* as a preemptive war, striking at a very real threat to Rome, before they can grow powerful enough to hurt her; thus, justifying it as a defensive war. However, it is important to note Cicero's rhetoric goal, and the reasons behind his support of Caesar in this speech. Grillo makes evident that Cicero willingly leaves out critical details in his oratory to push forward his *inventio*, an integral aspect of his argumentation. Grillo cautions the modern reader against the *inventio* and its selective truths as cause not to take Cicero at his word.⁹⁰ Furthermore, Steel argues that Cicero's presentation of Caesar (and his actions) is designed to show him as a dutiful public servant of Rome and of the Senate because of the orator's obligations towards the first

⁸⁸ Cicero *de provinciis consularibus* 32-34. "C. Caesare Imperatore gestum est, antea tantum modo repulsum. Semper illas nationes nostri Imperatores refutandas potius bello quam lacessandas putaverunt. Ipse ille C. Marius, cuius divina atque eximia virtus magnis populi Romani luctibus funeribusque subvenit, influentis in Italiam Gallorum maximas copias repressit, non ipse ad eorum urbes sedesque penetravit. Modo ille meorum laborum, periculorum, consiliorum socius, C. Pomptinus, fortissimus vir, ortum repente bellum Allobrogum atque hac scelerrata coniuratione excitatum proeliis fregit, eosque domuit, qui lacessierant, et ea victoria contentus re publica metu liberata quievit. C. Caesaris longe aliam video fuisse rationem. Non enim sibi solum cum iis, quos iam armatos contra populum Romanum videbat, bellandum esse duxit, sed totam Galliam in nostram dicionem esse redigendam. Itaque cum acerrimis Germanorum et Helvetiorum nationibus et maximis proeliis felicissime decertavit, ceteras conterruit, compulit, domuit, imperio populi Romani parere adsuefecit et, quas regiones quasque gentes nullas nobis antea litterae, nulla vox, nulla fama notas fecerat, has noster Imperator nosterque exercitus et populi Romani arma peragravit. Semitam tantum Galliae tenebamus antea, Patres conscripti; ceterae partes a gentibus aut inimicis huic imperio aut infidis aut incognitis aut certe immanibus et barbaris et bellicosis tenebantur; quas nationes nemo umquam fuit quin frangi domarique cuperet. Nemo sapienter de re publica nostra cogitavit iam inde a principio huius imperii, quin Galliam maxime timendam huic imperio putaret; sed propter vim ac multitudinem gentium illarum numquam est antea cum omnibus dimicatum; restitimus semper lacessati. Nunc denique est perfectum ut imperii nostri terrarumque illarum idem esset extremum. Alpibus Italiam munierat antea natura non sine aliquo divino numine. Nam, si ille aditus Gallorum immanitati multitudineque patuisset, numquam haec urbs summo imperio domicilium ac sedem praebuisset. Quam iam licet considant. Nihil est enim ultra altitudinem montium usque ad Oceanum, quod sit Italiae pertimescendum. Sed tamen una atque altera aestas vel metu vel spe vel poena vel praemiis vel armis vel legibus potest totam Galliam sempiternis vinculis adstringere. Impolitae vero res et acerbae si erunt relictas, quamquam sunt accisae, tamen efferent se aliquando et ad renovandum bellum revirescent." Text and translation taken from Marcus Tullius Cicero and R. Gardner, *Cicero: in twenty-eight volumes. 13: Pro Caelio*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 447 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005).

⁸⁹ For a contradicting opinion see Peter Rose, "Cicero and the Rhetoric of Imperialism: Putting the Politics Back into Political Rhetoric," *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 13, no. 4 (1995): 359-99.

⁹⁰ Luca Grillo, *Cicero's de Provinciis Consularibus Oratio* (Cary, UNITED STATES: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2015). p. 33-44.

triumvirate.⁹¹ Indeed, according to Steel, Cicero sought to advance his own political career (and that of his brother), which had weighed after his exile. As a result, Cicero was forced to serve the interest of the first triumvirate to advance his career.⁹² While it is obvious that Cicero had a political agenda behind his speech, this does remove from the fact that the Gauls remained a historical threat for the Romans on which a case for *bellum iustum* could be built upon.

In addition, Yakobson argues that Gaul, with all its past traumatic memories, made an easy target on which to justify Cicero's broadened definition of *bellum iustum*.⁹³ The latter's point is further made true by the fact that the Gauls had already caused *iniuria* to Rome through its past sacking. As such, the idea that a war is justified not only by past harm, but also by a potential future one⁹⁴, is critical to this study. Indeed, the idea that it was easier for Roman commanders to justify wars against certain peoples is an interesting argument that is highlighted by both Yakobson and Riggsby,⁹⁵ both of whom stress the ease with which Caesar could have justified his war against the Gauls due to both nations' tenuous past with each other. Because of the embedded religious dimension of warfare and of *bellum iustum*, ambitious generals had to find a way to justify their conquests beforehand taking into account what we would call today "religiously motivated concerns" ... Caesar included. However, given the importance of the *bellum iustum* for this study, this subject will be revisited and expanded upon in the third chapter of this thesis, due to the integral role it plays in the chapter's themes.

According to Meier, Caesar's wars in Gaul had long been premeditated and thus haven been an integral aspect of his overall ambitions. Indeed, historians such as Meier argue that his subjugation of all of Gaul "was intended from the start"⁹⁶. The latter argues that because of the legal limitations imposed on governors, including Caesar's own *lex repetundarum*, which forbade them from waging war on their own initiative, meant that military campaigns needed senatorial approval. Yet,

⁹¹ C. E. W. Steel, *Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire* (Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2002). p. 160.

⁹² Steel. p. 183-184.

⁹³ Alexander Yakobson in Claude Eilers, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World* (Leiden, NETHERLANDS: BRILL, 2008), p. 66. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umontreal-ebooks/detail.action?docID=468047>.

⁹⁴ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 170.

⁹⁵ Yakobson in Eilers, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World*. p. 66. And Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 162.

⁹⁶ Meier, *Caesar*. p. 235.

Caesar was able to wage war for seven years without this formal approval, taking the four legions that were provided for him by the state, and levying an additional six throughout his campaigns.⁹⁷ Meier attributes Caesar's extraordinary success to the year of his consulship which preceded his governorship of (*Gallia*) *Transalpina*. During the informal reign of the first triumvirate, Caesar as a consul had passed laws that made him extremely unpopular amongst Rome's senatorial elite, to the point where he faced prosecution at the end of said consulship. As such, thanks to Pompey and Crassus, Caesar had secured a governorship which granted him legal immunity to protect himself from prosecution. Originally, Caesar was supposed to obtain the governorship over Illyria. However, thanks to his cunning and political machinations, Caesar was able to obtain governorship over *Gallia Transalpina* instead. Meier believes Caesar specifically chose Gaul because it provided him with far greater opportunities for conquest: Indeed, since Ariovistus's arrival in Gaul, the shifting balance of power had been steadily increasing the tensions in the region, pushing it to war and giving Caesar his *casus belli*.⁹⁸ It is important to note that we rely solely on Caesar's commentaries for these facts with no other sources to corroborate these causalities. However, it stands to note, that the true cause of the *Bellum Gallicum* will be the migration of the *Helvetii* into Gaul to escape Germanic incursions. Since my thesis comes into direct contradiction with these arguments, as I will be arguing for Caesar's opportunism, rather than ambition, it is important to keep these facts in mind. Especially since Chapter 2 of my thesis will focus on the events of the *Bellum Gallicum* and analyze the causes of Caesar's interventions in Gaul; thus, making it crucial to cross-reference the arguments found in traditional historiography with those found in Eckstein's work and Lundestad's "Empire by invitation" theory.

⁹⁷ Meier. p. 236.

⁹⁸ Meier. p. 216.

2. Methodology

2.1 Sources

First and foremost, I will be using Caesar's *Commentarii De Bello Gallico* (BG) as my primary source and will be supplementing his commentaries with the works of other contemporary Latin writers such as Cato and Cicero, from whom we have many letters and speeches pertaining to the Gallic Wars. In addition, I will be relying on the specific expertise of several historians as secondary sources to help fill the gap of my analysis and provide supplementary evidence and information. That being said, it is important to note that Caesar's writings are notoriously filled with rhetoric and a personal agenda meant to justify his actions to his enemies in Rome, as well as convince his audience of his good deeds and intentions. And while it is important to keep these ulterior motives in mind when analysing Caesar's words, the lack of sources poses an unavoidable problem which Riggsby describes best: "It is by now notoriously difficult to confirm or refute anything Caesar says. There are few other sources for the Gallic War, and none can be shown to be substantially independent of Caesar's account. Consequently, even disagreement with Caesar may be more a sign of invention or error in the historical tradition than of independent testimony."⁹⁹ As a result, I will be using Caesar's narrative as the foundations to my work, while keeping in mind that Caesar was unaware of Eckstein's theory and could not have written with it in mind. While I acknowledge the presence of rhetoric and propaganda in Caesar's texts, his writings will still be taken at face value in order to make the necessary arguments to demonstrate the viability of Eckstein's model on a new theater of war. Nevertheless, I will point out whenever necessary, when episodes could also have an added propaganda value, and when passages seem highly rhetorically constructed to fit Caesar's own narrative.

Since my primary sources will be in Latin, I will rely on the English translations available in the Loeb Classical Library and comment on the Latin text whenever needed, or as suggested by specific commentaries and studies. Furthermore, since I will be studying Caesar's campaign in a new light, by leaning on the principles found in Eckstein's *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* it will be critical for me to follow the same reasoning outlined in this work to construct

⁹⁹ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 1.

my arguments. Although I have spent a great deal of this introduction explaining crucial political science concepts found in Eckstein's work that will be relevant to my own study; Eckstein builds his case using two central arguments: Firstly, that the Mediterranean was in state of constant warfare due to the systemic anarchy it found itself in. And secondly, that Roman ingenuity and flexibility in making allies and ensuring diplomatic ties with conquered peoples account for their widespread success. In addition, due to the modern connotations and definitions of some of the terminology I will be using throughout my thesis, it is important to define these words in this section as to avoid any future confusion. Indeed, throughout my thesis the word "state" will be used to help streamline its reading, but it is important not to confuse its use with our modern understanding of it. When mentioning the "state" I am not referring to a body of government with strict checks and balances that hold sovereignty over a specific territory, but rather, I will be using it as a substitution to the words "*civitates*, *oppidum*, *polis*, tribe, nation" and other such classical terms. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, throughout this thesis the word "unit" will be used to reference a *civitas*, a Gallic or Germanic tribe, or even Caesar's own army. Indeed, "unit" will be analogous with any entity that can be perceived as acting independently based on its own interests within the defined anarchic system, which in this instance, is the territory of Gaul.¹⁰⁰

2.2 Structure

As such, following Eckstein's example, I will be analyzing the *Bellum Gallicum* and dividing it into three distinct chapters:

The first chapter, entitled "The State of Gaul" will focus on the political, social, and military aspects of *Gallia* and explore whether the conditions for the successful application of Eckstein's model exist. It will offer an overview of the territory and its people while highlighting the systemic anarchy, permanence of war, and the pervasive bellicosity that defined it. The goal of this chapter is to draw correlations and similarities between Eckstein's analysis of the Greek *Polis* and Gaul's *oppida* and *civitates* in order to apply his model.

As such, to do so, I will be focusing on the Gallic mercenaries from their earliest known origins until their presence in the *Bellum Gallicum*. Indeed, the widespread presence of these soldiers of

¹⁰⁰ The word "unit" will be seen and used throughout this entire thesis as defined in this introduction.

fortune will help us establish that the territory of *Gallia* was subject to the permanence of war, and by default prone to the same systemic bellicosity as outlined by Eckstein for the wider Mediterranean system. Indeed, mercenaries are financially and logistically taxing for a state: in addition to being paid, they need to be fed and quartered; why then would a state bear the heavy burden of hiring mercenaries if their services were not required? Simply put, the heavy presence of mercenaries indicates a constant need for warriors with which to conduct regular war. For this, I will be relying heavily Luc Baray during this chapter who is a leading expert on Gallic mercenaries, and his works will be invaluable throughout the chapter.

After establishing the permanence of war, and the anarchic nature of the Gallic system, the second chapter will focus on the analysis of the *Bellum Gallicum* by summarizing Caesar's commentaries Book I through VII¹⁰¹ to show all the instances Caesar opportunistically intervened within the Gallic system through various *casus belli* and invitations. The chapter will follow how the Roman interventions progressively changed the balance of power in Gaul and forced its tribes to reorganize into bandwagoning and balancing states (or status quo and revisionist states), while Rome slowly ensured its position as the systemic hegemon by filling the power vacua left behind by its own interventions. It aims to distinctly show how Caesar used the pre-existing anarchy in the Gallic system to his advantage, by highlighting the specific instances of realist anarchy extrapolated from his commentaries.

Finally, the third chapter will draw from the conclusions of the previous chapters and will be divided into two distinct sections. Firstly, it will specifically study the applicability of Lundestad's "Empire by invitation" by studying all the instances within the *Bellum Gallicum* whereby Caesar was directly invited into the system by a revisionist state, in an attempt to change its own position and fortune within it. By acting selfishly, which is typical of units in a realist anarchy, the Gallic states inadvertently heralded their own downfall to the benefit of Rome.

Secondly, this chapter will study Caesar's use of diplomacy as an aggressive tool to further Rome's position, fuelling ever more bellicosity, and taking full advantage of the anarchic system he found himself in. This final chapter in combination with the previous ones will show that Gaul fits perfectly in Eckstein's geopolitical vision of the Mediterranean and will provide new light on the

¹⁰¹ Since Book VIII was authored by Aulus Hirtius, rather than by Caesar, and since I will not be taking any examples from it, we will not consider it in this study. However, for further details and context on the creation of Caesar's eighth book refer to Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 10.

possibility that Rome opportunistically conquered these expansive Celtic lands, instead of having done so through sheer aggressivity or ambition.

Chapter 1 – The State of Gaul

The Gauls were one of the Republic's most feared rivals, inflicting irrevocable trauma to the Roman people and instilling an endemic, if not pathological, fear of the Celts. This juggernaut of barbarity was perceived and rhetorically created as a shadow over Rome; an implacable reminder of insecurity. Yet, after 51 BCE, Gaul will become one of the Empire's most integrated provinces. Gaul's transition from dreaded adversary to docile subservience comes as a direct consequence of Caesar's conquests. Gaul's total subjugation and integration occurred so swiftly following the *Bellum Gallicum*, that shortly thereafter Gallic auxiliaries served as some of Caesar's best and most loyal troops throughout the *Bellum Civile*.¹⁰² As such, the consequences of Caesar's conquests are evident, but what of the state of Gaul prior to the *Bellum Gallicum*?

Moulded by the ancient sources and their stereotypes, Caesar's readers envisioned Gaul as a savage untamed land, teeming with wild forests, and inhabited by an equally savage people. With their long unwashed hair and thick moustaches, the proud and noble Gauls are bare-chested, sporting only their *Braccae* and *Torquis*. They personify the vicious barbarians, immortal enemies of Rome's invincible legions. Where the latter represent civilizational order, the former represents savagery and chaos. Although earlier classical scholarship undoubtedly romanticizes the *Bellum Gallicum* in our collective imaginations, the reality of things couldn't be further removed from the truth. As it stands, common preconceptions on the "barbarians", which often hold negative connotations, were a Greek construction mostly centred around Herodotus's writings used to mirror Greek society.¹⁰³ Indeed, Gruen affirms that Gallic stereotypes were circulated and well established long before Caesar's commentaries. Greek authors such as Polybius and Posidonius "tended to pick out the traits that would appeal to readers interested in the striking rather than the subtle", when writing their ethnographies to fulfill their agendas. This often meant that these authors would list

¹⁰² Jean-Pierre Br  thes "C  sar redessine l'espace gaulois." in Patrick Voisin and Marielle de B  chillon, eds., *L'espace Dans l'Antiquit  *, Collection Kubaba. S  rie Actes (Paris: L'Harmattan : Association Kubaba, Universit   de Paris I, 2015). p. 342-343.

¹⁰³ Thomas S. Schmidt, *Plutarque et Les Barbares: La Rh  torique d'une Image*, Collection d'  tudes Classiques, v. 14 (Louvain : Namur, Belgium: Editions Peeters ; Soci  t   des   tudes classiques, 1999). p. 4-5.

recurring traits that they attributed with the Celts, traits which were constantly reused and recycled.¹⁰⁴

1. Defining Gaul

1.1 Caesar's point of view

Caesar, in the opening sequence of his commentaries, gives the reader a brief description of Gaul:

“Gaul is a whole divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and a third by a people called in their own tongue Celtae, in the Latin Galli. All these are different from another in language, institutions, and laws. The Galli (Gauls) are separated from the Aquitani by the river Garonne, from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. Of all these peoples the Belgae are the most courageous, because they are farthest removed from the culture and the civilization of the Province, and least often visited by merchants introducing the commodities that make for effeminacy; and also because they are nearest to the Germans dwelling beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually at war. For this cause the Helvetii also excel the rest of the Gauls in valour, because they are struggling in almost daily fights with the Germans, either endeavouring to keep them out of Gallic territory or waging an aggressive warfare in German territory. The separate part of the country which, as has been said, is occupied by the Gauls, starts from the river Rhone, and is bounded by the river Garonne, the Ocean, and the territory of the Belgae; moreover on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, it touches the River Rhine; and its general trend is northward. The Belgae, beginning from the edge of the Gallic territory, reach to the lower part of the river Rhine, bearing towards the north and east. Aquitania, starting from the Garonne, reaches to the Pyrenees and to that part of the Ocean which is by Spain: its bearing is between west and north.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Erich S. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*, Third printing and first paperback printing, Martin Classical Lectures (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2012). p. 141.

¹⁰⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1.1.1. “*Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt. Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen, a Belgis Matrona et Sequana dividit. Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important, proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt. Eorum una, pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano, continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum, attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum, vergit ad septentriones. Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur, pertinent ad inferiorem partem fluminis Rheni, spectant in*

In this passage, Caesar describes that Gaul is divided into three parts inhabited by the Belgae, the Aquitani, and lastly by the Celts or Gauls as they were known to the Romans. Moreover, all three peoples are distinct in their language, customs, and laws. Each part of Gaul is encompassed by its own border in the form of rivers. According to Caesar, the Garonne separates the Gauls from the Aquitani; and the Marne and Seine separate the Gauls from the Belgae. By describing Gaul's basic geography to his reader, Caesar is setting the stage of his interventions.

However, Caesar's geographic delimitations of Gaul has sparked a debate among historians. Some historians such as Brèthes and Riggsby argue that Caesar artificially created the territory known as Gaul with its recognizable borders in modern France. For both authors, Caesar wanted to limit his conquests to a pre-defined territory, so he artificially set those limits himself and decided the Rhine and the Northern Sea marked Gaul's borders.¹⁰⁶ By defining the limits of the Gallic territory within a set of borders, something that the Celts knew nothing about, Caesar carefully created a pre-defined theatre of war.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, Brèthes argues that the Gauls, and by extension the Celts, did not view natural limits in the same way the Romans did. The latter saw them as implacable natural obstacles that could clearly mark and define a border; borders the Romans could not traverse. Yet, The Gauls regularly crossed borders into Britannia or even Germania to trade, deal, and even to attend gatherings in the case of the druids.¹⁰⁸ Finally, Brèthes argues that Caesar successfully redrew and redesigned Gaul and its borders as we know them today, and his vision of "Gaul" still fuels sentiments of French cultural identity, through their Gallo-Roman heritage.¹⁰⁹

Schadee takes Brèthes' argument one step further by explaining that Caesar purposefully kept his descriptions of Gaul ambiguous, void of any real geographic details bar using specific rivers as limits to make his conquests open-ended and allow him to choose when and how they would end.

septentrionem et orientem solem. Aquitania a Garumna flumine ad Pyrenaeos montes et eam partem Oceani quae est ad Hispaniam pertinet; spectat inter occasum solis et septentriones. Latin and English texts from Gaius Iulius Caesar and Henry J. Edwards, *Caesar: in three volumes. 1: The Gallic War*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 72 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004).

¹⁰⁶ Jean-Pierre Brèthes in Voisin and Béchillon, *L'espace Dans l'Antiquité*. p. 331. And Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 31.

¹⁰⁷ Jean-Pierre Brèthes in Voisin and Béchillon, *L'espace Dans l'Antiquité*. p. 330-343.

¹⁰⁸ Jean-Pierre Brèthes in Voisin and Béchillon. p. 331.

¹⁰⁹ Jean-Pierre Brèthes in Voisin and Béchillon. p. 342.

Thus, giving him complete control over his campaigns and their results.¹¹⁰ In addition, Schadee mentions that the “abundant archeological evidence” found around the Rhine shows great similarities between the people that lived on either side of its banks. Furthermore, by Caesar’s own accounts, the names of places on either side of the Rhine, except for the Suebi, are Celtic¹¹¹. As such, when we combine the archeological similarities and Caesar’s accounts, it becomes evident that both sides of the Rhine shared similar cultures and were by no means distinct societies as Caesar would have us believe in the opening statements of the *Bellum Gallicum*. This reinforces the idea that Caesar artificially created the borders of Gaul to clearly define the geographic scope of his conquests within pre-defined delimitations.

Nevertheless, these discussions spark a debate with regards to the context of creation of Caesar’s commentaries. There exists two different train of thoughts with regards to this issue: the first which suggests that the *Bellum Gallicum* was written after the fact as a single cohesive piece of literary work, while the second suggests instead that it was written episodically in the winters at the end of each campaign. Christina S. Kraus, by comparing the cohesive nature of the *Bellum Gallicum* versus the incohesive *Bellum Civile*, argues that Caesar’s commentaries were written as a single entity after the fact. Moreover, she leans on the nature of the latin word *commentarii* when refering to Caesar’s work and how for the Romans *commentarii* included several genres spanning from philosophical treaties, to memoirs.¹¹² On the other hand, authors such as Riggsby, Welch, and Wisemann, argue for the theory of “serial composition” whereby Caesar wrote the BG episodically (perhaps during the winter) after each campaign.¹¹³ While Riggsby covers both sides of the argument, he makes a compelling case for serial composition, one which I am inclined to agree with. I believe the BG was written episodically (not necessarily as senatorial reports) after each campaign, with the possibility of it having been re-edited at the end into a final version. Thus, if one adheres to the theory of serial composition for the BG, it stands to reason that Caesar purposefully wrote his description delimiting Gaul in his first book, meaning that he felt it was

¹¹⁰ Hester Schadee, “Caesar’s Construction of Northern Europe: Inquiry, Contact and Corruption in ‘De Bello Gallico,’” *The Classical Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (2008): 158–80. p. 159.

¹¹¹ Schadee. p. 162.

¹¹² Christina S. Kraus, “Bellum Gallicum,” Wiley Online Library (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, May 5, 2009), <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444308440.ch12>. p. 160.

¹¹³ For more on this topic see Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 9–11. Riggsby outlines here the main proponents, and their arguments, for both sides of the debate.

important enough to geographically delimit this territory before starting with the rest of his narration. Ultimately, giving more credence to the strategic and political motivations of doing so, as outlined in the previous paragraphs.

While Caesar's description of Gaul is certainly helpful in setting the stage for his *Bellum Gallicum*, it does not reflect the realities of the Gallic territory at the time of his interventions and oversimplifies the complex and vast territory we now conceive as Gaul. As we have seen, Caesar purposefully pre-defined the territory within strict parameters, differentiating between *Gallia* and *Germania* in order to set limits to his campaigns which would allow him to complete his goal. Although Caesar did in fact break these limits by invading both *Germania* and *Britannia*, these excursions were short-lived and were not the focus of his campaigns. It is important to consider these artificial limits set by Caesar to keep in mind the goal of his rhetoric and narrative for his intended audience. Nevertheless, it is important to note that even if Caesar writings are our only source on the Gallic Wars, a fact we should be weary about when using him as a primary source, He remains the utmost authority on these peoples in ancient sources, even by the standards of scholars such as Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Cassius Dio, all of whom, were very familiar with Caesar's writings, yet none of them went deeper into the subject.¹¹⁴ So, while Caesar's descriptions of Gaul are useful, it will still be important for my thesis that I establish the presence of an anarchic system prior to his arrival. To do so, we must delve into a deeper analysis of the Gallic system and its realities.

Meier offers an alternate summarized state of Gaul in his biography on Caesar where he states (by quoting Caesar) that the various Gallic tribes were organized by a loose affinity based on a common language and religion.¹¹⁵ This claim does not weaken the overall argument for the presence of anarchy in the Gallic system. Indeed, the Hellenistic polities that are at the heart of Eckstein's study all shared a common culture, language, and religion. Yet, these factors did not prevent Eckstein from establishing the presence of anarchy in the Mediterranean system. To that effect, he mentions the annual druidic meeting in the heart of Gaul where many disputes were settled. A gathering of the Druids would not be possible if the Gallic tribes were completely distinct from one another and

¹¹⁴ Thomas S. Burns, "Chapter 3: Through Caesar's Eyes," in *Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B.C.-A.D. 400*, Ancient Society and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 88–139. p. 138.

¹¹⁵ Meier, *Caesar*. p. 237-238.

without a shared culture.¹¹⁶ Moreover, Gaul was often unstable and in a state of unrest. Wars between local tribes were commonplace, with the whole Gallic system sometimes being disturbed by external forces from beyond the Rhine. Germanic peoples often crossed the Rhine for both conquests and raids, as was the case when the Helvetians were prompted to leave their lands because of such incursions.¹¹⁷ Yet, according to Meier, these still rarely influenced the system as a whole. Gallic tribes who bordered the Roman provinces, such as the Aedui, could gain special favour with Rome and often became a regional hegemon. In turn, this would cause rivalries among other tribes who would turn to the Germans for help, further destabilizing the system.¹¹⁸ As such, Gaul was far from an isolated region free from external influences that Caesar completely destabilized. Quite to the contrary, Gaul's system was heavily influenced by the North, East, and South, as units¹¹⁹ within its system vied for more power and control; often inviting external units to do so.

1.2 Gaul's Civitates

Meier's description of Gaul helps us draw general guidelines of the Gallic system. However, to gain a better understanding of Gallic society and its territory we refer to the works of Le Bohec, Brunaux, Buchsenschutz, and most notably Luc Baray. The latter is the *de facto* expert on all things pertaining to Celtic society and Celtic mercenaries. In fact, he is one of the rare authors who so heavily specialized on the topic of Gallic mercenaries and as a result his works will be predominantly cited in this Chapter, while also weaving in other scholars whenever possible. Although I acknowledge the deficiencies of leaning so heavily on a single scholar, the fact that he is one of the only authors to write about these topics forces me to rely so heavily on him. Nevertheless, his general theses are widely accepted by the historiographical community, allowing me liberal use of his works.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Meier. p. 238.

¹¹⁷ See Chapter 2.

¹¹⁸ Meier, *Caesar*. p. 238.

¹¹⁹ This term was defined in the Introduction and we will continue using it as such. See page 35.

¹²⁰ No book reviews for Baray's works were found bar for *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, mercenaires de l'Antiquité: représentation, recrutement, organization*. None of these reviews criticize Baray's work, but instead commend his efforts. As such, the lack of critical reviews leads us to safely assume that his theses are accepted by the historical community. Refer to the following reviews for more information on Baray's works: Uiran Gebara da Silva, review of *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, mercenaires de l'Antiquité: représentation, recrutement, organisation.*, by Luc Baray,

Contrarily to ancient literary sources, the Gallic *civitates* were structured and well-organized, far removed from the common myth of barbarians living in forests. Archeological evidence points to the presence of innumerable political units (named *civitates* in our Latin sources) spread throughout the whole Gallic territory. These “states” were further divided into *pagi* and *cantons*, territorial units that served political, religious, social, and economic purposes.¹²¹ Finally, the latter were further divided into *partes* showing the complexity of Gaul’s territorial organization.¹²²

Indeed, the presence of this widespread territorial organization around the central entity of the *civitas* serves as evidence for a generalized phenomenon of urbanization throughout the entirety of Gaul. According to Buchsenschutz, this phenomenon began two or three generations before Caesar’s conquest of the territory.¹²³ Buchsenschutz highlights Gaul’s urbanization in three phases: the development of what he refers to as “artisanal agglomerations” in the 2nd century BCE, the development of *oppida* near the end of the 2nd century and the start of the 1st century BCE, and finally, following the *Bellum Gallicum*, the Romanization of the Gallic urban landscape.¹²⁴

However, while Buchsenschutz speaks of Gallic urbanization, to be able to use Eckstein’s model in this thesis, it is imperative to demonstrate the likeness of Gallic cities, to that of the Greco-Roman world. Otherwise, Eckstein’s model which hinges on the Greek polities cannot be successfully transferred unto Gaul. To that effect, I refer to Arjan Zuiderhoek’s *The Ancient City* whereby he outlines the most distinctive features of Greek and Roman cities.¹²⁵ To do so, Zuiderhoek had to go through the tedious task of attempting to define what a city is, demonstrating the convoluted and complex nature of this question which “neither geographers nor sociologists nor historians have succeeded in agreeing on a definition”¹²⁶. Ultimately, by using concepts of

Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2017 (no pagination). And Leonhard A. Burckhardt, “Luc Baray, Celtes, Galates et Gaulois. Mercenaires de l’Antiquité. Représentation, Recrutement, Organisation. Paris, Editions Picard 2017,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 307, no. 3 (2018): 782–83.

¹²¹ Olivier Buchsenschutz, ed., *L’Europe Celtique à l’Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*, 2e édition, Nouvelle Clio (Paris: PUF, 2015). p. 355.

¹²² Yann Le Bohec, *Peuples et fédérations en Gaule (58-51 avant J.-C): lecture socio-juridique du Bellum Gallicum*, De l’archéologie à l’histoire (Paris: De Boccard, 2009). p. 19.

¹²³ Buchsenschutz, *L’Europe Celtique à l’Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 308.

¹²⁴ Buchsenschutz. p. 303.

¹²⁵ Arjan Zuiderhoek, *The Ancient City*, Key Themes in Ancient History (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017). p. 2.

¹²⁶ M. I. Finley, “The Ancient City: From Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, no. 3 (1977): 305–27. p. 307.

urbanism, Zuiderhoek used two distinct strategies to help define a “city”. The first was employed by Mogens Herman Hansen that focuses on settlements that the Greeks (and Romans) themselves considered to be “*poleis*” (or *civitates*, *municipia*, *coloniae*, and for the purposes of this thesis *oppidum*) as a qualifying factor. And the second strategy was used by Glenn R. Storey who regarded cities as “those places which are considered to be cities by the majority of specialist scholars who study them, even if such sites may not look like a city according to our modern standards”.¹²⁷ In other words, for me to apply Eckstein’s model to Gaul, by demonstrating the similarity of their cities to that of its Mediterranean counterparts, their cities must be considered cities by both their contemporaries and modern scholars. For the first, Caesar amply refers to Gaul’s urban centers using familiar Roman terminologies such as “*civitates*” and “*oppidum*” providing evidence that these settlements were familiar enough to Caesar for him to consider them cities. This fact is reinforced by the numerous Greek and Roman authors who used similar terminology and their own familiar social constructs to help define Gaul’s. Secondly, historians such as Brunaux, Buchsenschutz, openly refer to Gallic urbanization, while also using Caesar’s terminology. This fact provides sufficient evidence that modern scholars mostly view the Gallic “*civitates*” or “*oppidum*” as cities in their own right, allowing us to infer that these cities were in-line with the standards of the other Mediterranean city-states, therefore, allowing us to use Eckstein’s model for this study. However, it is important to note that Caesar was writing for a Latin audience, and in order to make his analogies clearer to better convey his message, he compared Gallic institutions with the Roman ones. Caesar is using literal translations and comparability to help explain foreign concepts at the expense of accuracy. Essentially, Caesar was describing Gaul and its people, in a way that his Roman audience could easily understand.¹²⁸

Additionally, Brunaux notes that the first *civitates* were likely built near, or around, existing trade routes that spanned the Gallic territory. He explains that the Greek colony of Massilia (modern day Marseille) had an effect on the Gauls, opening their world to Mediterranean trade.¹²⁹ The importance of trade for the Gallic economy is exacerbated by the development of a Gallic writing

¹²⁷ Zuiderhoek, *The Ancient City*. p. 8. Taken from Glenn Reed Storey, “Introduction: Urban Demography of the Past,” in *Urbanism in the Preindustrial World: Cross-Cultural Approaches* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), p. 2.

¹²⁸ Burns, “Chapter 3: Through Caesar’s Eyes.” p. 99.

¹²⁹ Jean-Louis Brunaux, *Les Celtes: histoire d’un mythe*, 2017. p. 118.

system. According to Buchsenschutz, the Celts began writing by borrowing systems from their Mediterranean neighbours¹³⁰. Subsequently, the Gauls continued to develop their own writing system because of its clear advantages as an economic tool, facilitating calculus, stock management, and archival upkeeping.¹³¹ Indeed, the historic link between writing and economy is well founded considering the earliest archeological evidence of writing found were cuneiform actuarial clay slabs. Just like in Mesopotamia, the development of a Celtic writing system hints at a larger Celtic civilizational effort. Thus, the creation of a writing system as a result of contact with the broader Mediterranean community is proof of Gallic adaptability; a trait that is highlighted by Brunaux.¹³² As such, the combination of a vibrant urban landscape, and the presence of international trade, marks the Gauls as having a surprising developed civilization by Caesar's age.

While Brunaux argues that trade and commerce were the driving forces behind Gaul's urbanization¹³³, the phenomenon was not limited to the latter's territory, but in fact, was part of a larger movement that spanned the entirety of the Celtic world; from Britain to the Danube.¹³⁴ This was only possible thanks to a period of great Celtic innovation, which included Gaul, which facilitated the mass production of the required materials to build these *oppida*.¹³⁵ Moreover, the Gallic engineers were particularly talented, being able to construct massive walls and gates, the *muris gallicis* which was present in all Gallic cities, even in smaller ones¹³⁶. This *muris gallicis* was so massive in scale that it even impressed Roman engineers.¹³⁷ However, Buchsenschutz claims that it was not designed to protect the *oppidum*, but rather simply to impress visitors and outsiders. Indeed, throughout the Gallic Wars, some Gallic nations preferred to abandon the bulk of their cities, opting to retreat and hold out only in those that possessed exceptional natural defences such as marshes, swamps, and steep hills.¹³⁸

¹³⁰ Buchsenschutz, *L'Europe Celtique à l'Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 318.

¹³¹ Buchsenschutz. p. 319.

¹³² Brunaux, *Les Celtes*, 112–13.

¹³³ Brunaux, *Les Celtes*. p. 118.

¹³⁴ Buchsenschutz, *L'Europe Celtique à l'Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 311-312.

¹³⁵ Buchsenschutz. p. 312.

¹³⁶ Le Bohec, *Peuples et fédérations en Gaule (58-51 avant J.-C)*. p. 20.

¹³⁷ Buchsenschutz, *L'Europe Celtique à l'Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 310.

¹³⁸ Buchsenschutz. p. 314-315. In his campaign against the Nervii Caesar had to fight them through marshes and swamps, while both Gergovia and Alesia, were cities built on steep hills.

Using their own city-states as models, Greek and Roman authors describe a Gallic political organization that was eerily similar to Rome's. Both Buchsenschutz and Le Bohec note the presence of a ruling political elite, or *nobilitas*¹³⁹, that shared many similarities with Rome's own senatorial elite. This *nobilitas* also referred to as knights, considered themselves first and foremost as warriors.¹⁴⁰ Displaying the importance of warrior culture and warfare for the Gallic peoples. Gallic political organization was structured around two political assemblies: a senate, which housed representatives of the aristocratic elite, and a second popular assembly open to everyone. The latter would only be summoned in cases where major decisions were needed, involving the whole population, such as wars or migrations.¹⁴¹ While the Senate and popular assembly held legislative power, executive power was beholden to a king, or Vergobret, depending on the *civitas*. The Vergobret was an elected magistrate, akin to the Roman consul, who would hold office for a limited duration, and was never referred to as *rex*.¹⁴² The Vergobret was not the only magistrate that we know of; with several others having been identified. The *argantodannos* (magistrate responsible for the emission of currencies), the *cassidannos* (corporate treasurer), *platiodannos* (officer in charge of places whose function remains unknown to us) are a few examples of magistrates that have been identified thanks to numismatics.¹⁴³ Starkly, Caesar describes a different Gallic reality in his commentaries; whereby a bipolar society was dominated by an aristocratic elite that ruled over a "plebeian" populace that were hardly distinguishable from slaves. The latter were bound to a chief by a clientelist relationship which created *factiones*, or influence groups, which had a divisive effect on the community.¹⁴⁴ Caesar wanted to show to his audience the lack of unity in the Gallic world,

According to Caesar, the territory he called "Gaul", was divided between sixty different tribes with most of its population living a rural lifestyle; a fact that is shared by all pre-industrial societies.¹⁴⁵ Archeological evidence suggests that there were forms of organized land ownership, however, due to the lack of written sources it is impossible to determine its modality.¹⁴⁶ Moreover,

¹³⁹ Le Bohec, *Peuples et fédérations en Gaule (58-51 avant J.-C.)*. p. 13.

¹⁴⁰ Buchsenschutz, *L'Europe Celtique à l'Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 222.

¹⁴¹ Buchsenschutz. p. 356.

¹⁴² Buchsenschutz. p. 356. And Le Bohec, *Peuples et fédérations en Gaule (58-51 avant J.-C.)*. p. 15.

¹⁴³ Buchsenschutz, *L'Europe Celtique à l'Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 357.

¹⁴⁴ Buchsenschutz. p. 354.

¹⁴⁵ Buchsenschutz. p. 352 and 355.

¹⁴⁶ Buchsenschutz. p. 355.

it is estimated that between five and twenty million Gauls inhabited the territory at the time of Caesar's conquests¹⁴⁷. As such, archeological evidence corroborates the population estimates Caesar presents in his commentaries. While these numbers are still theoretical, they don't seem to be exaggerated, and remain firmly within the realm of possibility and believability.¹⁴⁸ In other words, they are realistic, further highlighting the credibility of Caesar's writings as a primary source for historians.

1.3 Gallic Warfare

The last aspect of the state of Gaul that I would like to touch upon is the proverbial Gallic proclivity for war and the surrounding myth of their warrior culture. Brunaux mentions that Plato and Aristotle recognized that the Gauls were exceptional warriors, who honed their combat abilities through incessant warfare.¹⁴⁹ Gallic mercenaries were employed throughout the Mediterranean dating as far back as the 5th century BCE.¹⁵⁰ The earliest mention of Celtic mercenaries comes in 480 BCE, when an army of 30,000 international soldiers, led by the Carthaginian Hamilcar¹⁵¹, included Mediterranean Celts. Since Hamilcar was reported to have recruited these men personally, Brunaux believes that the Carthaginians may have been the first to have exposed the Celtic peoples to this form of military endeavours.¹⁵² Subsequently, the Gallic proclivity to being mercenaries was exacerbated by Massilia's need to defend itself; with the latter eventually serving as a broker and intermediary between the Gallic mercenaries and their prospective clients. These activities as soldiers of fortune led the Gauls to gain international renown and notoriety as fierce warriors and combatants.¹⁵³ With Cato the Elder even saying that "the Gauls very actively cultivated two things: the military art, and oratory ability"¹⁵⁴. However, how were the Gauls able to field large contingents of mercenaries to fulfill the warfare requirements of the ancient Mediterranean?

¹⁴⁷ Buchsenschutz. p. 353.

¹⁴⁸ Buchsenschutz. p. 352-353

¹⁴⁹ While this is a stereotype advanced by the ancient authors, there is enough evidence for this claim to be plausible considering their recruitment as mercenaries, shock troops, and given the permanence of war in Gaul.

¹⁵⁰ Brunaux, *Les Celtes*. p. 112.

¹⁵¹ Hamilcar I of Carthage (510-480 BCE).

¹⁵² Brunaux, *Les Celtes*. p. 114.

¹⁵³ Brunaux. p. 115.

¹⁵⁴ Cato, *Origines*, Book 2. 34. 1. "*Pleraque Gallia duas res industriosissime persequitur, rem militarem et argute loqui*". Caton l'Ancien and Martine Chassignet, *Les origines fragments*, Collection des universités de France, 0184-7155 ; 277 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1986), <http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb349103742>.

Brunaux argues that the only possible way for the Gauls to have served so prominently as mercenaries was to have a budding State apparatus complex enough to support them. The state of Gallic mercenarism, presupposes that the Gallic *civitates* would have had the ability to field an armed force three to four times larger than its mercenary force in order to ensure its own protection and survival. Such an army requires an apparatus capable of sustaining its efforts i.e., a state with sufficient resources and infrastructure to arm, feed, and house its army.¹⁵⁵ Given all the previous territorial, political, and demographic information that we have seen regarding Gallic society prior to Caesar's invasion. It becomes evident that Brunaux's supposition is entirely plausible and that the Gauls did in fact possess a sufficiently complex state apparatus capable of supporting and fielding such large mercenary groups.

So, prior to Caesar's conquests, Gaul was a complex multi-faceted society, with economic and military links to the greater Mediterranean system. But did Caesar violently put an end to a flowering Gallic civilization? Or did his conquests allow for the Gallic culture to adapt and evolve?

There exists a disagreement between Le Bohec and Buchsenschutz on the effects of Caesar's invasion on Gallic society. The former argues that Caesar put a clear end to a culture that was in full mutation and evolution.¹⁵⁶ The Gauls were beginning to create their own identity and society through an expanded urbanization. Brunaux indirectly reinforces Le Bohec's position by stating that the Gauls, just like the Romans, had learned from their contacts with the Etruscans and Greeks (Massilia), transferring aspects of their culture into their own but adapting and transforming it. The result is a distinct Gallic culture that is demonstrated through Gallic art.¹⁵⁷

On the other hand, Buchsenschutz argues that the urbanization movement in Gaul was a point of continuity of the post-Roman invasion. It acted as a catalyst for their Romanization and integration into the Empire explaining the rapid shift from dreaded rival to subservient province. The *oppida* allowed for the rapid integration of Roman customs in Gaul and allowed the Gauls to continue their urbanization by following the Roman example. Moreover, Buchsenschutz argues that through

¹⁵⁵ Brunaux, *Les Celtes*. p. 116. And Diodorus of Sicily, *Biblioteca historica*, Book XI. 20. Taken from Diodorus, *Diodorus of Sicily: in twelve volumes. 4: The library of history books IX - XII*, 40, Nachdr., The Loeb classical library 375 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007).

¹⁵⁶ Le Bohec, *Peuples et fédérations en Gaule (58-51 avant J.-C.)*. p. 38.

¹⁵⁷ Brunaux, *Les Celtes*. p. 113.

Romanization, the Gallic elite and urban population willingly Romanized and were free to continue the construction of their *murus gallicus*, to mint coins, and develop their artisanal workshops. In other words, free to continue the natural phenomenon of creating a distinct culture which began prior to the Roman conquest.¹⁵⁸ While this debate is interesting, it is beyond the scope of my thesis and I will not be exploring it further. Regardless, it was important to acknowledge its existence as a point of contention among historians.

1.4 Germania

Having discussed the realities of the Gallic territory prior to Caesar's conquests, we are left with the question of Germania because of its importance in the *Bellum Gallicum*. Germania and its people play a pivotal role within the scope of this thesis as they actively shaped the geopolitical realities of the Gallic system, provided Caesar with countless *casus belli*, and participated in the conflicts as mercenaries for both sides. Were the Germans truly a different people from the Gauls, or did Caesar artificially divide them into a distinct *ethnos*, as was the case with the territory, in order to advance his own proclivities?

Christopher B. Krebs in his article "Borealism: Caesar, Seneca, Tacitus, and the Roman discourse about the Germanic north" compares Tacitus's *Germani* with Caesar's. Krebs mentions that Rome's conceptions and understanding of Germania, and its people, was heavily influenced by Caesar's commentaries.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, the Roman and Greek worlds did not differentiate between the Celts and the Germans and their respective territories. Particularly, Caesar's conceptions of the Celts were heavily influenced by Posidonius' ethnographies.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the word "*Germani*"

¹⁵⁸ Buchsenschutz, *L'Europe Celtique à l'Âge Du Fer (VIIIe-Ier Siècles)*. p. 315.

¹⁵⁹ Christopher B. Krebs, "Borealism : Caesar, Seneca, Tacitus, and the Roman Discourse about the Germanic North," in *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean*, ed. Erich S. Gruen, Issues & Debates (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2010), p. 202.

¹⁶⁰ There exists a debate among historians as to whether or not Caesar was aware of Posidonius' writings prior to writing his own ethnography. To that effect, see Jonathan Barlow, "Noble Gauls and Their Other in Caesar's Propaganda," in *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter, The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (Classical Press of Wales, 2009), 139–70 and J. J. Tierney, "The Celtic Ethnography of Posidonius," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 60 (1959): 189–275. who argue that Caesar wasn't a pupil of the Greek writer. While on the other hand, see Josiah Osgood, "The Pen and the Sword: Writing and Conquest in Caesar's Gaul," *Classical Antiquity* 28, no. 2 (2009): 328–58, and Daphne Nash, "Reconstructing Poseidonios' Celtic Ethnography: Some Considerations," *Britannia* 7 (1976): 111–26. who argue that it was unlikely that Caesar was not familiar with Posidonius' writings given his Greek education.

first appears in Caesar's commentaries, leaving Isaac to claim the Greco-Roman world was "hardly or not at all aware of the existence of the Germans".¹⁶¹ Thus, just as was the case with the artificial division of the Gallic territory, it was Caesar's ethnography in his commentaries¹⁶² that artificially separated the Germans from the Celts (hence why Tacitus refers to Caesar as "*primus inventor Germaniae*"¹⁶³). Krebs makes it clear that prior to Caesar's ethnographic study of the Germans, they were considered Celts. Caesar divided the Germans into a separate *ethnos* to better serve his political interests. If *Germania* was considered Celtic, then Rome would consider Caesar's conquest of Gaul incomplete. By clearly separating the two cultures as distinct *ethnos*, Caesar had a better claim towards his completed objective.¹⁶⁴ In addition, Caesar recognized that the nomadic nature of the *Germani* would make them nigh impossible to conquer.¹⁶⁵ In his commentaries, Caesar describes the Suebi as unknown, but also as unknowable. He later transfers this sentiment from the Suebi to the whole of *Germania*. By making *Germania* unknowable, it becomes incorruptible, if it is incorruptible, it becomes unconquerable.¹⁶⁶ As such, Caesar constructed the Germanic *ethnos*, while also keeping it shrouded in mystery (a mystery which would help make *Germania* unconquerable, and therefore, further justify Caesar's choice in stopping his conquests with Gaul and the Rhine).

While Caesar may have separated the Gauls from the Germans for political and military reasons, it does not mean that he was wrong in assuming that they were different peoples. Although archeological evidence mentioned by Schadee points to tribes on the German side of the Rhine being Celtic in culture, it does not refute the fact that many cultural, political, and social differences existed between the Celts and Germans. Nevertheless, despite Caesar wanting to show the Rhine as a cultural barrier between two *ethnos*, in reality it was a mixed bed of cultures between the Germans and the Celts. "A transition zone in which lifestyles and peoples merged around shared topographic features" where the cultural cleavage between civility and barbarism could be seen

¹⁶¹ Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, 4. print., and 1. paperback print, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006). p. 411 and 427.

¹⁶² See book 6 of Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*.

¹⁶³ Christopher B. Krebs, "Borealism : Caesar, Seneca, Tacitus, and the Roman Discourse about the Germanic North." p. 203.

¹⁶⁴ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 68-70.

¹⁶⁵ Riggsby. p. 69-70.

¹⁶⁶ Schadee, "Caesar's Construction of Northern Europe: Inquiry, Contact and Corruption in 'De Bello Gallico.'" p. 168-169.

along the middle Rhine through the presence of life in *oppida*, or by the revealing nature of their absence.¹⁶⁷

In the space we call Gaul, we find many proto-urban centers (*Oppida*) governed by magistrates and councils, it used currency, possessed religious institutions and a pantheon of gods. It began integrating into the wider Mediterranean system through trade and was showing signs of increased artisanal production centers to meet the growing demand for Gallic products. All things were pointing towards Gaul steadily becoming an important actor in the Mediterranean system. On the other hand, Caesar's writings, and descriptions of the *Germani* try and convince us that they were the polar opposite of the Gauls and Celts. That they were nomadic, with no signs of urbanization, had no religious authority, worshipping the primal elements instead (sun, moon, etc.). That they had a strong sense of individualism and liberty; from boyhood doing "nothing whatever against their wish"¹⁶⁸. While still being surprisingly disciplined soldiers, with every aspect of their society aimed at making them better warriors.¹⁶⁹ They believed agricultural, and sedentary life weakened the warrior; hence they preferred a nomadic lifestyle, that kept them constantly moving and hunting, improving their endurance.¹⁷⁰ For the same reason, the Germans disallowed the import of wine and limited the presence of traders.¹⁷¹

However, the truth about Germania is far more complex than what Caesar describes. Firstly, the south of Germany is referred to by scholars as the "*oppida*" region where archeological evidence focused settlements highlights that these polities clearly existed beyond the boundaries of the Rhine. In addition to the existence of these fortified settlements, there existed open settlements with an industrial character, and smaller enclosed farmsteads referred to as "*Viereckschanzen*". Furthermore, what the region called "*Mittelgebirge*" by German scholarship, situated between the northern lowlands and southern Germany constituted a contact zone between the northern Germanic cultures, and the cultures of the Celts. As such, while southern Germany provides a plethora of archeological evidence through these settlements, northern Germany is a different story

¹⁶⁷ Burns, "Chapter 3: Through Caesar's Eyes." p. 137.

¹⁶⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 1-2.

¹⁶⁹ Christopher B. Krebs, "Borealism : Caesar, Seneca, Tacitus, and the Roman Discourse about the Germanic North." p. 201.

¹⁷⁰ Christopher B. Krebs. p. 206.

¹⁷¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 2. 6. "Vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur."

with settlements being extremely rare and archeological evidence mostly found thanks to cemeteries. Regardless, the archeological evidence in Germany shows that the territory known as *Germania* was far more complicated in nature, and that the Rhine did not act as a barrier between the Celtic and Germanic cultures with clear exchanges and intermingling occurring.¹⁷²

1.5 Revolutions and Oppida

The realities of the Celtic world prior to Caesar's interventions were more convoluted than traditional historiography would have us believe. It has already been mentioned that Gaul was in the midst of a revolution that was affecting every aspect of their civilization. But what are the details of these revolutions and their consequences with regards to the Gallic civilization before and after Caesar's interventions? Luc Baray explains that in the second and first centuries BCE Gaul was experiencing an economic revolution. The latter was a veritable paradigm shift in Gallic economic activities where the Gauls were slowly shifting from their traditional economic activities of agriculture, local artisanship, and raiding to long-distance commerce, semi-industrial artisans, and intensive agriculture combined with specialized animal husbandry.¹⁷³ He argues that the Gauls were forced, via this economic revolution, to adapt their economy to the ever-increasing trade demands of the expanding Mediterranean world.¹⁷⁴ This is especially true of Gallic pottery (*terra sigillata*) which was in such high demand from the 1st century BCE until well into the Principate that it was being mass produced in pottery centers found in Southern Gaul. The latter, were still being marketed in many parts of the Empire throughout the 1st century CE¹⁷⁵ So high was the demand for Gallic pottery that gigantic 4 metres wide and 3 metres wide kilns, capable of holding approximately 30,000 pots were found in these pottery centers. Such was their scale that these kilns, could "hardly be compared with the kilns in Greek potteries".¹⁷⁶ In addition, numerous coins

¹⁷² For a more detailed account on the realities of the territory of *Germania*, alongside further archeological evidence see Sievers Susanne, "Chapter 1: The Lands of the Germania in the Later Pre-Roman Iron Age.," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of Roman Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). p. 5-27.

¹⁷³ Luc Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.): La Terre, Le Pouvoir et Les Hommes* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2016). p. 297.

¹⁷⁴ Baray. p. 297.

¹⁷⁵ Helmuth Schneider, "Technology," in *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, ed. Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard P. Saller (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 144–72. p. 159.

¹⁷⁶ Schneider. p. 160.

found from this period serve as archeological evidence for the increased use of money in trades in Gaul as a result of their steadily increasing participation in Mediterranean trade.¹⁷⁷ While the word “revolution” with regards to this period may seem like a stretch, it was the historian Alain Duval that first used this term to highlight the dramatic increase in the production of metal equipment (from weapons to construction materials) serving as further evidence of the sweeping changes that were affecting Gaul¹⁷⁸.

Along with the aforementioned increase in industrial and artisanal productions in Gaul, new changes in agricultural techniques and forms of land ownership saw agriculture become a principal Gallic activity to the detriment of war and raiding/pillaging which had long been the more traditional forms of economic activity. Indeed, large farms were created, and were owned by an agrarian aristocracy who possessed the means to purchase the latest farming innovations and tools for their farms, greatly increasing their holdings and wealth in the process.¹⁷⁹ Thanks to these widespread agricultural changes, there was a food surplus throughout the territory which could be sent to its sprawling *oppida*, thus helping advance its urbanization efforts. Or this surplus could even be used to trade with Rome.¹⁸⁰ In addition, these increased agricultural yields allowed a demographic boom to occur in the centuries that preceded the Gallic Wars. Now having the ability to feed its ever-growing population, the Gauls began to colonize more and more lands within their territory, and by extent spurred the widespread creation of new settlements and *oppida*.¹⁸¹ In effect creating a vicious cycle whereby increased agricultural yields, would lead to increased population, which in turn resulted in further widespread colonization and urbanization. This colonization phenomenon was so widespread that *oppida* were found as far as Britain, Northern and Eastern France, Luxembourg, the south of Germany, and Bohemia.¹⁸² This Malthusian model of demography in the Greco-Roman world has been covered by Walter Scheidel in the *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* where he states that “this long-term trend [referring to the Malthusian model of population control] obtained for Greco-Roman antiquity as a whole is

¹⁷⁷ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*, p. 297.

¹⁷⁸ Baray. p. 300.

¹⁷⁹ Baray. p. 301-302.

¹⁸⁰ Baray. p. 303.

¹⁸¹ Baray. p. 317-319.

¹⁸² Baray. p. 331.

not in doubt”.¹⁸³ Scheidel explains that tremendous leaps in technology, and further improvements in the system of production can shift the theoretical saturation point of a population’s growth, and help spur further demographic increase.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, the economic and agricultural revolutions mentioned by Baray, helps us establish this model for Gaul, in addition to the Greco-Roman world.

Beyond being a simple urban centre, the *oppidum* served several functions. Firstly, according to Baray, it was the capital, and by extent the economic and political heart, of the *civitas*. Consequently, it served as a major hub for Gallic trade. Finally, perhaps its most recognizable trait, the *oppidum* is heavily fortified, and serves as a fortress for all nearby citizens in times of war.¹⁸⁵ As such, its importance as a pillar of this budding new Gallic society cannot be understated. In addition, evidence suggests that the *oppida* were founded from the very start as the seats of political power and as a tool for the political elite to centralize their authority over the rural lands.¹⁸⁶ As such, the elite spent some time in both the *oppida* as well as on their personal (and closed off) rural estates.¹⁸⁷ Lastly, recent archeological finds allow us to gauge the relative size of an *oppida*, which was considerable. The map of the oppidum at Bibracte shows it spanned 1.5 square kilometres and had both an inner and outer wall; thus, providing it with a double layer of fortifications. Within its walls, evidence of terrace farming, urban habitation, a main road, and even pastoral enclosures and a horse pen were found.¹⁸⁸

However, the *oppidum* was not the only important form of Gallic habitation, nor the most common. To that effect, the most widespread forms of habitation found in Gaul from the 2nd century onwards were farming establishments. Hardly being able to be referred to as “villages” these farming estates were classified into four increasingly spacious and developed “ranks”,¹⁸⁹ one of which being the *aedificia*; a fortified farming settlement which, according to Caesar, stockpiled enough grain and food that the latter was able to feed his army in the winter of 55 without want.¹⁹⁰ Where the

¹⁸³ Walter Scheidel, “Demography,” in *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, ed. Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard P. Saller (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 38–86. p. 52.

¹⁸⁴ Scheidel. p. 52.

¹⁸⁵ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 332-333.

¹⁸⁶ Baray. p. 348.

¹⁸⁷ Baray. p. 329. See “Rank 1” estates.

¹⁸⁸ Baray. p. 347.

¹⁸⁹ Baray. 328-329.

¹⁹⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 7

oppidum was an important economic and political actor, the *aedificia* served mainly as a producer and stocking centre for agropastoral products. And where the *oppidum* was the capital of the *civitas*, the *aedificium* served as the capital of the *pagus*.¹⁹¹

While these sweeping artisanal and agricultural changes may have helped Gaul to integrate in the wider Mediterranean system, it did not come without its share of societal upheaval. The consolidation of rural lands by this new agrarian aristocracy saw the creation of an “enclosure” system¹⁹² whose negative societal consequences were twofold: Firstly, as was the case in Rome, these enclosures created a rural pleb who had no choice but to agglomerate in the ever-growing *oppida*.¹⁹³ Secondly, the increased wealth of this new agrarian elite meant that they could now challenge the authority of the *pagus* who traditionally organized pastoral rotations and activities.¹⁹⁴

Furthermore, the agglomeration of land within the hands of a few rural elites led to the steady pauperization of the rural milieu, a pauperization which will reverberate all the way through Caesar’s conquests.¹⁹⁵ However, the rise of this agrarian elite also exacerbated Gaul’s urbanization phenomenon by giving the rural poor no choice but to conglomerate in the *oppida*. This only steepened the divide between rich and poor, and worsened the problem through the creation of an urban *pleb*. As a matter of fact, the rich saw the rural exodus and growing urbanization phenomenon as a means to “double down” on their position and accelerate their rural consolidation.¹⁹⁶

Nevertheless, the culmination of these circumstances (the creation of an urban pleb, and the consolidation of rural lands in the hands of an agrarian elite) was not entirely negative. Indeed, they became extremely beneficial for the development of long-distance trade in Gaul, which further allowed its integration into the wider Mediterranean system.¹⁹⁷ As a result, the Gallic *oppida* saw the birth of a new social class in the form of rich merchants. This new urban *bourgeoisie* slowly began being more and more important within Gallic society to the point where Baray refers to them

¹⁹¹ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*, p. 337.

¹⁹² Baray, p. 310.

¹⁹³ Baray, p. 308.

¹⁹⁴ Baray, p. 310.

¹⁹⁵ Baray, p. 310.

¹⁹⁶ Baray, p. 310-311.

¹⁹⁷ Baray, p. 313.

as “*homines novi*” and compared them to the Roman *equites*; their knightly class. These *homines novi* came to play an important societal role throughout Caesar’s Gallic Wars. Caesar’s arrival and interventions in Gaul began considerably upsetting the *status quo*, and as such, it was this knightly class that had everything to gain from the establishment of a new social order.¹⁹⁸ Thus, these “nouveaux riches” found themselves at odds with the Gallic societal “old guard” creating upheaval at a time where Gaul required unity to fight off Caesar’s consolidation of power. These conflicts highlight the growing divide between the rising new agrarian and merchant elite against the well-established noble and political elite. Caesar’s arrival exacerbated these cleavages and began dividing the Gallic elite between two factions: the pro-Romans and the anti-Romans.¹⁹⁹ As such, While Caesar’s arrival may have aggravated these societal disputes, it is important to note that these cleavages existed prior his arrival as demonstrated by the agrarian elite’s ability to militarily oppose the Gallic magistrates (hence, displaying the evidence of realist anarchy in Gaul, prior to the Emperor’s interventions).²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Baray. p. 313.

¹⁹⁹ Baray. p. 345-348.

²⁰⁰ Baray. p. 348.

2. Establishing the Anarchy

2.1 Gallic mercenaries

The presence of heavily fortified *oppida* throughout Gaul is a clear sign of the permanence of war which is critical to the establishment of realist anarchy. It demonstrates a pervasive fear of attack, and a need to defend the *civitas* in a war-prone environment.²⁰¹ While the presence of the latter aids the argument that Gaul was in a constant state of war, several other key components will have to be established. To that effect, I lean on the heavy presence and influence of Gallic mercenaries throughout Gaul to argue that so many armed men and war bands would not be present if warfare was sporadic and rare. Indeed, the presence of these men infers by default a state of anarchy. Additionally, it will be important to demonstrate the presence of a “Hobbesian world” whereby interstate Gallic rivalries, and diplomatic and military aggressiveness, highlight a bilateral fear of attack and helps define a militaristic anarchy.²⁰²

To that effect, the earliest literary mention of Celtic mercenaries comes from Herodotus and his detailing of the battle of Himera in 480 BCE where southern Gauls, living near the Mediterranean were contracted by the Carthaginians to fight alongside them.²⁰³

“There is, however, another story told by the Sicilians: even though he was to be under Lacedaemonian authority, Gelon would still have aided the Greeks had it not been for Terillus son of Crinippus, the tyrant of Himera. This man, who had been expelled from Himera by Theron son of Aenesidemus, sovereign ruler of Acragas, at this very time brought against Gelon three hundred thousand Phoenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Elisyci, Sardinians, and Cynrians, I led by Amilcas son of Annon, the king of the Carchedonians. Terillus had induced him to do this partly through the prerogative of personal friendship, but mainly through the efforts of Anaxilaus son of

²⁰¹ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 123.

²⁰² Eckstein. p. 122.

²⁰³ Herodotus, Book VII. Taken from “Herodotus et al., *Herodotus*, The Loeb Classical Library 117–120 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 1981). Book VII, 165.

Cretines, tyrant of Rhegium. He had handed over his own children as hostages to Amilcas, and brought him into Sicily to the help of his father-in-law; for Anaxilaus had as his wife Terillus' daughter Cydippe. Accordingly Gelon sent the money to Delphi, because he could not aid the Greeks."

The presence of Gallic mercenaries here is confirmed by the mention of the Ligurians and Elisyces which were Gallic tribes living in the south of Gaul.²⁰⁴

On the other hand, the oldest archeological piece of evidence pertaining to Celtic mercenaries is a Funerary Stela of Felsina, found in Bologna today. The stela entitled "Funeral stela with scenes from the journey of the deceased" served as the marker for an interred tomb²⁰⁵, depicting an Etruscan knight fighting against a Celtic cavalryman.²⁰⁶ The stela is dated from the second half of the 5th century BCE.²⁰⁷ and while there is no evidence that the mercenary depicted in the stela is Gallic, Baray believes he is Celtic²⁰⁸, and given the Etruscan origins of the stela; a Gallic mercenary is the most likely candidate for geographical reasons. Regardless of the origins of the mercenary in question, the stela serves as archeological evidence that Celtic mercenary tradition is extremely old and well established.

While the earliest literary sources make it evident that Celtic mercenaries were present in various theatres of war throughout the Mediterranean they do not mention in what quantity or capacity²⁰⁹. To that effect, Baray presents us with numeric estimates for Celtic mercenaries present in foreign armies from the 4th to 1st centuries BCE, these numbers range from a few hundred to the twenty and thirty thousands. Although these numbers seem very large, Baray notes that the percentage of Celtic mercenaries found within foreign armies never exceeded 50% of their total military effective. As a precautionary measure, Baray rounded his estimates down, allowing for the

²⁰⁴ Luc Baray, *De Carthage à Jéricho: mythes et réalités du mercenariat celtique (Ve-Ier siècle a.C.)*, Scripta antiqua 98 (Bordeaux: Ausonius Éditions, 2017). p. 51.

²⁰⁵ "Etruscan Bologna | Museum: Sections: Etruscan Bologna | Archaeological Museum of Bologna | Iperbole," accessed November 11, 2019, <http://www.museibologna.it/archeologicoen/percorsi/66287/id/75034/oggetto/74544/>.

²⁰⁶ Luc Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité: Représentation, Recrutement, Organisation*, Antiquité Synthèses 18 (Paris: ePicard, 2017). p. 39.

²⁰⁷ "Etruscan Bologna | Museum: Sections: Etruscan Bologna | Archaeological Museum of Bologna | Iperbole."

²⁰⁸ Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité*. p. 39.

²⁰⁹ Baray, *De Carthage à Jéricho*. p. 52

possibility that the presence of these mercenaries was much higher.²¹⁰ With regards to the capacity of these troops, it was later sources, starting in the 4th century BCE, that mention in greater details the actions of Gallic and Celtic mercenaries.²¹¹

Unsurprisingly, most accounts of these mercenaries can be found in the employment of Carthage while also representing the bulk of the Carthaginian casualties.²¹² Although it is common knowledge that Carthage leaned heavily on the use of mercenaries from throughout the Mediterranean, the heavy death toll encompassed by the hired Celtic troops highlights the Carthaginian's use of them as front line troops. Another example of the Carthaginian reliance on these Celtic troops can be traced back to the first Punic War where, in order to hold their positions in Sicily, the Carthaginian resorted to the mass recruitment of Celts (Ligures, Gauls, and Iberians) to hold the line against the Romans.²¹³

2.2 *The portrayal of Gauls as warriors*

Stereotypically the Gauls (and Celts in general) were portrayed as savage warriors, going as far back as Plato who mentions them among the warlike peoples of this time.²¹⁴

Yet, Carthage regularly relied on them to safeguard their front line, and by extent, to take on the bulk of the dangers and risks that entails (heavy casualties). This shows the confidence that Carthage entrusted these warriors, and were their reputation as fierce warriors not merited, Carthage would have seldom relied so heavily upon them.

Indeed, the *ethos* of the Gallic (and Celtic) warriors is legendary, expansively described throughout ancient sources creating a distinct *topos*. According to Baray, of all the ancient sources, it is Polybius who draws the best suited portrait of the Gauls to illustrate the general idea the ancients had of them, here are to name a few:²¹⁵

²¹⁰ Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité*. p. 101-103.

²¹¹ Baray, *De Carthage à Jéricho*. p. 52.

²¹² Baray. p. 52.

²¹³ Baray. p. 53. citing Polybius, *The Histories*, Book 1. 17. 3-4. and Appian, *Sic.* 2. 3. and *Hisp.* 4. 15. and *Num.* 5. 18. and Diodor of Sicily 25.1b.2.

²¹⁴ Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. p. 411, citing Plato, *Laws* 637d.

²¹⁵ Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité*. p. 43-44. Baray directly cites Polybius and other ancient authors who are the source of these stereotypes. However, these examples are so numerous in the ancient

- They are strong of stature and well built.
- They are passionate, quick to anger, and eager to fight, while described as being particularly bellicose.
- They are undisciplined, violent, cruel, and bloodthirsty.
- They are greedy pillagers who are always avid for booty.
- And finally, they are bold, rash, and irrational.

The final point is particularly emphasized in the ancient sources going from Polybius, Plato, and Hippocrates, to Gallienus, all of which stress the Gaul's inability to act rationally or to employ reason.²¹⁶ Instead, the Gauls are motivated by their emotions with ancient authors such as Polybius, Hippocrates, Plato helping to create the image of the *tumultus Gallicus*²¹⁷ thus, emphasizing their chaotic nature. To further emphasize their lack of reason, Polybius mentions how the Gallic chiefs and commanders threw themselves in the front line in order to display their courage. In addition, they also frequently challenged Roman commanders and participated in regular duels. For Polybius, this comes as a stark contrast to the Roman and Greek strategists who emphasize the use of *logos* and avoid unnecessarily putting their life at risk, lest their army lose its commander and by extent its command structure and with it any hopes of winning.²¹⁸ For these authors, the conflict between these cultures remains at its core a struggle between the disciplined and the undisciplined, the civilized against the savage.²¹⁹ Interestingly, Caesar's own descriptions of the Gauls in his commentaries, mirror Polybius' qualifications.²²⁰ As such, it is likely that Caesar used Polybius' preconceived *topos* of the Gauls; thus, perpetuating this image. Subsequently, when we as historians use Caesar's commentaries as our primary source to draw our own image of the Gauls, we are indirectly recycling Polybius' constructs in an endless cycle. However, it is important to note, as outlined by Isaac, that Caesar had firsthand experience fighting the Gauls, and would not have blindly agreed with Polybius' descriptions, if he did not believe them to be true.²²¹

sources that it would be unreasonable to cite them all in these footnotes. For the direct citations from Polybius, refer to Baray's work who has done a complete job enumerating these sources. In addition, for more insight on Polybius' perceptions of the Celts refer to the follow articles: Foulon Eric, "Polybe et Les Celtes (II)," *Les Études Classiques* 69, no. 1 (2001): 35–64. And Philippe Berger, "Le Portrait Des Celtes Dans Les Histoires de Polybe," *Ancient Society* 23 (1992): 105–26.

²¹⁶ Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité*. p. 43-45.

²¹⁷ Baray. p. 45.

²¹⁸ Baray. p. 46.

²¹⁹ Baray. p. 51.

²²⁰ Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. p. 413.

²²¹ Isaac. p. 414.

Roman and Greek historians were unable to understand the cultural differences between them and the Gauls. This can most likely be attributed to what Isaac refers to as “proto-racism” or the combination of established prejudices that were commonplace in the Greco-Roman world.²²² A concrete example of these different mindsets can be found in some of Caesar’s engagements against the Gauls. Specifically, in Book II when a Belgic war band, after having raided and pillaged the lands of the *Remi* had gathered on top of a hill, awaiting Caesar to engage them. When the latter didn’t, the *Belgae* simply retreated and disbanded their army. Caesar was simply unwilling to meet the *Belgae* in such unfavourable conditions. However, this was not what the *Belgae* perceived. Rawlings explains that the barbarians, having successfully raided enemy territory, and having proved their “moral superiority” to the Romans, assumed the conflict was over and returned home.²²³ These differences in mentality were linked to their different interpretations of warfare. The Gauls, loved to wage war, and could easily be incited to do so, as demonstrated by the endless conflicts, both internal, and external, that they participated in. For the Gallic peoples, military prestige and opportunism were central to their way of thought, along with what they perceived as a “fair fight” to achieve victory²²⁴, which was not necessarily shared by the Greeks or the Romans, who had their own preconceived notions of “just” warfare.

So, what may have appeared to Polybius as foolish recklessness on the part of the Gallic chieftains, was in their minds a display of courage and bravery on the battlefield. Qualities which are exemplified in a warrior culture. In fact, Caesar himself was also known for leading his men from the front line; by doing so, Caesar was able to achieve victories in three distinct battles: Against the *Nervii*, the Battle of Alesia, and the Battle of Munda.

In the first, the *Nervii* aided by traitors in Caesar’s baggage train, assaulted the marching legions in an attempt to overpower them in a surprise attack. Caesar then personally went flank to flank to encourage his soldiers, even taking up a shield from one of them, and appealing to his centurions by name. His coming brought hope and renewed vigour to his faltering forces.²²⁵

²²² Isaac. p. 1.

²²³ Rawlings, “Caesar’s Portrayal of Gauls as Warriors.” p. 175.

²²⁴ Rawlings. p. 177.

²²⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 25.

At Alesia, Caesar was hard pressed on all sides by the outnumbering Gallic troops and in order to rally his wavering men, and to insure victory; Caesar took personal command of the Cavalry and some cohorts and led them into the fray making sure his scarlet cloak was visible for all to see. Using this highly recognizable symbol, Caesar was able to inspire his men and take the day.²²⁶ Finally, at Munda, Caesar's troops were on the verge of being routed; to bolster their resolve Caesar once again took up the shield from one of his legionnaires, and rushed the front line encouraging his soldiers along the way. Seeing their commander charge so recklessly towards danger, emboldened the soldiers to rally to his side and fight more vigorously as to not disappoint him.²²⁷ Nevertheless, Polybius' negative portrayal of the Gauls has resonated throughout history prompting many historians to accuse him of Hellenocentrism. Regardless of Polybius' own prerogatives, ancient sources in general had a tendency of describing the Celts as the antithesis of the Romans, their polar opposites in customs and behaviour. So much so, that historian J.-G. Texier was able to compile a table of these oppositions which Baray relates to us.²²⁸

Polybius was not the only ancient author to draw the Gauls in a negative light. Baray highlights Pausanias' terrifying portrait and description of the Gauls. The latter, describes their behaviour after a victory, painting them as not only irrational beings, but also as being morally corrupt.²²⁹ To that effect, Pausanias mentions several disturbing Gallic activities when victorious; namely, their utter disregard and lack of respect towards the dead. According to Baray, the Gauls are described as actively being anthropophagic (cannibalistic) savages who decapitate their victims for trophies, pillage tombs and rob the dead, do not respect the virginity of young girls, nor shy away from raping them along with all manner of women, including the dead. Lastly, they have no respect for the gods whose temples they sack.²³⁰

²²⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 8.

²²⁷ Appianus, Book 2. 104. *Appian's roman history: in four volumes*. 3: ..., Reprinted, Loeb classical library 4 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press [u.a.], 1995). I wonder, would Polybius have criticized Caesar's actions as lacking reason? Or would he have applauded the *Imperator* for ensuring victory through decisive action?

²²⁸ Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité*. p. 51. and Jean-Georges Texier, "Polybe Géographe," *Dialogues d'histoire Ancienne*, 1976, 395–411. p. 410, table 3.

²²⁹ Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, Book 10.22. 3 and 4. Taken from Pausanias and William H. S. Jones, *Description of Greece*. 4: *Books VIII.22 - X*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 297 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007).

²³⁰ Baray, *Celtes, Galates et Gaulois, Mercenaires de l'Antiquité*. p. 51.

Nevertheless, the Celts were still employed as soldiers of fortune throughout all of antiquity and were present in almost every theatre of war in both the Eastern and Western Mediterranean.²³¹ Indeed, the Celts' military successes around the Mediterranean were well known to Plato, Aristotle, and their contemporaries.²³² However, with Hannibal's defeat at Zama, Gallic mercenaries stopped seeing widespread use throughout the Mediterranean. Carthage had been the largest employer of Celtic mercenaries, and their defeat after the second Punic war severely hindered the practice throughout the system.²³³ Yet, the decrease in Gallic mercenaries did not signal the end of this lucrative Celtic practice, a practice which first introduced the confined Gallic world to the rest of the Mediterranean system. As such, rather than focusing their efforts outwards, or changing professions to something less violent, Gallic mercenaries began being exploited within their internal market. Afterall, the violent appropriation of goods, through raiding and war, were a "natural" aspect of Celtic society, meaning that there was no reason for the Gauls to stop their proficient mercenary trade.²³⁴

2.3 Conflicts Within

With their decreased use internationally, Gallic aristocrats began heavily using Gallic mercenaries as their own private armies, a tradition which began prior to the *Bellum Gallicum* but that was maintained during Caesar's interventions as well.²³⁵ Luc Baray identifies two distinct types of Gallic mercenaries, which according to him have "always" existed: what he calls "*contingents encadrées*" and "*contingents libres*". The former is composed primarily of trained soldiers, "elite" battle-hardened troops that are led by a commander. Often, this commander is a king or an aristocrat whose solidifying bonds between himself and his troops lies heavily on a clientelist relationship akin to *devotio*.²³⁶ Mercenaries swore loyalty to their leaders and chiefs in this clientelist relationship, which means that they voluntarily entered into a position of social and economic inferiority to their chiefs. Therefore, these men were bound to the personal ambitions of

²³¹ Baray, *De Carthage à Jéricho*. p. 52. For specific examples of these theaters of war, refer to Baray's full work.

²³² Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. p. 411.

²³³ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 367.

²³⁴ Baray. p. 367.

²³⁵ Baray. p. 367.

²³⁶ Baray. p. 368.

their leaders and would be unquestionably loyal to them; leading to the privatization of both the mercenary trade and the armed forces.²³⁷ Indeed, Gallic aristocrats, such as Orgetorix²³⁸, were able to mobilize vast armies and resources thanks to their clientelist relationships, not unlike what the Roman elite could muster. According to Baray, these aristocrats were the main source of recruitment for Gallic mercenaries within the Gallic system; This recruitment provided an armed option of employment for the Cadets of families who had no other economic prospects. These clientelist relationships and the followings that the aristocrats were able to mobilize were a cause of the constant political upheavals that plagued Gallic society and were the source of these incessant conflicts.²³⁹

On the other hand, the latter, is comprised of an amalgam of individuals, sharing no immediate bond or sense of loyalty. As such, these “*contingents libres*” had strong links with criminality and deviant behaviour. Not being tied down to a rich commander capable of sustaining their wages year-round, these mercenaries were true soldiers of fortune and needed to economically supplement their activities in between war contracts. Raiding, pillaging, and banditry were simply the most logical source of income for these armed men; who could easily find work within Gaul as violence and political disputes were incessant within their societies.²⁴⁰ Caesar fought against some of these mercenaries in his wars against Vercingetorix. As a matter of fact, Caesar portrays these hired Gallic mercenaries very negatively referring them to as: *exules*, *damnati*, *egentes*²⁴¹, *perditi homines*²⁴², and *latrones*²⁴³.²⁴⁴ These descriptions led Baray to believe that by Caesar’s time most of the Gallic mercenaries present for hire were comprised of the second group, rather than from the well-disciplined first group.

The importance of the Gallic economic situation with regards to the creation and sustainment of mercenary troops cannot be overstated. Gaul went through an economic crisis during the time of its social revolution; creating tremendous poverty as the rich agrarian aristocracy consolidated rural

²³⁷ Baray. p. 379.

²³⁸ See Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1.2-4, 9, and 26.

²³⁹ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 369.

²⁴⁰ Baray. p. 368.

²⁴¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 4. 3.

²⁴² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 4. 3.

²⁴³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 38. 8.

²⁴⁴ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 368.

lands. Consequently, it left innumerable men with no other economic prospects but to bind themselves to a patron; in the hopes of earning glory and riches through wartime pillaging. Thus, for many young Gauls, the mercenary profession was an escape from their paltry economic situation.²⁴⁵ While the economic crisis helped spur the Gallic mercenary trade by creating an abundance of willing recruits, the opposite is traditionally true in times of economic growth.

However, the economic revolution that followed the crisis and its subsequent growth, did not stop Gallic mercenary activity which proved to still be a very lucrative and healthy activity well into the 1st century BCE.²⁴⁶ Historically, alternative means of income signalled the decline of violent mercenary activities, such as raids and pillaging, as a means of sustenance. This was the case, as Baray highlights, of the proficient Swiss mercenaries in the 18th century CE whose trade saw a rapid decline as their state's economic situation ameliorated.²⁴⁷ Why then did Gallic mercarism persevere? Its particular tenacity can be explained by the nature of political power within Gallic society. Commonly, as the state consolidated and affirmed its power, it could no longer tolerate the widespread use of mercenaries, leading to their inevitable decline. From the 7th to 5th centuries BCE, the Celtic world was predominantly administered by kingdoms. However, by the 5th to 1st centuries BCE these kingdoms gave way to councils and senates in a series of political changes that must have come as a great upheaval to the Celtic societies.²⁴⁸ While archeological evidence has shown that the state was beginning to affirm its power in Gaul, there is no evidence to suggest that the blossoming Gallic state had imposed hard regulations to control or regulate mercenaries. Instead, Baray believes that soft measures were put in place to allow those who wished to take up the career of a mercenary, to be able to do so.²⁴⁹ Thus, in effect, the state was unable to curb mercenary activity in Gaul and impose its authority. It is likely that the aforementioned influence of the aristocratic elite, and its proclivity for hiring mercenaries as a means of exerting force, is to blame for the tribal unit's failure of imposing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Indeed, the famed political scientist Max Weber, defines the state as a "human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given

²⁴⁵ Baray. p. 384.

²⁴⁶ Baray. p. 376.

²⁴⁷ Baray. p. 376.

²⁴⁸ Baray. p. 377.

²⁴⁹ Baray. op. cit. p. 377-378.

territory”²⁵⁰ Per Weber, only the state can ascribe the use of force to institutions, so long as it wishes to do so.²⁵¹ However, with the aristocratic elite enjoying the benefits of a privatized use of force, combined with their societal role as the governing elite, it explains the Gallic state’s failure to rein in mercenary activity.

Moreover, according to Baray, mercenaries may have played a far more important role than simple soldiers for hire in Celtic societies. He characterizes Celtic mercenarism as a form of militarized migration which was spearheaded by the aristocratic elites and young cadets of prominent families. These military migrations were not random, but rather, were organized and planned out. Leading Baray to believe that the *Civitates* were aware of these migrations, if not altogether sanctioned by them. Furthermore, it would seem that the leaders of these migration parties received honorary titles such as *rex* or *princeps* from their *Civitas*, reinforcing the idea that Celtic states, and by extent Gallic states, regularly sent out armed groups of mercenaries in order to colonize additional lands in the name of their unit.²⁵² It is then possible, that the Helvetii were trying to follow this Celtic custom, but on a much larger scale during the beginning events of the *Bellum Gallicum*. Now, if we were to believe that every *Civitas* in the Celtic world participated in this form of militarized migration, it would leave their system in a state of constant conflict. By sending out regularly armed parties, intent on settling additional lands, the Celtic world opened itself to ceaseless warfare as various nations competed against each other in a race to claim the most land. Ergo, explaining the state of constant war present in Gaul (and other Celtic areas) as observed by Caesar and other ancient sources. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these migratory movements occurred prior to the rise of the *oppida* and prior to the affirmation of power by the Gallic states.²⁵³ Thus, I can’t help but wonder if the regularity of these armed migratory movements helped establish the creation of *oppida* as a defensive measure against them; which would help to explain their widespread presence throughout the entirety of the territory. The same argument could be said with regards to the state’s rise in power as a direct consequence to the unrestrained anarchy these

²⁵⁰ Max Weber, *Politics As a Vocation* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1946), p. 3-4. http://archive.org/details/weber_max_1864_1920_politics_as_a_vocation.

²⁵¹ Weber. p. 4.

²⁵² Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 378.

²⁵³ Baray. p. 379.

movements would have undoubtedly caused, since an organized *Civitas* would be far more efficient at organizing the defense of a territory.

Nevertheless, mercenary tradition in Gaul lasted all the way to the Gallic Wars and Caesar's interventions. However, things become far more convoluted during this time, and the lines between mercenary and soldier were blurred. The only mention of Gallic mercenaries during the events of the *Bellum Gallicum* occurs in the decisive final battle of Alesia in book VII, whereby Vercingetorix called on all the Gauls to send reinforcements to him after his defeat at Avaricum.²⁵⁴ While no direct mention is made by Caesar that indicates these reinforcements were mercenaries, Vercingetorix is quoted as having requested, "all the archers in Gaul"²⁵⁵. The nature of this request has led historian J. Harmand to strongly believe that these reinforcements were in fact Gallic mercenaries.²⁵⁶ Here exists a disagreement between Brunaux and Baray regarding the nature of the Germanic troops. While the former argues that the Germans were not true mercenaries because they did not respect the laws of mercenarism; namely that "*La guerre comme une prestation de service qui donne seulement droit à une solde*". According to Brunaux, the Germans who sought to plunder and install themselves permanently on the lands they waged war in, this desire to colonize, goes against the basic principles of mercenarism because they were not simply hired soldiers, but rather opportunistic colonizers.²⁵⁷

Conversely, Baray believes Brunaux' definition is incomplete. For Baray, mercenarism is defined as a mercantile relationship whereby strangers, who are professionals at war, voluntarily participate in warfare on a private basis.²⁵⁸ Baray does not limit his definition based solely on a form of waged remuneration, but rather on an overall form of recompense in exchange for service; including the acquisition of booty through pillaging, which he views as a valid form of compensation. Furthermore, Baray directly counters Brunaux's argument by stating that the *Germani* who settled on the lands of their employers, would have done so without their consent, and while it is true that

²⁵⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 31.

²⁵⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 31.

²⁵⁶ Jacques. Harmand, *Une campagne césarienne Alesia.*, 1967. p. 108-109. And Jacques Harmand, *Les Celtes au Second Age du Fer* (Paris: Nathan, 1970). p. 60.

²⁵⁷ Jean-Louis. Brunaux, *Guerre et religion en Gaule : essai d'anthropologie celtique* (Paris: Errance, 2004). p. 77.

²⁵⁸ Baray, *De Carthage à Jéricho*. p. 193-194.

this would not fall within the category of regular compensation for mercenaries, it is not enough to label these Germans as “false mercenaries” as Brunaux would argue.²⁵⁹

With the basis of their argument for defining a “mercenary” hinging on the forms of compensation they receive, Baray has proven more inclusive than Brunaux. However, he goes even further by stating that the Romans helped sustain the mercenary trade in the long term through the recruitment of auxiliaries.²⁶⁰ According to him, Gallic recruitment into the Roman *Auxilia* could be considered as the natural next step to the Gallic mercenary tradition. The Romans differentiated between auxiliary troops and mercenaries; the former were an official contingent of the Roman army comprised of foreign troops, while the latter had no official affiliations with the Roman military and were comprised of soldiers of fortune looking to fight in exchange for payment. Additionally, Roman auxiliaries would have received a regular salary even in times of peace, mercenaries are only paid so long as their services are needed, i.e.: uniquely in times of war. Despite these clear Roman differentiations, it is unlikely that the Gauls would have made the same distinctions. As such, to understand the Gallic point of view, it is important to understand the role that mercenaries played in their military structure. According to Baray, only the largest cities in Gaul were able to recruit mercenaries the reasons for which were twofold:

- 1) Firstly, the larger tribes had the financial means necessary to actually pay for these mercenaries, whose cost was substantial; especially if the contract of service spanned several months.²⁶¹
- 2) Secondly, the private armies of the rich aristocrats, comprised of “*contingents encadrées*”, were used to supplement the Gallic *Civitas*’ own Civil Army.²⁶²

To further expand on the second point, since the 2nd century BCE, Gallic armies were constituted mainly by state levied troops, recruited from its citizen base, which was reinforced by both the private armies of rich aristocrats (*contingents encadrées*) and of regular mercenary troops (*contingents libres*).²⁶³ So Gallic mercenaries were already accustomed to being a supplementary

²⁵⁹ Baray. p. 194. For this thesis, I accept Baray’s definition of mercenaries to encompass any form of remuneration, rather than Brunaux’ insistence on a paid wage.

²⁶⁰ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 384.

²⁶¹ Baray, *De Carthage à Jéricho*. p. 194.

²⁶² Baray. p. 194.

²⁶³ Baray. p. 194.

force following a regular civic army. As such, in post-Caesar Gaul, the Gauls would have understood the auxiliary system as a necessary last resort modification of one of their ancestral traditions: mercenarism.²⁶⁴ They would not have differentiated between an auxiliary and a mercenary because to them they meant the same thing: Namely, that they were being paid to fight.

²⁶⁴ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 367.

Conclusion

Was Gaul then in a state of anarchy prior to Caesar's interventions? I believe the answer is yes; the Gallic *Civitates* were already in a state of anarchy prior to the Gallic Wars. An anarchy, that Caesar opportunistically took advantage of to advance his own interests and that of his unit.

Throughout this chapter, the presence of widespread *Oppida* throughout the territory of Gaul was made evident. The heavy presence of these fortified settlements signals the need for the various *Civitates* to defend themselves. They highlight the security risk these entities found themselves in, and their reactions to the realities of their system. Furthermore, it was shown that these Gallic *Civitates* acted independently for one another, with no form of supra-national government or order. Each individual *Civitates* acted in its own interest to increase its power and standing within its system. This is exemplified by the gallic mercenary trade which saw the Gauls fight within and outside their territory. The Gauls heavy inclination as soldiers of fortune, both as private armies for Gallic warlords, and as shock troops for foreign powers highlights their use of warfare as an economic activity and their proclivity for war. However, this proclivity for war does not stem from their nature, but rather from social and structural causes that exacerbates their bellicosity. Combined, all these factors demonstrate the permanence of war that existed in the Gallic territory, and it is from that permanence of war that we can assume the existence of a state of anarchy.

While the presence of anarchy is imperative to Eckstein's model, it is not the only element that is required to apply his theory unto the Gallic system. To that effect, it was shown that the Gallic territory was sprawling with proto-urban centers akin to those found throughout the rest of the Mediterranean. Since Eckstein focuses on the Greek polities, it was essential to highlight the similarities between them and the Gallic cities in order to successfully apply his model.

Chapter 2 – Anarchy in *De Bello Gallico*

Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the state of Gaul as a whole and through a detailed analysis of Gallic society from the 5th and 4th centuries BCE onwards, we were able to examine aspects of it up until Caesar's interventions, allowing us to draw the following conclusions:

- Our vision of the Gauls is heavily influenced by stereotypes imposed on the Celtic peoples by the Greek and Roman authors. Through their sources, these stereotypes have survived the test of time and have come to shape the general perception of these peoples.
- *Gallia* was artificially separated from *Germania* by Caesar who wanted to clearly define his objectives and limit his campaigns. However, historians still argue whether or not the Gauls and *Germani* are two distinct *ethnoi*.
- Gaul itself was home to various tribes or “*civitates*” with sprawling cities or “*oppida*” with complex social, and political institutions. The Gallic “cities” throughout the territory shared enough similarities with the Greek polities in the East allowing us to transpose Eckstein's model. Furthermore, the Gauls actively participated in the Mediterranean's economic system through their artisanal trade and mercenaries solidifying their ties to the wider Mediterranean system.
- It was the Carthaginians who first introduced the Gauls to the wider Mediterranean system and exposed their warriors to the rest of the Mediterranean world.
- The Gauls were renowned warriors, and warfare played an important role in Gaul. The permanence of war through mercenarism, the conflicts between the different *civitates*, and the internal conflicts between nobles, made the Gauls into prominent warriors established their system's state of anarchy.
- Finally, Gaul was an extremely bellicose and violent system, prone to war, well before Caesar's arrival.

As such, this chapter will chronologically follow the events of Caesar's interventions in Gaul as to highlight the events that present the state of anarchy and the realist view throughout the *Bellum Gallicum*. The goal of the chapter is to argue that Caesar did not create a situation of anarchy in Gaul through his interventions, but rather used the pre-existing anarchy to his advantage and opportunistically filled the power vacuum left in his wake. To do so, a thorough examination of Caesar's text will be necessary to observe the *casus belli* he uses to justify his actions. Indeed, Caesar often portrays his motivations and interventions defensively or as preventative measures because of his opponents in Rome. He seldom portrays himself as the belligerent, allowing us to interject the instances of "empire by invitation" found in his text. Thus, supporting the thesis, while also keeping in mind the complex realities of the Roman notions of warfare (*bellum iustum*, *iniuria* etc.) and subjugation (*devotio*).

How then did Caesar take advantage of the anarchy in Gaul, and the interstate conflicts within it, to subjugate in record time one of the largest swaths of territories ever to be conquered by Rome? Indeed, Caesar was able to conquer and pacify Gaul in less than a decade, whereas in comparison, the Iberian Peninsula, previously belonging to Carthage, also one of Rome's most feared rivals, needed 100 years of warfare to be subjugated.

It bears repeating here that for the purposes of this thesis, Caesar's accounts will be used as they appear. Once again, he is the only contemporary source on the subject, and as Riggsby pointed out, any criticism to Caesar's writings are just as much fiction and the writings themselves due to our lack of other sources.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, throughout this chapter I will point out whenever elements of Caesar's narrative may be creations meant to serve his rhetoric and propaganda goals. With that in mind, much of Caesar's rhetoric comes from the conversations and speeches that take place throughout his commentaries, especially with enemy leaders. Eric Adler highlights the controversy surrounding the historicity of speeches in Greco-Roman historiography, and while no clear solution to the veracity of these events will ever be determined, Adler mentions that speeches addressed to troops before battle are the most likely category for orations to have been invented by ancient

²⁶⁵ Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 1.

historians.²⁶⁶ However, Adler's work revolves around using the comparative method, forcing him to exclude Caesar's commentaries from his study.²⁶⁷ Indeed, since Caesar's writings do not have any other surviving sources, it is not possible to compare the events depicted within. Although Adler did not directly work on our subject matter, he highlights that fictitious orations have certain common trends, they follow set patters, that suggest that dramatic and rhetorical considerations went into their inclusion within the author's test. One of these common traits in these (possibly) fictitious speech is the fact that the oration is always given by a foreigner.²⁶⁸ This trend, is of particular interest to us, since many speeches within Caesar's commentaries are given by enemy leaders.²⁶⁹ Thus, it will be important to keep this in mind throughout this thesis and infer that whenever an enemy leader is addressing Caesar, these discussions are likely fictitious rhetorical tools written by Caesar, and not the actual discourse that took place between the leaders.

Caesar's commentaries are structured in eight different books, each representing one year of his conflict in Gaul which spanned from 58 to 51 BCE. Here, each book will be individually analyzed in chronological order, while summarizing the most important events as to provide proper historical context.²⁷⁰ The Gallic Wars will officially begin when the *Helvetii* will attempt to cross into Gaul in a mass migration. Caesar immediately sets the scene:

1. Book I:

“they [the Belgae] are nearest to the Germans dwelling beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually at war. For this cause the Helvetii also excel the rest of the Gauls in valour, because they are struggling in almost daily fights with the

²⁶⁶ Eric Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians Enemy Speeches in Roman Historiography*, 2014. p. 7.

²⁶⁷ Adler. p. 6. This thesis is faced with a similar challenge.

²⁶⁸ Adler. p. 7.

²⁶⁹ The reasonings for this behavior will be explored in Chapter 3. Essentially, In Roman historiography, Rome's enemies lack the ability to speak for themselves, with Roman authors giving them voices.

²⁷⁰ As was mentioned in the Introduction, Book VIII shall be omitted from this study as it was authored by Aulus Hirtius and not be Caesar, and because we will not be taking any examples from it.

Germans, either endeavouring to keep them out of the Gallic territory or waging an aggressive warfare in German territory.”²⁷¹

As it stands, Caesar in these opening lines informs us that both the *Belgae* and *Helvetii*, two border tribes, are in a constant state of war with the Germans, engaging in both defensive and offensive wars against them daily, leading him to call both these tribes the “bravest” amongst the Gauls. In this instance the word “*virtus*” is a colloquialism for the word “strongest”. Due to their constant conflict with the Germans, these tribes are naturally stronger than their Gallic counterparts who are closer to the “effeminizing” effects of the Roman province of *Gallia Narbonensis* (southern France). Prolonged warfare has hardened their warriors and strengthened their armies. So much so, that Orgetorix, king (*rex*) of the *Helvetii* believes it would be easy to conquer the whole of Gaul.²⁷² The latter had clear hegemonic ambitions that reverberated through a unilateral show of strength.²⁷³ Beyond the obvious establishment of an anarchic system in Gaul, Orgetorix’s ambitions show the clear paradigms of realist attribute theory, whereby each state seeks to grow their own influence and strength, to the detriment of the other units²⁷⁴ in the system. This bellicose attitude from Orgetorix serves as an example for the statements made in the previous chapter. It exemplifies the harsh realities of the Gallic anarchy which were exacerbated by the hyper-violent and bellicose Mediterranean system that was thrust upon them. While the *Helvetii* longed for war, they were limited by their geographical location and needed to migrate. It is possible that these attempts led by the wealthy Orgetorix harken back to the earlier age of armed migrations and colonization which were popular in Gaul in earlier centuries.²⁷⁵ For the *Helvetii* to migrate away from the alps and deeper into Gaul, they needed to cross through the Roman province. Quickly, they dispatched emissaries to Caesar to make their case known and to ask him for his blessing.²⁷⁶ Reluctant to allow an armed band of conquerors through the Roman province, for fear that they would raid and

²⁷¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 1. 4. “*proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent, aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt.*”

²⁷² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 1-2.

²⁷³ Upon doing additional research on Orgetorix, only Yves Gerhard, “Orgétorix l’Helvète et Le Bellum Gallicum de César,” *Les Études Classiques* LIX (1991): 267–74. seemed promising. However, the article focuses on Caesar’s conveyance of a message to his contemporary audience which bore no relevance for my thesis beyond highlighting Orgetorix’s bellicosity. All other scholarly works on the character did not seem relevant.

²⁷⁴ This term was defined in the Introduction and we will continue using it as such. See page 35.

²⁷⁵ See “Chapter 1”.

²⁷⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 7.

pillage²⁷⁷, Caesar refused their request and the *Helvetii* were forced to migrate through the lands of the *Aedui*; who were long-standing Roman allies. As anticipated by Caesar, these armed men wrought havoc to the *Aedui*, laying waste to their lands, enslaving their women and children, and killing the men.²⁷⁸ The treatment suffered by the *Aedui* at the hands of the *Helvetii* should not come as shock, but rather once again be used as an example of the brutality of the Celtic peoples, even towards each other; thus, reinforcing the existence/presence of the Gallic system within the realist political sphere.

The migrating *Helvetii* did not stop with the *Aedui* but also inflicted similar calamities on the peoples of the *Aedui Ambari* (a distinct nation from the *Aedui*) and the *Allobroges*. All three tribes, no longer able to bear the strain of the *Helvetii* raids, pleaded for Rome's assistance by petitioning Caesar.²⁷⁹

On account of their long-standing friendship with Rome, Caesar was forced to intervene on their behalf. This event is significant for many reasons: Firstly, it marks the beginning of Caesar's interventions and the start of the Gallic Wars, an eight-year-long conflict which will result in the total conquest and subjugation of Gaul. And as such, it is the instigating event of this thesis. Secondly, the Gallic cries for help represent the first instance of Lundestad's "Empire by Invitation" concept. By asking for Caesar's aid, the Gauls are by default inviting Rome into their geopolitical system. They are inviting Rome to become a player in their anarchy, a fact consolidated by Caesar's acceptance of the invitation. Furthermore, this invitation gave Caesar the *casus belli* he needed to engage the *Helvetii*. Prior to these invitations, Caesar's hands were figuratively tied by the harsh and strict Roman laws that regulated warfare. Having rejected the *Helvetii* plea to cross the Roman province, Caesar could only engage them if they violated the Roman province, or by receiving an invitation into the conflict. Thus, by rejecting the *Helvetii*'s request, and by building a wall to keep them out²⁸⁰, Caesar steered them towards his Gallic allies, forcing them to ask for his assistance. In addition to the *casus belli* automatically provided by aiding allies, the *Tigurine* Canton (one of the four Helvetic cantons) had caused *iniuria* to Rome in

²⁷⁷ See "Chapter 1". Raiding and pillaging were common practice and seen as "natural" economic activities in Gaul.

²⁷⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 11.

²⁷⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 11-12.

²⁸⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 8.

previous years by destroying one of her armies and slaying its consul.²⁸¹ By going to war against them now, Caesar was avenging an ancient wrong and conducting *bellum iustum*. While these justifications absolve Caesar's actions in Gaul, it is important to note that they also serve as judicial safeguards against his opponents in Rome. It is no secret that Caesar had many enemies in the ancient capital, and by ensuring his actions were in line with the Roman principles of *bellum iustum*, Caesar ensured his actions were also legally defensible in the eyes of his political opponents.

Nevertheless, to lead an effective campaign to aid his allies, Caesar had to secure his supply lines. To that effect, Caesar relied on the *Aedui*'s corn. Yet, dissension amongst the *Aedui* led to supplies not being delivered.²⁸² Dumnorix, an affluent noble, was plotting the downfall of his brother Diviciacus. Dumnorix had forged alliances with several other states, including the *Helvetii*, and was antagonistic to the Romans. The latter, through their interference had reduced Dumnorix's own power and limited his ambitions.²⁸³ Here lies the first instance whereby Caesar will take advantage of the existing anarchy in Gaul. Two affluent brothers of the *Aedui* were divided in their loyalties vis-à-vis the Romans. Indeed, throughout the Gallic Wars, we will be able to divide the Gauls into two distinct categories: Status Quo states vs. Revisionist states. For this thesis, Status Quo states will also be known as the "Balancing" states; those tribes that will band together to resist the changes brought about by Caesar's interventions. On the other hand, the Revisionist states will also be known as the "Bandwagoning"; those tribes who decided to join the Romans for their own personal gains. At the heart of these factional divisions lies an underlining principle of realist theory: whether they be a Status Quo or Revisionist state, each unit (or state) which falls under one of these categories has decided to do so based on their own interests. Thus, faction choice was done solely on the basis of what the *civitas* could gain, how it could profit from the ensuing chaos. Caesar will take advantage of this first instance of factionalism by interfering in Aeduan affairs, and by doing so, establish a political foothold, or initial power base, in Gaul. After discovering that it was Dumnorix who invited the *Helvetii* into the lands of the *Sequani* without the "orders from his state or from Caesar"²⁸⁴ and because of the nature of his friendship with both the *Aedui* and Diviciacus,

²⁸¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 12.

²⁸² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 18.

²⁸³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 18.

²⁸⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 19. 1.

Caesar needed to confer with the latter before any punishment could be dispatched. Upon informing Diviciacus of his brother's treachery, Caesar relegates any punitive responsibility unto him, and the *Aedui*. Yet, Diviciacus reverts said responsibility back unto Caesar and beseeches him to be lenient. For if Caesar punishes his brother too harshly, all of Gaul will believe it was done so with his consent; thus, substantially damaging his reputation.²⁸⁵ As such, Caesar was given retributive power by a high-ranking member of the ruling Aeduan elite. Despite the *Aedui* being an ally of Rome and not a subjugated *devotio* state, Caesar has obvious *potestas* and *auctoritas*. The fashion in which Caesar simply imposed his will over the Aeduan state after having agreed to enter a war on their behalf, harkens Rome's conquest of Italy, and their subjugation of Capua.²⁸⁶ It would seem that the Aeduan plea for Roman intervention, was understood by Caesar (and subsequently by Rome) as an acceptance of submission by the *Aedui* to a form of *devotio* in exchange for the help they received. How else would Caesar have had so much power within the *Aedui* if not for a form of formal submission from the one unto the other?

Indeed, Caesar's direct interference into the affairs of independent Gallic tribes will become a recurring theme throughout the *Bellum Gallicum*. Another such instance occurs after the defeat of the *Helvetii* and their allies, whereby Caesar commands the *Allobroges*, neighbouring victims of the *Helvetii* raids, to help their aggressors rebuild by providing them a steady supply of corn.²⁸⁷ After defeating the migrating horde, Caesar forced the *Helvetii* to resettle the lands they abandoned because he feared that Germanic tribes would be tempted to settle those lands if they remained vacant. In doing so, Caesar is not only behaving as a general but also as a statesman. Well aware of the rules of the anarchic system they were playing by, he kept in mind the ambitions of the other units within the system and sought to safeguard his own province by denying the nearby prospective settlement of far more bellicose and aggressive units (the *Germani*). From the very start of the *Bellum Gallicum* Caesar is practising *realpolitik* on a system-wide level while recognizing the threats that the ambitions of the other units within the system may pose to the stability of his conquests.

²⁸⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 20.

²⁸⁶ Capua pleaded for Rome's help, in exchange it was submitted to *deditio in fidem*. Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 142.

²⁸⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 28. 3.

Furthermore, after having defeated the *Helvetii*, several Gallic tribe leaders came to Caesar in order to congratulate him and thank him for his interference at their behest;²⁸⁸ solidifying the argument that the Gallic Wars did not begin because of Caesar's bellicosity and ambitions, but rather, that he was invited into the conflict by its units due to the constant shifts in the balance of power in their anarchic system which prompted external balancing requests. Yet, the Gauls thanked Caesar without knowledge of the existential danger that was before them, and while Orgetorix sought to unify Gaul as a single unit under the *Helvetii* banner, Gaul will have to wait until 52 BCE and Vercingetorix to be united against the Romans, fulfilling Orgetorix's vision for the territory.²⁸⁹

These balancing requests were not limited to the Romans. Diviciacus informs Caesar that historically in Gaul two tribes vied for supremacy: the *Aedui* and the *Averni* (and *Sequani*).²⁹⁰ As a result, the latter often recruited Germanic mercenaries from beyond the Rhine to assist and intervene on their behalf. Consequently, the *Aedui* suffered numerous defeats and were forced to give out hostages to the victors. While the tradition of giving out hostages in defeat to secure peace is common during this time period, its reverberating effects are often neglected. Every time a tribe is forced to give out hostages, they are forced to part with a considerable part of their nobility; in other words, with its ruling aristocratic elite. This in turn greatly diminishes the effectiveness of the *civitas*' governing body while also allowing for the potential of internal political upheaval through the creation of a void in power. True to form to the realist system, some of the Germanic mercenaries who were invited by the weaker Gauls to interfere, sought after their own interests and established permanent settlements in Gaul. Indeed, the Germans led by Ariovistus, had betrayed their employers, taking one third of their lands and subsequently asking for another one third to help settle another 24 000 of their kinsmen.²⁹¹ The arrival of any new unit into a pre-established system, more often than not, results in a balance of power shift that upsets the pre-established order of the system;²⁹² prompting a response from the other units in the system to either balance or bandwagon. In this specific instance, the permanent establishment of these Germanic peoples into the Gallic territory prompted its tribes, who feared the loss of their independence, to seek a

²⁸⁸ Gaius Iulius Caesar and Henry J. Edwards, *Caesar: in three volumes. 1: The Gallic War*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 72 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004). Book 1. 31.

²⁸⁹ Gerhard, "Orgétorix l'Helvétie et Le Bellum Gallicum de César." p. 270.

²⁹⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 31.

²⁹¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 31.

²⁹² See Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 82.

balancing alliance with Rome. Therefore, once again, the Gauls, through the *Aedui*, beseeched Caesar to help them defeat the Germans. To that effect, Diviciacus argues that if Caesar opted not to help the Gauls, their hostages would be executed, the *Germani* would begin crossing the Rhine uncontrollably, and the Gauls would be forced to mass migrate just like the *Helvetii*.²⁹³ Knowing full well that the *Germani* would not stop their conquest with the lands of the *Sequani*, and with the shadow of both the *Cimbri* and *Teutones* still fresh in Roman minds, Caesar decided he had enough arguments for a *bellum iustum* and began a preemptive campaign against the looming threat.²⁹⁴

However, after some reconnaissance work, Caesar's scouts informed him that a new German force was gathering by the Rhine. Approximately one hundred cantons of the Suebi were being led by two brothers to regroup and reinforce Ariovistus.²⁹⁵ The arrival of these new troops would have dramatically upset the balance of power present in Gaul, taking Ariovistus from a powerful local warlord to a systemwide threat. The arrival of these unexpected troops, and the ease with which Ariovistus was able to mobilize them is further evidence of the unpredictability and overall volatility of the anarchic system present in Gaul at the start of Caesar's interventions. Thus, Caesar was forced to act before Ariovistus could gain these crucial reinforcements and decided to organize a meeting between himself and the German warlord.²⁹⁶

The case of Ariovistus is a curious one. Indeed, during Caesar's consulship of 59 BCE, the Roman Senate hailed him as a friend to Rome²⁹⁷ and he was bestowed the title of "*Rex Germanorum*" in Caesar's commentaries.²⁹⁸ As such, Caesar was hard pressed to remind the warlord of these honours during their meeting. In a way, Caesar was inciting Ariovistus by reminding him that he owed him for these past favours and demanded he retreated, leaving the *Aedui* and their allies in peace whilst also returning their hostages.²⁹⁹ To which, Ariovistus answered that he had crossed

²⁹³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 31-38.

²⁹⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 31-38.

²⁹⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 37. 3-4.

²⁹⁶ The speech given by Ariovistus to Caesar is likely fictitious, given it follows the trends mentioned by Adler. For more on this trend see: Eric Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians Enemy Speeches in Roman Historiography*, 2014.

²⁹⁷ Meier, *Caesar*. p. 238.

²⁹⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 31. 10.

²⁹⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 43.

the Rhine only at the behest of the Gauls who invited him and not through his own volitions.³⁰⁰ He then explains that he had sought the friendship of Rome in order for them to help him, and not to hinder him.³⁰¹ To him, Caesar's terms were unreasonable, and sought to strip him of his rightful victorious rewards.³⁰² To that effect, he would rescind his friendship with Rome and consider them an enemy.³⁰³ Furthermore, Ariovistus mentions that never before had a Roman army ventured away from its province as Caesar had, forcing him to assume it was an act of war, and as such, would continue to hire Germanic mercenaries to help him protect the lands he had won through the contest of war.³⁰⁴

Interestingly, much like Caesar, Ariovistus was himself invited, by the Gauls, into their system. While, on the one hand, the *Aedui* sought Rome's protection as a balancing tool against their enemies, so did the *Sequani* with Ariovistus and his Germanic mercenaries. Both the warlord and the Emperor were external forces introduced into the system as balancing tools, but through their invitation the balance of power of the whole system was thrown out of equilibrium prompting further bellicosity. Based on Caesar's hasty preemptive reaction and mobilization against Ariovistus, because of his massing *Suebi* reinforcements; one can only imagine the devastation these would have wrought had Caesar been idle. Essentially, it is entirely possible that we could have been studying the Germanic conquest of Gaul through the "Empire by invitation" today, instead of Caesar's. If the presence of Ariovistus and his Germanic mercenaries is not enough evidence to convince you of the pre-existing anarchic situation in Gaul, perhaps the warlord's accusations that Caesar was interfering in his "sphere of occupation"³⁰⁵ would be. Indeed, Ariovistus saw Gaul as his to conquer by right of strength, as is standard in a realist system, while also denouncing Caesar's unjust behaviour.

Now it would be natural to assume that Ariovistus is in the right, and that Caesar is being unreasonable and unjust. His demands are too harsh and treats Ariovistus as the belligerent. In the sphere of international anarchy where no international law exists, the conquered must submit to the

³⁰⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 44. 1-3.

³⁰¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 44. 5. "*Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, atque se hac spe petisse.*"

³⁰² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 44. 5.

³⁰³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 44. 7-8.

³⁰⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 44. 6.

³⁰⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 44. 8. "*Quid sibi vellet, cur in suas possessiones veniret?*"

conqueror. While the *Sequani* had initially invited Ariovistus into their lands, they were unable to defend said lands. Since the Gauls were weaker, through warfare, Ariovistus was able to defeat a Gallic coalition and rightfully lay claim to one third of the *Sequani*'s land. In addition, Ariovistus was well within his rights to ask for tribute and take hostages in order to guarantee the subjugation of the defeated Gauls. Caesar himself does the exact same thing throughout the *Bellum Gallicum* to the vanquished Gauls. So why then is Caesar being "unreasonable" and interfering in affairs so far removed from his jurisdiction?

Firstly, there are the obvious strategic reasons as stated by Caesar himself, Ariovistus is a conqueror and will not be satisfied with his current status quo. He will continue to bring in more Germans from beyond the Rhine, whose abilities as proficient warriors has already been established by Caesar. Following the realist approach, it is safe to assume that Ariovistus would have continued pushing his conquests so long as he remained unchallenged. Having already defeated a confederation of Gauls, it is unlikely they would have been able to overcome him. Therefore, Caesar, not wishing the Roman Empire to share a border with the *Germani*, sought preventative actions against a potential threat, choosing to maintain his friendship with the *Aedui*, rather than his friendship with Ariovistus. He chose the weaker of the two, because it is easier to ensure its loyalty and friendship. One cannot subjugate and control a bloodthirsty and powerful ally; the same cannot be said of a weak and dependant one.

Secondly, Caesar, by being unreasonable and unjust with Ariovistus, and giving him impossible terms, left him without a choice but to respond antagonistically; especially since he is in the "right". By reacting belligerently, and declaring Rome as an enemy, Ariovistus played right into Caesar's hand. Caesar needed to find a *casus belli* in order to confront Ariovistus. Under normal circumstances, the plea for help from his Gallic allies would have sufficed. However, Ariovistus is also a friend of the Roman people, making this a conflict between two Roman allies. Thus, making it unjust for Caesar to intervene on behalf of one, against the other. But, if Ariovistus were the one to rescind Rome's friendship, due to Caesar's impossible terms for peace, Caesar would have his *casus belli* as well as his *bellum iustum*. Baray further explains that Ariovistus had become an undesirable by Rome because he was disturbing the order of the system and disrupting its stability. Baray believes the warlord did so for economic reasons, wanting to unify the Gallic territory under

his rule, and by doing so, trade on a much larger scale with Rome and reaping its rewards. His ambition led for his loss of status with Rome, giving Caesar yet an additional reason to go against him in order to preserve the stability of Gaul and maintain its role as a Roman buffer zone.³⁰⁶

Lastly, Caesar had much to gain through a conflict with Ariovistus. By defeating the overlord, Caesar is replacing him, and adding his territory to his own *Imperium*, subjugating the Gallic tribes under his command in a clientelist relationship.³⁰⁷ Ariovistus was taking tribute and hostages from the tribes he was dominating, and his defeat created a power vacuum whereby the dominated states would now wage war in attempt to command supremacy. The removal of Ariovistus without a suitable replacement would beget a further destabilization of the system; something that Rome, and Caesar, cannot abide. Thus, it is only natural for Caesar to fill the warlord's position and uphold the system's stability upon his defeat. Caesar wintering troops in Gaul, in the lands of the *Sequani*, after having defeated Ariovistus, who had taken said lands, is in fact Caesar filling that power vacuum while also irrevocably altering the balance of power in Gaul forever. These events in Caesar's first book helps establish the theory that Caesar's subjugated Gaul through the "Empire by invitation" concept, while also solidifying the anarchic realities of the Gallic system.

It is important to note that this event concerning Ariovistus will be re-examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis where Caesar's arguments and position will be explained through the lens of his contemporary audience, and the Roman conceptions that surrounded the *bellum iustum*.

³⁰⁶ Baray, *Sociétés Celtiques et Mercenaires (VIIe-Ier Siècle Av. J.-C.)*. p. 353-354.

³⁰⁷ Schadee, "Caesar's Construction of Northern Europe: Inquiry, Contact and Corruption in 'De Bello Gallico.'" p. 161.

2. Book II

The events of Caesar's second book occur in the year 57 BCE when the *Belgae* were conspiring against Rome and preparing for war. Firstly, according to Caesar, the latter were afraid that once Caesar had finished pacifying "Celtic Gaul" he would look towards their lands. The *Belgae* feared sharing a border with the Roman Empire, as well as the presence of its armies.³⁰⁸ Secondly, there was growing discontent amongst the Gauls about the increasing presence of foreign armies in their lands. Germanic incursions had been steadily rising and had culminated with their permanent settlement in Gallic lands under Ariovistus. Furthermore, the presence of foreign powers in Gaul was exacerbated by Caesar's own interventions which only furthered discontent.³⁰⁹ Caesar himself mentions that the presence of his legions had limited the ability of powerful and rich chieftains to hire mercenaries in order to grow their own power.³¹⁰ Thus, the arrival of these foreign units hindered their ability to wage constant war against each other to increase their own standing, further fuelling this discontent. In other words, the chieftains feared the loss of the realist anarchy that allowed them to compete against each other in order to accrue their own power and fulfill their ambitions. The chieftains preferred to chance interstate anarchy and competition in order to become the system's hegemon, but Caesar's arrival distorted the balance of power and through his subjugation of the Gauls is in effect bringing order to the anarchy through hierarchy, quelling their competition. Indeed, according to Waltz³¹¹ order can be brought to an anarchic system through the appearance of a hegemon, whereby competition will decrease, and the system will stabilize as the distribution of power favours one of the units.³¹² As such, the *Belgae* perceiving that Caesar, who didn't have the full support of Rome, was weakened because of his conflict with Ariovistus, decided to pre-emptively act against him before he could consolidate the subjugated lands and truly bring the borders of the Empire to the limits of their lands.

³⁰⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 1.

³⁰⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 1.

³¹⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 1. 4. "*ab non nullis etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro consequi poterant.*"

³¹¹ As seen in Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*.

³¹² Eckstein. p. 14-15.

Subsequently, the *Remi* mention that the *Belgae* were being aided by Germanic mercenaries from beyond the Rhine.³¹³ As was the case with Ariovistus and the *Sequani*, the *Belgae* also resorted to Germanic mercenaries to help bolster their forces. These correlating events highlight the importance of these mercenaries to the Gallic system while also exacerbating the balance of power shifts and instability that they beget. Further still, the *Remi* inform Caesar that the *Belgae* were in fact mostly Germanic peoples that had long ago crossed into Gaul.³¹⁴ Because of the fertility of the land, they decided to colonize it while pushing out its original Gallic inhabitants.

Through conquest, the *Belgae* had forged themselves a considerable “empire” claiming one third of Gaul.³¹⁵ As such, it is possible that these first Germanic “*Belgae*” were invited into Gaul as mercenaries, not unlike the situation with the *Sequani* and Ariovistus; however, without Caesar to interfere, they were able to permanently settle in the territory. Regardless, if the *Belgae* were invited into Gaul as mercenaries or not, their Germanic origins and their settlement in Gaul, highlights the realist paradigm whereby each state, independent of the other units in the system seek first and foremost their own power and security.

According to Caesar, the *Belgae* host attacked the towns nearby to Caesar’s camp, in turn prompting them to call on the Romans for help. Caesar was quick to intervene and forced the surrender of the *Suessiones* and the *Bellovaci*. The latter, after surrendering, asked Caesar for his protection. Diviciacus, the Aeduan, will argue in their favour and will lobby Caesar on their behalf. To which, “Caesar replied that for the respect he had towards Diviciacus and the *Aedui* he would receive them into his protection and save them alive.”³¹⁶ Here lies the first possible example of *deditio* between Caesar and a Gallic tribe. As was previously explained in the Introduction, these rituals are crucial to understanding the international affairs between Caesar and the Gauls, while also highlighting the slow and steady subjugation of the latter by the former throughout his interventions. In this case, the presence of the *deditio* can be inferred from Caesar’s text when he

³¹³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 3.

³¹⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 3-4.

³¹⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 3-4.

³¹⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 15. 1. “Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduorum causa sese eos *in fidem* recepturum et conservaturum dixit”

uses the words “*in fidem recepturum*” indicating a surrender to faith, and the tribe’s official subjugation.³¹⁷

Later, Caesar would find himself at odds with the *Nervii* tribe, who alongside traitors and dissidents from his own baggage train (mostly captured Gauls and Germans), attacked the Roman rear guard.³¹⁸ Hoping to overpower Caesar through this surprise attack, the *Imperator* was forced to personally go from flank to flank in order to encourage his soldiers, even throwing himself into the fray when one of his flanks nearly faltered.³¹⁹ The resulting *Nervii* defeat left their forces significantly weakened, with only 3 leading aristocrats out of 600 having survived the battle alongside only 500 men from the original fighting force of 60 000.³²⁰ Subsequently, Caesar entered the lands of the *Aduatuci* where he laid siege to one of their towns; the townsfolk of which, surrendered immediately upon witnessing the Roman siege engines.³²¹ For both the *Nervii* and the *Aduatuci* surrender was made with the stipulation that they would give up their weapons to the Romans. A stipulation which made the latter reluctant to do so, lest their neighbours (whom they had been the masters of) opportunistically attacked the now defenceless tribe. To that effect, on account of their fears, and of the *Nervii*’s depleted military state, Caesar promised to protect them by “command[ing] the neighbours to do no outrage to the surrendered subjects of Rome”.³²²

The case of both the *Nervii* and the *Aduatuci* shows the full consequences of a surrender to Rome. Despite Caesar engaging the *Belgae* in a defensive war (according to himself) as a riposte to their preemptive belligerence, after each victory Caesar steadily increased his political power in the system through the subjugation of the defeated units. The words “command” and “surrendered subjects” speak volumes towards this trend. While Caesar has no supervising body with international jurisdiction, this lack of a supranational authority in the context of the realist anarchy, allows the Romans to assert dominance over the Gauls through sheer military strength. By referring to the defeated tribes as “subjects” Caesar is affirming that these units entered a *deditio* contract

³¹⁷ On Diviciacus, the only scholarly work to be found was Gerhard Dobesch, “Einige Beobachtungen Zu Politik Und Tod Des Haeduers Diviciacus Und Seines Bruders Dumnorix,” *Tyche: Beiträge Zur Alten Geschichte, Papyrologie Und Epigraphik* 19 (2004): 19–74. Which did not seem relevant to this thesis. It is important to note, that due to language limitations, my analysis of this work was incomplete.

³¹⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 15-27.

³¹⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 15-27.

³²⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 28.

³²¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 31.

³²² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 32. 2. “*se id quod in Nervii fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam inferrent.*”

with Rome, whether they knew it or not.³²³ On the other hand, for Caesar to “command” neighbouring tribes not to attack these newly subjugated tribes, infers the clientelist nature of *deditio* whereby Rome offers protection to its clients in exchange for obedience. Moreover, the ability of Caesar to impose his will, through command, on undefeated neighbouring tribes, highlights Caesar’s growing political influence in the region (and by de facto Rome’s power, since Caesar was there representing the *Res Publica*. Caesar is taking advantage of the anarchy of the Gallic system to absorb the “head” tribes or patrons into his protectorate, in turn indirectly subjugating their former clients by taking over the clientelist relationship. That would explain how Caesar is able to command these neighbouring tribes by defeating those that “were accustomed to hold mastery” over them.³²⁴ Lastly, through the integration of these tribes, Caesar is widening the borders of his *Imperium*, allowing for further possible *casus belli* as other neighbouring tribes grow weary of Rome’s intentions, just as the *Belgae* had. Caesar is using the natural fear and distrust that exists between the units in the realist system in order to further instigate wars which he may benefit from.

Caesar’s victories, alongside those of Publius Crassus (who subjugated the maritime states), led to a mass surrender of units from beyond the Rhine. The *Belgae* defeated, Caesar left his legions to winter in the lands of friendly tribes, before heading off to Rome. In recognition of these events, fifteen days of thanksgiving were declared in Rome.

³²³ See the Roman capture of Aegina in Polybius, *The Histories*, Book 9. 42. and 20. 10.

³²⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 31. 6. “*Sibi praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati quam ab his per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consuessent.*”

3. Book III

While in Rome for winter, a host of *Seduni* and *Veragi* assaulted one of Caesar's legions garrisoned near the alps under the command of Galba. The Gauls seeing that the Roman garrison was not at full strength decided to opportunistically strike against them. According to Caesar's account, these states saw the presence of the nearby legion as an indication of the desire of Rome to acquire their territories. Thus, they attacked Galba's garrison out of fear of future Roman intervention and subsequent subjugation.³²⁵

In truth, Galba's legion was not merely garrisoned for the winter. Caesar stationed Galba and the twelfth legion near a common trade route. There, Galba led numerous assaults on the neighbouring tribes, capturing many of their forts and forcing them to give out hostages. The Gauls' natural fear of Roman expansionism was exacerbated by Galba's bellicosity and Caesar's recent large-scale pacifications of Gallic territory. As such, similarly to the *Belgae*, the *Seduni* and *Veragi* chose to take the initiative while only one legion was present near their lands.

Once again, this incident with the twelfth legion shows the anarchic situation in Gaul. Roman soldiers garrisoned for winter, in an area that was not under their control, came into assault by Gauls despite the presence of hostages. This indicates that the Gallic tribes were accustomed and ready to wage war regardless of traditional contemporary means of international peacekeeping: i.e., the presence and exchange of hostages. Traditionally, this exchange ensures no further hostilities will take place lest harm come to the held hostages, functioning as a form of guarantee in a world without supranational order. Thus, by going to war, the Gauls indicate that they are willing to risk the safety of their kinsmen and children if a decisive pre-emptive strike can be dealt unto the Romans.

Originally, Galba and his troops were only meant to garrison for the winter near the alps and defend the nearby trade routes.³²⁶ However, the twelfth legion was dragged into several conflicts with the nearby Gauls and due to lacking corn supplies, Crassus the younger who was in command of the legions wintering near the maritime tribes, sent out deputies to requisition supplies from them. Thereafter, the *Venetii* captured the emissaries in the hopes of exchanging them for previously

³²⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 2.

³²⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 6.

given hostages. Following their example, the rest of the maritime tribes followed suit.³²⁷ By capturing emissaries, the Gauls were willing to risk war, for the chance of recovering their hostages. When combined, the actions of the *Seduni*, *Veragi*, and *Venetii*, highlight the volatility of the Gallic system. In the first instance, the Gauls were willing to sacrifice their Roman held hostages in exchange for a chance at a decisive victory against the Romans. While in the second instance, they were willing to go to war to attempt to recover their previously lost hostages. In both cases, the safeguarding nature of the exchange of hostages as a means to guarantee some form of international order, was completely inconsequential, if not irrelevant, to the Gauls. This disregard for international conventions entrenches the pre-existing anarchy of the system in defiance of contemporary norms.

While Caesar attributes the volatility of the system to the “rash” nature of the Gauls³²⁸, for us, it can better be explained by the honour culture in Gaul which promotes bellicosity. This will be explored in more detail later in this chapter. Yet, the banding together of the Maritime tribes³²⁹ would suggest a higher understanding of the geopolitical realities of their anarchic system. By effectively uniting their forces, the Gauls exhibited a balancing attempt to counteract Rome’s increasingly dominant position in their territory. However, by imprisoning the emissaries, the *Venetii* had violated the rights of men “whose titles had ever been sacred and inviolable among all nations”³³⁰. Indeed, as stated by Eckstein, despite no formal presence of international law, certain widespread, common, inviolable conventions existed to help regulate interstate affairs³³¹; the sacrosanct nature of emissaries and deputies was one of said customs. Thus, by disregarding this common convention, the *Venetii* (and the rest of the Maritime tribes) had committed a grave international *faux pas*; subsequently, granting Caesar a *casus belli* in order to wage a *bellum iustum* without breaking the *pax deorum*. Or, in other words, allowed Caesar to conduct a “legal” war against them, within the strict confines of Roman traditional practices, while also allowing him to justify his actions to his Roman opponents in the Senate. Furthermore, the Gaul’s lack of adherence to international conventions (treaties, hostages, emissaries), and rashness towards war and

³²⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 8.

³²⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 8. 3. “*ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia*”

³²⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 8.

³³⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 9. 3. “*legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos*”

³³¹ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 39.

violence, unequivocally demonstrates the lack of international order, and exacerbates the state of anarchy in Gaul. As such, since these conventions can be so easily broken, especially by powerful states, it highlights the lack of regulatory supranational authority, and allows the free rein of ambitious hegemonic powers.

After a series of Roman victories at sea, the *Venetii* surrendered to Caesar. However, deciding to make an example out of them, so that other Gallic tribes might respect Roman emissaries, Caesar put their entire aristocracy to the sword and had the rest of their men enslaved.³³² Uncharacteristically, Caesar acted with great severity when faced with the *Venetii* surrender. Typically known for his mercy, in this instance, Caesar displayed none. Two factors are likely responsible here: Firstly, the sanctity of international conventions had not been respected by a weaker state and as such, drastic measures had to be taken by the stronger one, as firm punishment. And secondly, through his interventions, Caesar was slowly bringing hierarchy, and therefore order, to the anarchy in Gaul. To that effect, he had to ensure that the other subjugated states would not follow the *Venetii*'s example and rebel. Lest we forget, Caesar had previously been very lenient to several of the tribes he had waged war against (*Belgae*, *Helvetii*), and by being uncompromising with the *Venetii*, he was warning the other tribes that he could be just as harsh as he was merciful.

³³² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 3. 16. 4. "*Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.*"

4. Book IV:

The following year, the *Usipetes* and *Tencteri*, two Germanic tribes, crossed the Rhine to escape the *Suebi* who were pushing them out of their lands.³³³ The *Suebi* were the strongest of the Germanic tribes, according to Caesar whose numbers are likely to be exaggerated for rhetorical purposes, hosting over 100 cantons with the ability to levy 1000 men each. The *Suebi* waged yearly wars on the tribes outside their borders and were so confident in their own renown that they left large swaths of their lands undefended.³³⁴ These yearly wars waged by the largest Germanic tribe, suggests that the lands beyond the Rhine had their own anarchic system not dissimilar to Gaul's or the Mediterranean's. Furthermore, based on previous experiences with the Germanic tribes, and their famed proclivity for war (through their conquests of northern Gaul, and their widespread use as mercenaries for both Caesar and the Gallic tribes) it can be inferred that the Germans often resorted to violence as a means of conflict resolution within the confines of their own system, making them exceptional warriors. In addition to the harsh conditions of their system, every aspect of the *Suebi*'s culture, from their social structure to their spartan training program, were designed to prepare them for war, to make them strong, and to avoid any "effeminizing" influences (such as wine).³³⁵ This is why, for the purposes of this thesis, we will simply assume that *Germania* was in its own state of anarchy without going into further details about it. The *Usipetes* and the *Tencteri* were not the first tribes to be in opposition with the *Suebi*. The latter had already made the *Ubii* a tributary state, a tell-tale sign of expansionist bellicosity.

The escape of the *Usipetes* and the *Tencteri*, as well as the *Suebi*'s growing hegemonic influence, are signs of unstable balances of power which are a critical aspects of an anarchic system.³³⁶ As such, the increasing power of one of the units in the system, pushed two other units into another system: the Gallic one. The fleeing Germanic tribes, in their desperation, laid waste to the *Menapii* who had settlements on both sides of the Rhine.³³⁷ There, they wintered whilst inviting even more Germanic tribes to join them. As was made thus far clear by Caesar's interventions, and his fear of

³³³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 1.

³³⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 1.

³³⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 2.

³³⁶ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 12.

³³⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 4. 2. "*quas regiones Menapii incolebant. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant*"

the *Germani*, he could not allow permanent and uncontrolled migrations of Germanic tribes into Gaul. Thus, he decided once again to pre-emptively act before the Germans could establish a stable foothold in both numbers and territory.³³⁸ Upon Caesar's arrival to the lands of the *Menapii*, he sent, to no avail, a delegation to treat with the Germans. After some cavalry skirmishes where Caesar lost 74 of his *equites*,³³⁹ a Germanic delegation comprised of the tribe's most important men was sent to him seeking "peace". Refusing to negotiate, Caesar had them quickly imprisoned.³⁴⁰ Indeed, he felt that this small victory, which the Germans had won through deceit, had given them hope and began rousing them against him. He therefore needed to make an example out of them.³⁴¹ With their most important men imprisoned, Caesar launched a surprise attack on the *Germani*, easily defeating them without the single loss of Roman life. Their lack of leadership caused a widespread panic leading most of them to be slain in the rout. By Caesar's account, some 430 000 souls were lost, including women and children.³⁴²

Ironically, by having the emissaries detained, Caesar violated both their sacrosanct status and international conventions. Yet, a year prior, Caesar had severely punished the *Venetii* for the same offence. These events highlight the nature of the realist paradigm. Caesar didn't fear repercussions for having violated a tradition that he himself held sacred and used it as an excuse to wage a cruel and merciless war against a Germanic tribe; because, he was in a position of strength. Without a form of supranational government to police and administrate violations in international conventions, they can be easily broken by hegemonic powers without any consequences. Quite to the contrary, Caesar even used this violation to gain a clear advantage for an upcoming battle by stripping the Germans of their leadership and their most important political figures, leaving their army severely weakened in terms of command. Without any international law or means of enforcing the respect of international conventions, the units within a system are left at the mercy of the realist anarchic paradigm whereby the strongest units can dictate the rules of the system. Hence, Caesar can punish a weaker unit for an offence, while also gaining an advantage through the comital of the same offence.

³³⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 6. 1.

³³⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Bppl 4. 12. 3. "*In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur quattuor et septuaginta*"

³⁴⁰ The Germans had already previously feigned seeking peace, only to attack Caesar, leading to the loss of his cavalry. The particulars of this event will be covered in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

³⁴¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 13.

³⁴² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 16.

Despite the massacre, a host of the defeated Germanic cavalry managed to escape across the Rhine and sought refuge in the lands of the *Sugambri*. To that effect, Caesar sent envoys to the latter, demanding that they surrender the men that had waged war against him and against “Gaul”. The *Sugambri* replied that the limits of the Roman Empire stopped at the Rhine. If Caesar did not suffer the Germans to cross, why should they suffer him?³⁴³ In essence, they informed him that he had no authority beyond the Rhine. By doing so, the Germans recognized that Gaul now marked the limits of the Roman Empire, or at the very least, the limits of its influence. This recognition is only exacerbated by Caesar’s own claims that the Germans had caused *iniuria* by attacking Gaul, something he considered to be analogous with an attack on himself. Thus, it would seem that in Caesar’s own perception, Gaul was already pacified and subjugated, a fact confirmed by the words of the Germans through their demarcation of the *Imperium*’s limits. Through his interventions, Caesar had now become the *de facto* authority in Gaul, with which the *Germani* were now forced to negotiate. However, by adding Gaul to Rome’s sphere of influence, they were in direct contact with that of the Germans; with the contact of these two spheres of influence, the “possibilities of serious conflict are obvious”³⁴⁴.

Subsequently, at the behest of the *Ubii*, and to help safeguard them, Caesar’s troops built a bridge³⁴⁵ to cross the Rhine in order to wage a preemptive war against the *Suebi*.³⁴⁶ Here lies another example of the hypocrisy of the realist system. Caesar had waged wars on numerous Germans, including Ariovistus, for having crossed the Rhine into Gaul. These crossings provided Caesar with enough cause to wage a *bellum iustum* against them. However, despite the reasonable argument of the *Sugambri* with regard to the delimitations of the Roman’s sphere of influence, Caesar crosses the Rhine nonetheless. So once again, while Caesar is completely capable of reprimanding weaker states; as the hegemon, he has no qualms engaging in the same behaviour. If anything, the hypocrisy found within this system helps establish Eckstein’s argument that the Romans were not more or less bellicose/violent than their contemporary counterparts within the system. But rather, that they possessed exceptional military organization and discipline, giving way to countless

³⁴³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 16.

³⁴⁴ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 19.

³⁴⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 17-18.

³⁴⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 16.

successes across multiple theatres of war.³⁴⁷ Thus, achieving a hegemonic status that allowed them to bend the rules of the anarchy and use the chaos to their advantage.

Caesar remained a total of eighteen days in *Germania* during which time he sought out the *Sugambri* and destroyed them.³⁴⁸ Subsequently, he went to the lands of the *Ubii*, to answer their call for aid against the *Suebi*. The latter had already mobilized all their cantons for war and were awaiting the arrival of the Romans in the heart of their lands. Yet, having accomplished all his objectives, Caesar saw no reason to engage them, and retreated across the Rhine without any confrontation taking place.³⁴⁹ Cato the Younger had actually been an adamant opponent of Caesar's interventions against the *Suebi*, claiming that the *Imperator* broke the *Pax Deorum* through his unprovoked aggression against them.³⁵⁰

The summer being almost over, Caesar decided he would use the remaining time to cross the English Channel to gain invaluable information for his next campaign. Indeed, Caesar was planning military interventions into Britain for the following summer. According to him, the Britons had been assisting the Gauls throughout Caesar's previous campaign, so he sought to pacify them.³⁵¹ However, since no Roman had ever been to the British Isles, they were shrouded in mystery. Yet, since the Britons were made aware of Caesar's plans, thanks to information provided to them by Gallic traders, they sent envoys to him that promised they would give him hostages and would accept "the empire of Rome".³⁵² Accepting their offer, Caesar sent Commius, whom he had recently made king of the *Atrebates* (after having subdued them), to petition states and tribes in Britain on his behalf.³⁵³

³⁴⁷ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 205.

³⁴⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 19.

³⁴⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 19.

³⁵⁰ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 221.

³⁵¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 20.

³⁵² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 21. 5. "*ad eum legati veniunt, qui polliceantur obsides dare atque imperio populi Romani obtemperare*"

³⁵³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 21. 8. "*Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet.*"

The appointment of Commius as *rex*,³⁵⁴ and his use as an emissary provides us with interesting evidence regarding Caesar's utilization of aggressive diplomacy and lends itself to the theory of empire by invitation with regards to the Gallic conquests, both of which will be further explored in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

Using eighty transport ships to carry two legions, Caesar made way for Briton.³⁵⁵ Upon his landing, somewhere between the modern-day towns of Walmer and Deal, Caesar was faced with harsh resistance.³⁵⁶ After fierce fighting, Caesar managed to rout the enemy but his lack of cavalry hindered a total victory as he was unable to pursue the fleeing Britons.³⁵⁷ Defeated, the latter sent emissaries to the Roman general with the hopes of surrendering; which Caesar agreed to in exchange for hostages.³⁵⁸ However, the peace with the Britons would not last long, as they would soon go against their word and re-engage Caesar's forces. The latter had left his cavalry in Gaul for them to join him later; following a devastating storm, much of these reinforcements were either lost at sea or forced back towards Gaul.³⁵⁹ Caesar had made plans to winter in Gaul, with the British expedition merely being for first contact and scouting purposes. With the loss of his reinforcing cavalry, and his own transport ships being unusable, he was stuck in Britain with no winter supplies. Sensing the Romans's weakened state, the British tribes once again chanced the fortunes of war and engaged Caesar's forces. Taking advantage of the Romans's situation, the British tribes hoped that a decisive victory against the *Imperator* would safeguard their isle from further invasion attempts.³⁶⁰ The Britons were once again defeated and Caesar repaired his ships and sailed back to Gaul. There, he found the *Menapii* and *Morini* in open revolt, which he managed to repress rapidly before wintering in Belgic lands.³⁶¹

³⁵⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, 4. 21. 7. "*eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat, cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit.*"

³⁵⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 22.

³⁵⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 26.

³⁵⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 26.

³⁵⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 27.

³⁵⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 28-29.

³⁶⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 30. 2. "*quod his superatis aut reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum confidebant.*"

³⁶¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 38.

Twice now the Britons had sought peace with the Romans, only to make empty promises and assurances as they declared war. Not unlike the Gauls which tenuously kept their peace agreements with Caesar, The Britons also seemingly had no respect for Roman customs of international relations. As shown by Eckstein, gods and the divine needed to be invoked regularly to safeguard international conventions because of a lack of real world guarantees in the anarchic system.³⁶² However, the Gauls, and by extent the Celts, had no respect for oaths or promises, because they had no fear of the divine.³⁶³ Thus, meaning that the traditional contemporary means of insuring international guarantees had no effect on the Gauls (or Celts) explaining their frequent traitorous behaviour with Caesar. Therefore, the incident with the Britons' repeated betrayal after suing for peace³⁶⁴, is merely an additional indication pointing to the overwhelming evidence at the state of anarchy and the permanence of war perpetuated by the fragility of peace guarantees in the ancient Celtic world.

³⁶² Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 40.

³⁶³ According to Cicero found in Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*. p. 56.

³⁶⁴ As well as the *Menapii* and *Morini* revolts.

5. Book V:

Upon his return to Gaul after the winter, and suspecting a rebellion, Caesar led four legions into the lands of the *Treviri* because they had been absent from the Roman convened Gallic councils and were ignoring Caesar's commands. Additionally, they were stirring up the Germans beyond the Rhine, coaxing them to cross.³⁶⁵ According to Caesar, two men of the *Treviri*: Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were vying for power. Upon hearing the news of his arrival, Cingetorix chose to pre-emptively meet with Caesar to show his support and state that he wished to maintain his tribes' friendship with Rome.³⁶⁶ On the other hand, Indutiomarus gathered his followers and prepared for war. However, fearing the loss of his support and clientelist power base, Indutiomarus sent emissaries to Caesar suing for peace. Unwilling to spend too much time in Gaul, as his second campaign in Britain was looming, Caesar accepted Indutiomarus' offer on the condition that he gave the Romans hostages.³⁶⁷ Yet, doubting Indutiomarus' sincerity, Caesar began swaying the chiefs of the *Treviri* towards Cingetorix, socially empowering the latter while infuriating the former.³⁶⁸ Once again, Caesar is actively interfering and shaping another state's politics.

Having settled the issues with the *Treviri* prior to any rebellion erupting, Caesar once again sailed for Britain, but this time, taking with him a body of cavalry levied from throughout Gaul with him.³⁶⁹ The presence of these Gallic allied troops (who from their perspective would not see a difference between being allied troops and mercenaries)³⁷⁰ within Caesar's army highlights the Romans' increasing importance, and influence, within the Gallic system. Indeed, it was the long-standing Roman military custom to invite allied armies to its own campaign, but while this may have been customary for the Romans, from the Gallic perspective Caesar may simply have been another warlord that hired them for military service. Nevertheless, Caesar's integration of this cavalry within his own military structure was not just a means of strengthening his military forces

³⁶⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 1-2.

³⁶⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 3. 3. "*e quibus alter, simul atque de Caesaris legionumque adventu cognitum est, ad eum venit, se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit.*"

³⁶⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 4.

³⁶⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 4.

³⁶⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 5.

³⁷⁰ See the debate in Chapter 1 between Baray and Brunaux with regards to defining a mercenary.

or demonstrating superiority towards defeated territories, but also as a means to safeguard against possible rebellions while he was abroad. Indeed, the cavalry host that accompanied Caesar was mainly comprised of Gallic chiefs and noblemen. Thus, hindering Gallic leadership and making it far more difficult to organize an insurrection. A specific example to that effect is Caesar's insistence that Dumnorix the Aeduan accompanies him.³⁷¹ Caesar knew that he was bent on revolution, and by forcing him to accompany them, it would be impossible for him to plot against the Roman presence in Gaul.

Even so, the prospect of rebellion amongst the *Aedui* is a hint towards the growing discontent that the whole of Gaul held against Caesar and Rome's increasing hegemonic status within their system. The fact that Rome's long-term allies and friends began contemplating revolution, possibly to balance against Rome's growing uncontested control of the system, speaks volumes to the geopolitical situation, and the clear shift in the balance of power that has occurred in Gaul since the start of Caesar's interventions. As was the case in the Greco/Macedonian Mediterranean world³⁷², the arrival of Rome into the system's anarchy shattered its de facto balance of power, forcing paradigm shifts unto its units. As such, Dumnorix's open discontent with the Romans, shows the beginnings of a clear divide within Gaul's factions and as the fight for Gaul becomes ever more important, more and more cleavages will appear separating the Gauls between Balancing and Bandwagoning States.³⁷³

Despite Caesar's direct command to Dumnorix for him to follow them to Britain, Dumnorix and his Aeduan companions, on the eve of their departure towards Britain, left Caesar's army to return home. Subsequently, Caesar instructed some of his cavalry to apprehend the deserters and bring them back to camp; Dumnorix and his companions refused and resisted, forcing Caesar's cavalry to follow their general's command and slay them.³⁷⁴ Dumnorix was an important Aeduan noble, who held sway over his kin and was part of their political elite. Rome's alliance and friendship with the *Aedui* had been instrumental during Caesar's campaign; with the Gauls providing his army with a constant source of corn and acted as a safe haven for his troops. Additionally, lest we forget,

³⁷¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 6. 1. "*Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix Aeduus, de quo ante ab nobis dictum est. Hunc secum habere in primis constituerat, quod eum cupidum rerum novarum, cupidum imperi, magni animi, magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis cognoverat.*"

³⁷² Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 82.

³⁷³ These concepts were defined in the Introduction. See pages 23-24.

³⁷⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 7-8.

Caesar's interventions in Gaul began at the behest of the *Aedui* and under the guise of providing them with help against the *Helvetii*. Despite the vital strategic importance of the Aeduan's friendship with Rome, Caesar saw fit to execute one of their political nobles for refusing a direct order from him. The power of life and death over members of a state's political elite, free from reprisal or consequence, is more akin of subjugation found in Roman *deditio* rituals, rather than a bonified friendship between two equal States. Thus, in the span of a few years, from the start of his interventions to his fifth year of campaign, Caesar had gained so much power by destabilizing the balance of power within the system that he was able to levy troops from Gaul, interfere in the political affairs of individual units, but also held the power of life and death over their nobles.

Dumnorix having been killed, and the risks of a rebellion amongst the *Aedui* dead alongside him, Caesar was now free to pursue his planned campaign in Britain.³⁷⁵ Upon arriving on the British shore, he found that the Britons had gathered a large war host inland. After a skirmish, they were driven back by Caesar's cavalry and forced to hide in fortified positions in the woods (both natural and man-made).³⁷⁶ Caesar notes that these defensive positions were built in advance for war between the Britons, and not as a preparation to repel the Romans.³⁷⁷ Thus, the presence of these forts helps us extend the anarchic Gallic system to the British Isles as well. These fortified positions suggest that a permanence of war existed there prior to the Romans' arrival, which can be further exacerbated via Cassivellaunus's appointment as commander in chief of the Briton forces. Prior to that, it is said that he was renowned for waging continuous war against the other British tribes.³⁷⁸ Indeed, these forts indicate a desire from individual units to ensure their own survival in the presence of a realist anarchy. They are acting based on their own interest and fortifying their territory in anticipation of bellicosity. This is not dissimilar to the widespread presence of *oppida*

³⁷⁵ Upon doing research on Dumnorix I was made aware of the following articles: Giacomo Amilcare Mario Ranzani, "The Rebellion of Dumnorix and the Second Expedition to Britain: Events Manipulation in Caesar's *De Bello Gallico* V 1-7," *Maia: Rivista Di Letterature Classiche* 70, no. 3 (2018): 461–76. Which discusses how Caesar used rhetoric and manipulation in his descriptions of Dumnorix's betrayal. As well as Dobesch, "Einige Beobachtungen Zu Politik Und Tod Des Haeduers Diviciacus Und Seines Bruders Dumnorix." Which provided no relevant information for this thesis. And finally, Werner Rinner, "Caesar Und Dumnorix, Ein Beispiel Manipulierter Information," in *Jahresber. 1978-1979 Der Expositur Stift Rein Des 1. Bundesgymnasiums Graz* (Graz 1979), n.d., 30–34, accessed August 26, 2020, which proved too difficult for our library to acquire.

³⁷⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 9. 4. "Repulsi ab equitatu se in silvas abdiderunt, locum nacti egregie et natura et opere munitum, quem domestici belli, ut videbantur, causa iam ante praeparaverant"

³⁷⁷ Caesar and Edwards, *Caesar*, 2004. Book 5. 9. 4.

³⁷⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 11. 9. "Huic superiore tempore cum reliquis civitatibus continentia bella intercesserant"

found in Gaul. Additionally, Cassivellaunus' bellicosity towards the other units shows a desire to achieve hegemonic status within the system through the use of force. Once again, in the presence of a realist anarchy, individual states will try to accumulate as much power as possible because it is one of the only ways to ensure its survival. This aggressive behavior undoubtedly helped increase the overall systemic violence found in Briton, hearkening back to Eckstein's own arguments regarding the bellicosity of Philip V of Macedon and the Seleucid king Antiochus III against the Greek states and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean. Their bellicosity helped fuel the overall violence found in the system and aggravated the systemic crisis caused by the shifts in the balance of power after the decline of Ptolemaic Egypt.³⁷⁹ Lastly, despite the innate bellicosity between the various units in Briton, they recognized the immediate threat to their survival posed by Caesar's interventions and set aside their differences in order to balance against this threat and even appointed the most bellicose amongst them, Cassivellaunus, as the commander of their combined forces, highlighting important realist paradigms in the behavior of these ancient *civitates*.

Caesar was able to push back Cassivellaunus and his forces to his territories near the Thames and began laying siege to the lands of the *Trinobantes*.³⁸⁰ Shortly thereafter, the latter surrendered to Romans, prompting many of the other British tribes to follow suit.³⁸¹ Caesar had successfully subjugated Briton, by the fact that they gave him hostages and agreed to pay a yearly tribute to Rome.³⁸² The surrender of these tribes, highlights a paradigm shift in Briton, whereby the *Trinobantes*, through *deditio*, had gained the protection of Rome. Through this protection, the balance of power in Briton had shifted, as Rome introduced, and imposed, itself on the other units. Beyond the obvious links with subjugation, the *Trinobantes* surrender to Rome also provided Caesar with a means to intervene in Briton on a regular basis. Afterall, the protection of allies is a well-established *casus belli* in the *Bellum Gallicum*, even having been its initial cause.

His campaign in Briton complete, and upon his return to Gaul, Caesar divided his legions and spread them throughout the whole of Gaul for winter.³⁸³ However, Tasgetius, a *Carnutes* that

³⁷⁹ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 6.

³⁸⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 20-21.

³⁸¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 20-21.

³⁸² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 22. 4. "*obsides imperat et quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet constituit*"

³⁸³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 24.

Caesar had elevated to the rank of king for his loyalty, was assassinated after two years of rule.³⁸⁴ Thus, fearing a rebellion, Caesar ordered Lucius Plancus to move his legions to the lands of the *Carnutes* and to seize, arrest, and send to Caesar those who had killed Tasgetius.³⁸⁵ Moreover, Caesar was forced to divide his legions for the winter, his forces were now dangerously spread thin and sensing this opportunity, the Gauls were spurred to revolt by Indutiomarus of the *Trevirii*.³⁸⁶ Under the auspice of these widespread revolts, Ambiorix of the *Eburones*, along with his forces, attacked one of Caesar's encampments led by the *legatus* Sabinus.³⁸⁷ After failing to capture the Roman camp, Ambiorix attempted to negotiate with them. He informed Sabinus and Cotta (an officer in the encampment) that he had been coerced to attack them by his tribe and by the rest of Gaul. He affirmed that he owed much to Caesar who had been a great friend of his and exclaimed that he did not wish to harm them. Moreover, he warned the officers that all of the Roman garrisons throughout Gaul were being attacked simultaneously as part of this coordinated uprising, and that the longer they would hold out, the more dire their situation would be seeing as a large host of Germanic mercenaries had been invited to cross the Rhine.³⁸⁸ Lastly, he promises the commanders, under oath, that were they to surrender the camp, he would allow all of them to leave unscathed in order to regroup with Caesar.³⁸⁹ Sabinus and Cotta argued these points, with the former wanting to accept the Gaul's offer, and the latter wishing to remain within the camp. Ultimately, Cotta concedes to Sabinus, and they agree to leave the camp the next day.³⁹⁰ The deciding factor in Sabinus' decision, was Ambiorix, who had given them council and he believed him to be a trustworthy friend of Rome.... this would prove to be a fatal error. As Cotta expected, Ambiorix had made nothing but false promises to Sabinus in order to pull the Romans out of the safety of their encampment and ambush them.³⁹¹ Once the Romans were outside the camp, the Gauls engaged them in combat, and were able to win a decisive victory forcing the Romans back into their camp. In addition to the treacherous means used by the Gauls to lure the Romans out, the Roman commanders tried to negotiate with the Gauls whilst the battle ensued. Ambiorix agreed,

³⁸⁴ Upon doing additional research on Tasgetius, no scholarly works on him were found.

³⁸⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 25-26.

³⁸⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 26.

³⁸⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 27.

³⁸⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 27.

³⁸⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 27.

³⁹⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 29-31.

³⁹¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 32.

but purposefully slowed down negotiations allowing more time for his troops to press the wavering Romans who were now deprived of their leadership.³⁹²

The analysis of this part of the *Bellum Gallicum* is twofold: Firstly, regarding the events with the *Carnutes*, and secondly, with the events concerning Ambiorix's treachery. In the first case, it is further evidence of Caesar's interference in the affairs of Gallic tribes. In this instance, his appointed leader was assassinated, and despite this push by the *Carnutes* to free themselves from their Roman puppet king in an act of auto-determination, Caesar's grasp on Gaul is powerful and secure enough to exact vengeance by capturing, judging, and punishing those at fault. In this instance, he is exercising both executive and judiciary powers amongst the *Carnutes*. While it is true that the latter was a subjugated state and Caesar was the one who appointed its king, he was rendering justice upon it for having supplanted his choice. The entire incident shows how Caesar was now micromanaging the units in the system and the extent of their subjugation. He is bringing order to the anarchy through hierarchy.³⁹³

In the second instance, the ambush by the Gauls and the betrayal of Ambiorix does not come as a surprise given all the evidence Caesar has provided with regards to the untrustworthy nature of the Gauls. While the traitorous characteristics of the Gauls remains a stereotype advanced by ancient authors, including Caesar, the fact remains that oaths, promises, the giving of hostages, and other contemporary interstate diplomatic conventions (meant to account for some form of international law) were not strictly followed or abided by the Gauls. Once again, it exemplifies the state of interstate anarchy present in the system. If anything, the fact that Ambiorix, someone whom Caesar had greatly helped, was willing to sacrifice his friendship with Rome, by attacking, and betraying the trust of Sabinus who referred to him as "not an enemy" but "a devoted friend"³⁹⁴; shows that he believed he could gain more power and renown, for himself and his state by achieving a military victory over the weakened Romans. It is a clear-cut example of a unit following realist paradigms by placing its own interest, ambitions, and security, over preestablished notions of friendship and alliances. His actions embody the characteristics of the realist perception. Nevertheless, Ambiorix must have known that Caesar would retaliate and not leave this *iniuria* unresolved. Thus, this event shows that the Gauls were more than willing to risk war, and retaliation, even against the system's

³⁹² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 36-38.

³⁹³ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 14-15.

³⁹⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 31. 6. "*non ab hoste, sed ab homine amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum*"

growing hegemon, if they believed that it would ultimately advance their own interests and allow them to acquire more power in the theatre of Gallic anarchy. Once again, this instance shows a clear example of the Gallic tribes balancing against Caesar and his growing influence in the system. It is important to note that while the Gauls are showing repeated examples of balancing against Caesar's interventions (in the face of those tribes, such as the *Aeudi*, that have bandwaggoned with the Romans), this behavior is not as intense as the Greek polities who Eckstein has highlighted were particularly active in their balancing behavior as a response to the rise of a local hegemon.³⁹⁵ Nevertheless, these examples help establish the presence of the realist paradigms in the ancient Gallic system.

Caesar did not appoint a king only to the *Carnutes*, he also appointed a king to the *Senones*. Not unlike the fate that Tasgetius, so too, was the king of the *Senones* assassinated.³⁹⁶ To answer for this killing, Caesar demanded that the whole *Senones* Senate come to him.³⁹⁷ To be able to make such a demand of a tribe's ruling elite demonstrates once again Caesar's position and dominance in Gaul. However, the *Imperator* knows too well that his grasp on the territory is not completely stable. The recent events regarding these assassinations makes Caesar question all of the Gallic tribes' loyalties with the exception of the *Remi*, thanks to their aid in recent wars, and the *Aedui* thanks to their long friendship with Rome.³⁹⁸ He was right to be weary, as Ambiorix's success against Sabinus had emboldened the rest of the Gauls to follow suit. Most notably, Indutiomarus³⁹⁹ who began to raise forces from various tribes, as well as Germanic mercenaries, to attack Labienus' camp. To further make his intentions clear, Indutiomarus summoned an armed convention, which was the traditional Gallic way of declaring war. Customarily, the last man to arrive to the convention would be tortured and killed because of his hesitation or cowardice. However, Indutiomarus was careless in an attack against the Romans led by Cicero. The latter feigned weakness to bait the Gauls in, subsequently leading his forces into a *sortie* while focusing their efforts on killing Indutiomarus, which they did. With the death of their commander, the Gallic forces quickly routed, and the Romans escaped sharing the fate of Sabinus and Cotta.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁵ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 65.

³⁹⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 54-58.

³⁹⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 54-58.

³⁹⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 54-58.

³⁹⁹ Indutiomarus was an important actor during the events of Book III.

⁴⁰⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 54-58.

One of Eckstein's core arguments with regards to establishing anarchy and the permanence of war within a system is using "honour culture". He argues that societies which abide by an "honour culture" apply systemwide pressure which increases the chance of bellicosity and violence.⁴⁰¹ His argument is logical given that the glory (and wealth) that can be achieved through warfare would undoubtedly be valuable to honour cultures. "Rome and barbarians were honour-based societies"⁴⁰², while the arguments given throughout chapter one of this thesis help to establish the Gauls as an "honour culture", it does not specifically explain this point. While common sense would naturally allow us to infer such a claim, given the Gauls' love of war, renown as great warriors, and mercenary activities. Indutiomarus' summon of the armed convention helps us empirically prove that point. The Gauls held war to such a high esteem that they would execute the last man to arrive to the summit.⁴⁰³ As such, it can be understood that Gallic warriors had a duty to eagerly answer their warlord's call and emphatically follow him to war. The eagerness with which these Gauls are expected to answer the call, in order to demonstrate their *virtus*, unequivocally identifies them as an "honour culture", therefore, befitting of Eckstein's argument.

However, to help further demonstrate Gaul as an honour culture, we turn to J. E. Lendon's *Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World*, which outlines the importance of honour in the Roman Empire. To that effect, Lendon argues that honour served a particular role in ancient societies, where it would help conceal the less desirable aspects of society and make them more tolerable. In essence, "It allows proud men to obey without balking, orders to be given without inspiring hatred, sacks of gold to be accepted without shame by men who could not bear to be imagined other men's hirelings."⁴⁰⁴ Because of this concealing nature, Lendon argues that honour therefore, becomes an integral part of political power.⁴⁰⁵ He then continues to argue that historical traditions depict honour as an important part of ruling, making it an ideology and more rhetoric.⁴⁰⁶ Lendon exacerbates the intrinsic relationship between power and honour by stating that it

⁴⁰¹ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 76.

⁴⁰² Burns, "Chapter 3: Through Caesar's Eyes." p. 115.

⁴⁰³ Upon doing research on Indutiomarus, no relevant scholarly works were found for the purposes of this thesis.

⁴⁰⁴ J. E. Lendon, *Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World* (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1997). p. 24-25.

⁴⁰⁵ Lendon. p. 24-25.

⁴⁰⁶ Lendon. p. 25.

legitimized authority and played an active role in the “day-to-day business of government”⁴⁰⁷. Beyond the authority of government, Lendon argues that the Graeco-Roman honour system underlined political gratitude, and by extension patronage. With clientelism being at the heart of Roman political and social life, even dictating the terms of surrender under the *deditio* rituals⁴⁰⁸ the importance of honour cannot be understated. Yet, clientelist relationships also flourished in Gaul as nobles and aristocrats vied for power against each other using their “*contingents encadrées*”.⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, it is safe to assume that if honour plays an important role in clientelist relationships, and that clientelist relationships existed in Gaul (perhaps not to the extent as they did in Rome), that honour also played an important role in Gallic politics. Furthermore, given the intrinsic importance of honour to political power and governance, as argued by Lendon, it can then be inferred that honour played an important role in Gallic society as a whole.

Lastly, Lendon mentions numerous examples of informal politics as found in the Roman world, that are still common for us today: such as favours. These favours were used to exert influence, and although familiar to us, were strongly rooted by the sense of personal honour, prestige, and dignity. Words, which the ancient sources used interchangeably as partial synonyms to “honour”: *Gloria*, *honos*, *dignitas*, *auctoritas*⁴¹⁰ and, of course, for the purposes of this thesis, *virtus*. All these words are seen extensively throughout Caesar’s commentaries, and apply to both Romans and Gauls.⁴¹¹ While *virtus* is not directly mentioned by Lendon as a synonym to honour, the word itself refers to many things including courage/bravery, worth, manliness, virtue, character, and excellence. All words that bare a significant importance when thinking about honour, allowing us to include it to the list of synonyms. And with that in mind, Caesar repeatedly mentions the Gauls’ *virtus* and makes a point at times that it is even greater than the Romans’.

As such, it should be abundantly clear by now that we can define Gaul as an honour culture, highlighting the bellicosity of its system, and the anarchy that exists therein.

⁴⁰⁷ Lendon. p. 25.

⁴⁰⁸ As seen in “Introduction”.

⁴⁰⁹ As seen in “Chapter 1”.

⁴¹⁰ Lendon, *Empire of Honour*. p. 30-31.

⁴¹¹ *Virtus* is mentioned 77 times, *dignitas* 22 times, and *auctoritas* 35 times in Caesar’s commentaries.

6. Book VI:

The sixth year of Caesar's campaigns began with the *Trevirii* who, under Ambiorix, were sending delegations across the Rhine to recruit Germanic mercenaries. However, ever since Caesar's own crossing, the Germanic tribes were reluctant to continue interfering in Gallic affairs. The *Trevirii* were not alone in their rebellious ambitions with the tribes of *Nervii*, *Aduatucii*, and *Menapii*, all looking to join them. However, gaining knowledge of these events Caesar prepared for war and swiftly acted against the *Nervii* easily defeating them in a preemptive war.⁴¹² Following which, Caesar summoned a covenant for all the tribes of Gaul to meet in Lutecia⁴¹³ (modern-day Paris). The latter acted as a form of general convention whereby each tribe would send representative to Caesar. Only three tribes: the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Trevirii*, abstained by sending no delegating...a clear sign of dissent. Once again, acting swiftly and decisively, Caesar moved against the *Senones*, and *Carnutes* who surrendered quickly thereafter without a conflict taking place.⁴¹⁴ With only the *Trevirii* remaining, Caesar requisitioned cavalry from the recently defeated tribes to bolster his forces.⁴¹⁵

Firstly, the convention that Caesar summons in Lutecia demonstrates two things: One, it further solidifies Rome as the hegemon within the Gallic system, a fact that has slowly been growing more obvious with each subsequent year of Caesar's campaign. Two, that the existence of such a conference displays evidence of international diplomacy, cooperation, and interstate communications between the various units. These attempts at widespread cooperation through diplomacy hint at the waning strength of the anarchic Gallic system, as Caesar slowly aligns the system to Rome's through his opportunistic and strategic interferences in Gallic affairs.⁴¹⁶

Secondly, the *Senones* and *Carnutes* were "vassals" of the *Aedui* and *Remi*, both of which were Caesar's closest allies in Gaul. When the two former tribes prematurely surrendered, they did so by sending delegations to the latter, and not to Caesar himself, suggesting that hierarchical

⁴¹² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 2-3.

⁴¹³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 3. 4. "*Concilio Galliae primo vere, ut instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent, initium belli ac defectionis hoc esse arbitratus, ut omnia postponere videretur, concilium Lutetiam Parisiorum transfert.*"

⁴¹⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 3-4.

⁴¹⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 4. 6. "*Peragit concilium Caesar equitesque imperat civitatibus.*"

⁴¹⁶ Client kings, the dispatching of justice, summoning Gallic senates to him, etc.

clientelist relationships were forming between the weaker and stronger Gallic tribes. With Caesar's interventions and Rome's growing hegemony, so did the power of its closest friends. These bandwagoning states used Rome's interventions to increase their own standing as the system's balance of power shifted.

Lastly, Caesar's requisitioning of cavalry from the surrender tribes is more indicative than a simple need for reinforcements. By losing a fair amount of their cavalry, the requisitioned tribes are both militarily and politically weakened. Gallic Cavalry, or *equites*, are part of the noble ruling social class. As such, they cannot exercise their power and administer their state if they are accompanying Caesar. Furthermore, the presence of this cavalry within Caesar's own army continues the integration of Gaul's military strength within the Roman army and the long-standing Roman tradition of inviting allied armed forces to join the Romans during particular campaigns. However, as was already discussed, it is unlikely that the Gauls would have differentiated between this, and mercenarism.⁴¹⁷

In anticipation of his war with Ambiorix, Caesar moved against the *Menapii* who were friends and neighbours of the *Trevirii*, and by doing so cut off the Gallic chief's potential escape route.⁴¹⁸ Upon Caesar's approach, the *Menapii* abandoned their *oppida* and sought refuge in the forests and marshes. As a response, Caesar exercised a scorched earth policy, burning all their villages and farmlands to the ground, forcing the Gauls to surrender. From there, Caesar invaded the lands of the *Trevirii*. The latter, fearing to be in an unfavourable position between two Roman armies, pressed their attack on Labienus' camp.⁴¹⁹ However, Ambiorix wished to reinforce his position with Germanic mercenaries, and was awaiting their arrival. Knowing this fact, Labienus decided to press the Gauls, through disinformation and a feigned rout, he was able to goad the Gauls into attacking in unfavourable conditions. Instead of finding a fleeing and panicked Roman army, the Gauls were faced with a prepared and disciplined military force. Through his cunning, Labienus defeated Ambiorix and his *Trevirii*, and received their surrender.⁴²⁰ Following their defeat, Caesar

⁴¹⁷ See the debate in Chapter 1 between Baray and Brunaux with regards to defining a mercenary. See pages 68-70.

⁴¹⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 5.

⁴¹⁹ See section "Book V".

⁴²⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 7-8.

appointed Cingetorix as chieftain of the *Treviri*⁴²¹ rewarding the Gauls that displayed loyalty. By doing so, he is actively shaping Gallic leadership and politics, choosing subservient leaders, and increasing the likelihood that Gallic tribes would bandwagon rather than balance. Furthermore, by choosing friendly chieftains, Caesar is helping soften their societies to Roman influence, shaping it from the top-down. Thus, Caesar's actions and careful *realpolitik* could be one of the possibilities how Gaul so quickly integrated the Roman Empire after the *Bellum Gallicum*.⁴²²

Ambiorix survived Labienus' onslaught and fled across the Rhine to *Germania*. For this reason, and since the *Germani* had helped him, Caesar decided to once again cross the Rhine and pursue his foe.⁴²³ To that effect, his legions built a second bridge⁴²⁴, nearby to where the first once stood.⁴²⁵ The *Suebi* were responsible for the aid Ambiorix received, and heard that Caesar had crossed the Rhine. With the help of the *Ubi*⁴²⁶, Caesar discovered that the *Suebi* were amassing their forces at the entrance of the Bacenis forest.⁴²⁷ It is at this point in Caesar's commentaries that he extensively describes both the Gallic and Germanic civilizations. Caesar describes that in ancient times, the *Aedui* held hegemony over Gaul, with the *Sequani* being a close second. Hoping to change the current balance of power, the latter invited Ariovistus and his band of Germans from over the Rhine to topple the *Aedui*. However, Ariovistus grew too powerful for either tribe; instead, asserting his own dominance over the territory.⁴²⁸ To that effect, Diviciacus of the *Aedui* ventured to Rome to lobby for the Senate's support, but to no avail. Following Caesar's interventions, and the shift in the balance of power brought about by Ariovistus's defeat. The *Aedui* being friends and allies of Rome, were restored to their previous strength, and the *Sequani* were weakened, allowing the *Remi* to subvert their second-place position.⁴²⁹

⁴²¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 8. 8. "*Cum his propinqui Indutiomari, qui defectionis auctores fuerant, comitati eos ex civitate excesserunt. Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum.*"

⁴²² Upon doing additional research on Cingetorix, no additional relevant scholarly works on him were found.

⁴²³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 9.

⁴²⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 9.

⁴²⁵ See section "Book IV".

⁴²⁶ A Germanic tribe across the Rhine that Caesar subjugated during his first crossing.

⁴²⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 10.

⁴²⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 12.

⁴²⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 12.

What Caesar describes in chapters 11 and 12 of Book VI highlights the arguments laid out in the first chapter of this thesis, whereby a state of anarchy existed in Gaul prior to Caesar's interventions. The *Sequani* who sought to overthrow the *Aedui*'s hegemony, brought in external pressures within the system through Ariovistus and his warriors, which destabilized the balance of power and saw this external unit become its chief power and actor. By acting according to their own interests, and through the intervention of the Germanic mercenaries, the *Sequanii* forced the *Aedui* to do the same with the Romans, which saw the former fall from grace. Through their own ambition, and unable to guarantee their own security, they saw their standing within the system decrease rather than increase. It is a stark lesson in the geopolitical realities of the anarchic system and the possibilities of change that can occur from the desires of individual units. Furthermore, it asserts that the *Aedui* sought help from Rome in a balancing attempt, but later became a bandwagoning state as the *Bellum Gallicum* ensued, further displaying the fluidity of interstate behaviour depending on their personal gain.

Still, as part of his description of the neighbouring societies, Caesar mentions the Gallic nobles and their active role in the perseverance of warfare. According to him, prior to his interventions, these nobles participated in yearly wars against each other.⁴³⁰ In this instance, Caesar is confirming the permanence of war in Gaul that was established in the first chapter of this thesis. The Gauls were either fighting each other, or the Germans, either way, their skills as warriors were being constantly challenged and acts as proof for their warlike abilities and customs as a people, a warrior culture that was emphasized by the concepts of "Valour" and "Honour".⁴³¹

Following his descriptions of these civilizations and those of the Hercynian Forest, in what many historians refer to as "Caesar's ethnography", Caesar continued his hunt for Ambiorix and chased

⁴³⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 15.

⁴³¹ See the section about honour cultures found at the end of section "Book V". Warrior cultures that are presumably waging war for irrational reasons, and especially the ones of individual warriors seem to lack the rational unitary actors that a realist model would need to argue in its analysis on the events in the Gallic Wars. However, Eckstein himself mentions the warrior culture of the Celts in northern Italy, and how they contributed to the violence of the anarchy. Their warrior culture made it difficult for the Etruscans establish stability in the Po Valley, a stability that only finally imposed when Rome conquered them thanks to their greater resources. This is also paralleled by the Greek states in the classical and Hellenic periods through their militarism and preservation of state honor. As such, warrior culture need not be at odds with our realist model, as they do in fact promote violence, bellicosity, and greater instability within the system from which we can infer anarchy. See Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 131-132.

him into the lands of the *Eburones* where he hid. Along the way, he “collected a great host from the neighbouring states”⁴³² and hoping to teach a lesson to those that would harbour a fugitive of Rome, Caesar once again adopted a scorched earth strategy, burning all the *Eburones* villages in his path, while requisitioning their supplies and livestock.⁴³³ Despite his large host, Caesar was unable to capture Ambiorix who fled deeper into *Germania*.⁴³⁴ Feeling his mission accomplished, Caesar retreated to the city of Durocotorum⁴³⁵ where he summoned another Gallic convention to investigate the conspiracy that started these events.⁴³⁶

A man named Acco was designated as the arch-conspirator at the origins of the plot and was sentenced to death in the traditional Roman way: i.e., by being flogged to death. Caesar then divided his legions for winter encampments, as was his custom, before leaving for *Latium*.

Here, Caesar once again demonstrates his position and power in Gaul by summoning a convention after completely destroying the *Menapii* and *Eburones*. During which, through the judging of Acco, Caesar once again shows that he possesses judicial power in Gaul. Acco’s sentencing to be killed in a traditional Roman way shows that Caesar not only has enough power to pass judgment but does so following the Roman traditions and interpretations of justice. As it stood, a Gallic noble, was put to death in Gaul, after a Roman sentencing, as if he was being judged in Rome itself. In addition to serving as a demonstration of Caesar’s accrued power, this event shows that the Gauls lost control of their own judicial processes in what can only be described as a loss of autonomy, and the waning status of the individual units within the system.

Lastly, this event helps serve as another example for one of my arguments that Gaul was being introduced, and slowly assimilated, into the *Imperium* of Rome during Caesar’s conquests, rather than occurring as a post-*Bellum Gallicum* phenomenon.

⁴³²Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 43. 1. “*Caesar rursus ad vexandos hostes profectus magno coacto numero ex finitimis civitatibus in omnes partes dimittit.*”

⁴³³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 43.

⁴³⁴ Upon doing additional research on Ambiorix, I came across G. Stégen, “Le Discours d’Ambiorix (Caes., *De Bell. Gall.* V, 27),” *Bulletin Semestriel de l’Association Des Classiques de l’Université de Liège* VI (1958): 1–11. Refer to this work for additional information, which answers numerous general questions regarding his betrayal in a list form factor. Moreover, there are numerous other scholarly works that refer to Ambiorix, however, none were relevant for this thesis.

⁴³⁵ Modern day “Reims” in France.

⁴³⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 6. 44.

7. Book VII:

While Caesar was away in Italy, the tribes in Gaul saw his absence as an opportunity to summon a secret convention. Together, they discussed a combined rebellion to regain their freedom from their “subjection to the sovereignty of Rome”⁴³⁷. The circumstances of Acco’s death⁴³⁸ had left the Gauls unhappy with the current state of the balance of power in Gaul.⁴³⁹

This is the first time that the Gauls gather in such large numbers to discuss the realities of their system. Throughout the past seven years, Caesar had slowly consolidated his power in Gaul, culminating in his enforcement of Roman judicial authority; and by doing so affirming Gaul’s subjugation. This secret convention was a sign that the Gauls had finally awoken to the geopolitical consequences of Caesar’s interventions and their system-wide implications. So long as Caesar was absent, the Gauls believed they had the best chance of achieving victory and regaining their freedom.⁴⁴⁰ As such, their objective was to keep Caesar away from his army and prevent him from rejoining them. The Gauls had gained much strategic insight from their wars with Caesar, and had recognized Caesar’s personal importance, and critical role to the Roman victories. Without Caesar, the Romans would not have been able to subjugate Gaul.⁴⁴¹

Deciding that it is better to die fighting for their freedom, rather than be subjugated or executed (like Acco) by the Romans, the tribes vowed to make war, with the *Carnutes* leading the fray. Unable to exchange hostages to safeguard their promise to each other, the Gauls swore oaths, “a formality which represents their most solemn ritual”,⁴⁴² whereby all the participating tribes vowed not to abandon each other once the rebellions started.⁴⁴³ Here, the Gauls swore oaths as a means to safeguard an interstate alliance treaty. Since they were unable to do so through traditional contemporary means: exchanging hostages, they fell back on their honour as a guarantee of their intentions. Should a tribe break their oath, their honour would be besmirched, losing renown in the

⁴³⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 1. 3. “*Hac impulsu occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt.*”

⁴³⁸ Upon doing additional research on Acco, no relevant scholarly works were found regarding his death which would help expand this thesis’s arguments.

⁴³⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 1.

⁴⁴¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 1.

⁴⁴² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 2. 2. “*quo more eorum gravissima caerimonia continetur*”

⁴⁴³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 2.

process. However, it is important not to confuse this act of cooperation with a taming of the anarchic system. Rather, the Gauls have finally understood that the rules of the system had changed since Caesar's interventions, and that they were now forced to cooperate or be faced with extinction. Indeed, the rules of the anarchic system and the realist paradigms are still maintained here, each tribe is still striving towards their own betterment and acting entirely in a selfish self-preserving manner. Recognizing that no individual unit in the system was strong enough to challenge Roman hegemony, they were forced into a situation of balancing. As such, the units in the system are uniting to defeat a common foe but will undoubtedly act in their own self-interest during and after the process.

Following the convention, the *Carnutes* attacked the city of Cenabum, igniting the revolution, and putting to the sword the Roman merchants that had settled there.⁴⁴⁴ The news of the attack spread quickly throughout the rest of Gaul, eventually making its way to the land of the *Arverni*.⁴⁴⁵ It was there that the news of the rebellion reached Vercingetorix⁴⁴⁶; a charismatic leader able to stoke the fires of his men and encourage them to wage war. It was he, who would unite the tribes of Gaul against the Romans.⁴⁴⁷ As Vercingetorix began preparing for war, he commanded weapons to be crafted, gave orders to individual "states", and implemented strict military disciplinary rules and punishments.⁴⁴⁸ The Gauls being a highly adaptable people,⁴⁴⁹ had learned from their prolonged conflicts against the Romans and began integrating many Roman military characteristics into their own strategies. As such, Vercingetorix is carefully preparing for his war with the Romans, rather than simply gathering a war band and striking unprepared as had been the case thus far throughout the *Bellum Gallicum*. Furthermore, by enforcing disciplinary rules, Vercingetorix was trying to emulate the famed Roman military discipline which undoubtedly accounted for many of their

⁴⁴⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 3.

⁴⁴⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 3.

⁴⁴⁶ Upon doing additional research on Vercingetorix, and despite the plethora of arguments, the only article that was relevant for this thesis, that means on his speech given to Caesar was: Chrysanthé Tsitsiou-Chelidoni, "Macht, Rhetorik, Autorität: Zur Funktion Der Reden Caesars Und Seiner Gegner in « De Bello Gallico », " in *Stimmen Der Geschichte: Funktionen von Reden in Der Antiken Historiographie*, Beiträge Zur Altertumskunde, 284 (Berlin ; New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 125–55.. The latter will be analysed more in depth in "Chapter 3" and will include Vercingetorix's role in Caesar's rhetoric.

⁴⁴⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 4.

⁴⁴⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 4.

⁴⁴⁹ See "Chapter 1".

victories. This is a drastic change when compared to the traditional Gallic style of war described in the earlier books. Through his efforts, Vercingetorix will challenge Caesar on a series of firsts:

- it is the first time that the Roman general will face off against a charismatic Gallic leader (since Ariovistus was Germanic).
- The first time he will face a disciplined and ready Gallic army.
- And lastly, the first time he will face the combined might of Gaul.

Thanks to these measures, Vercingetorix was able to rapidly raise a large army and then quickly set to the task of uniting by force the tribes which had not yet voluntarily joined him. To do so efficiently, Vercingetorix once again emulated Caesar's own actions, and divided his armies to more efficiently bring the remaining Gallic tribes to heel. Just as Caesar had often tasked Labienus and Cicero to individually subdue tribes while he himself focused on another objective; Vercingetorix ordered one of his lieutenants to subdue the *Ruteni* while he set off against the *Bituriges*. Vercingetorix understood the necessity of a unified Gaul, and had no qualms using violence to obtain what he needed. The Gallic leader was demonstrating exceptional adaptability and was emulating Caesar's own strategies to achieve his objectives.

However, Caesar quickly responded to the threat posed by Vercingetorix, but rather than confront the chieftain and his army directly, the Roman general decided to bypass them and strike at the undefended lands of the *Arverni*. Giving strict orders to his men and cavalry to pillage and reap as much panic in these lands, it was Caesar's hope that Vercingetorix would be forced to recall his forces to try and defend his homeland.⁴⁵⁰ However, the Gallic general did not take the bait and chose to press the *Aedui* instead. This put Caesar in a difficult position as it forced him to choose between dealing a deadly blow to the *Arverni* or safeguarding his allies. Caesar opted for the former rather than the latter, honouring his protection promises, and avoiding that the *Boii*, and by extent the *Aedui*, could be forced to join Vercingetorix's rebellion.⁴⁵¹ Along the way, Caesar sieged the *oppida* of Vellaunodunum in the lands of the *Senones* and Cenabum in the lands of the *Carnutes*.⁴⁵² From there, Caesar continued to the lands of the *Bituriges* and captured the *oppidum* of

⁴⁵⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 7-8.

⁴⁵¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 8.

⁴⁵² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 11.

Noviodunum.⁴⁵³ Upon hearing news of Caesar's proximity, Vercingetorix pulled back from his attacks on the *Boii* in order to meet Caesar's army which was heading towards the *Bituriges* "capital" of Avaricum.⁴⁵⁴ After these successive Roman victories, Vercingetorix convened a convention of his allies, and instructed them to begin a "scorched-earth" strategy in order to starve the Romans from towns and supplies;⁴⁵⁵ a strategy that Caesar had employed against the *Menapii* and *Eburones* in his prior campaigns. While most of those present agreed to the scorched earth policy, the *Bituriges* refused to burn Avaricum, believing it to be naturally well enough defended to resist a siege. Reluctantly, Vercingetorix was forced to accept this outcome, despite warning them against such action.⁴⁵⁶

The siege of Avaricum proved difficult for Caesar because the Gauls had adapted to Roman siege warfare and understood how to counter it effectively.⁴⁵⁷ Caesar himself, praised their adaptability and ingenuity, stating that:

*"The matchless courage of our troops was met by all manner of contrivances on the part of the Gauls; for they are a nation possessed of remarkable ingenuity, and extremely apt to copy and carry out anything suggested to them."*⁴⁵⁸

In the end, the Gauls failed to defend Avaricum, with Caesar putting the entire *oppidum* and its 4000 to 8000 inhabitants to the sword as retribution for the difficult siege and the massacre at Cenabum.⁴⁵⁹ Consequently, Vercingetorix blamed the *Bituriges* for this defeat and their unwillingness to burn the town. However, rather than lose power and faith from this event, Vercingetorix's standing was strengthened because he had warned his allies of this outcome during the convention.⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, Vercingetorix vowed that:

⁴⁵³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 12-13.

⁴⁵⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 12-14.

⁴⁵⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 14.

⁴⁵⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 15.

⁴⁵⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 22-24.

⁴⁵⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 22. 1. "*Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia cuiusque modi Gallorum occurrebant, ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab quoque traduntur, aptissimum.*"

⁴⁵⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 28.

⁴⁶⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 30.

*“He would by his own efforts bring to their side the states which disagreed with the rest of Gaul, and establish one policy for the whole of Gaul, whose unanimity not even the world could resist.”*⁴⁶¹

There are several interesting attributes of these events. Firstly, while Caesar summoned conventions as a means to administer the subjugated *civitates* of Gaul, Vercingetorix seems to possess the same *auctoritas* as the Roman general. This reaffirms that these conventions served as interstate forums of discussion. Secondly, the positive effects of the *Bellum Gallicum* are made evident through the Gauls’ adaptability and understanding of Roman strategies. With Caesar himself highlighting these Gallic proficiencies. Indeed, we can recall in the earlier books how the *Aduatuci* had surrendered upon the mere sight of siege weapons. Now, as the Gallic Wars drew towards their end, the Gauls not only knew how to effectively counter said siege weapons, they also knew how to use Roman strategies for themselves. Lastly, despite Caesar’s own victories, Vercingetorix’s arrival into the system, created a binary reality for all the units within it, giving them two choices: to join either with Vercingetorix or with Caesar. This stays true to Eckstein’s model whereby the ever-shifting nature of the balance of power within any given anarchic system, sways all the units within it to reorganize into status quo vs. revisionist states. While this was seen throughout the Gallic Wars, the recent events as outlined in Caesar’s seventh book highlight an unprecedented occurrence, whereby the revisionist states (assuming that Caesar’s position as the system’s hegemon, and the subjugation of the Gallic tribes has become the status quo) are banding together, and uniting against the status quo faction. As such, the fate of the entire Gallic system lies in the hands of these two parties, these two men, Caesar and Vercingetorix. Regardless of the victor, the system’s anarchic nature had forever been altered by the Roman interventions. By the end of the war, only one clear hegemon will remain to claim the entirety of the system and eliminate its anarchic nature altogether by unifying it under a singular ruler.

While Caesar was at Avaricum, the *Aedui* were on the verge of a civil war, as its two most prominent leaders were not respecting its democratic institutions and vying against each other for power. As such, Caesar invited the Aeduan “senate” and the conflicting parties, to the town of

⁴⁶¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 29. 6. “*Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere.*”

Decetia so that he might settle the dispute.⁴⁶² In this instance, Caesar is taking matters into his own hands with the *Aedui* to avoid civil strife which might lead them to join Vercingetorix's rebellion.⁴⁶³ The *Aedui*'s support has been instrumental to Caesar throughout the *Bellum Gallicum*, and their loss would be a strategic disaster. To keep them as allies, Caesar promised them rewards after his campaign in Gaul was concluded.⁴⁶⁴ Having settled the issues with the *Aedui*, Caesar began marching his men to the *oppidum* of Gergovia. Upon hearing this news, Vercingetorix rushed to do the same.⁴⁶⁵

The Aeduan revolt:

Gergovia was well defended by natural elements, and its approach was difficult on all sides. Caesar would be forced to lay siege to it but did not wish to do so without first securing his corn supplies;⁴⁶⁶ a corn supply that the Romans depended on the *Aedui* for. However, Vercingetorix had bribed Litaviccus⁴⁶⁷ to try and convince his kinsmen to join the former's rebellion and forsake the Romans.⁴⁶⁸ Once again, the importance of the *Aedui* to the Roman campaign cannot be understated, even by Caesar's own accounts they were the lynchpin to the Roman presence in Gaul. If the *Aedui* were to rebel, the Romans would lose their foothold in Gaul and all hopes of controlling the territory.

*"The state of the Aedui was the only bar to the absolutely certain victory of Gaul; by its influence the rest were held in check; if it were brought over, the Romans would have no foothold in Gaul."*⁴⁶⁹

The potential treason of the *Aedui* provided an excellent case study for the realist theory. Insisting upon the selfish nature of states, which act solely based on their own best interest, we can see here

⁴⁶² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 33.

⁴⁶³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 33.

⁴⁶⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 34.

⁴⁶⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 34.

⁴⁶⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 36.

⁴⁶⁷ An influential Aeduan.

⁴⁶⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 37.

⁴⁶⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 37. 3. "Unam esse Aeduorum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam detineat; eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis in Gallia non fore."

that the *Aedui* forgo any past loyalty (to the Romans), no matter how historic, to best suit their own interests. Despite the Romans having intervened countless times in Gaul at the behest of the *Aedui*, and by doing so, had greatly increased the *Aedui*'s own standing and power within the Gallic system due to bandwagoning⁴⁷⁰. And despite Caesar even having personally given advantage to Litivaccus.⁴⁷¹ Regardless of these past favours, and friendliness, the *Aedui* still entertain the idea of betraying the Romans, given that they have enough to gain from the betrayal with Litivaccus even stating:

*“Why should the Aedui come to Caesar to decide a question of their own right and law, rather than the Romans to the Aedui?”*⁴⁷²

The previous statement shows Litivaccus' personal ambitions, and perhaps those of his *civitates*, to surpass, and replace Rome as the hegemonic power in Gaul. This desire and ambition from any given unit, is highly characteristic, and natural, of a realist anarchic system.

In the end, the *Aedui* were led to revolt under by Litivaccus's deceitful actions, but Caesar was able to show the falseness of Litivaccus' *casus belli*, and bring the *Aedui* back to the fold, refocusing his attention towards Gergovia.

While the siege and events at Gergovia ensued, the *Aedui* chose to opportunistically join the rebellion against the Romans.⁴⁷³ After which, the war intensified with countless other Gallic units joining the rebellion. Promptly, the *Aedui* summoned a general convention of the Gauls to attempt to seize control of the Gallic armies from Vercingetorix.⁴⁷⁴ The former, wanted to assert themselves as the supreme Gallic *civitates* in the fight against the Romans, knowing full well they would yield the utmost prestige and position as a result. The timing of the *Aedui* rebellion is extremely fortuitous, as it comes immediately after the Roman defeat at Gergovia and at a time where they

⁴⁷⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 54. 3-4. “their position, their humiliations at the time when he had received them – crowded into towns, deprived of fields, all their resources plundered, a tribute imposed, hostages wrung from them with the utmost insolence – the success and the distinction to which he had brought them, with the result that they had not only returned to their ancient position, but, to all appearance, had surpassed the dignity and influence of all previous ages.” Caesar is outlining all the advantages the *Aedui* have received since the Roman interventions.

⁴⁷¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 37.

⁴⁷² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 37. 5. “Cur enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam Romani ad Aeduos veniant?”

⁴⁷³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 56-62.

⁴⁷⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 63.

seemed weak. If the realist motivations of the *Aedui* had not been made apparent through the previous paragraphs, their actions now should speak volumes at the selfish *modus operandi* of the anarchic world. They finally betrayed their long-time allies, in the hopes of replacing them as the system's hegemonic unit. This is only after Caesar had spent countless years pacifying and weakening the overall anarchy present within it. Caesar had systematically defeated the most powerful units within the system (*Helvetii*, *Belgae*, *Ariovistus*, etc.), liberating and empowering the *Aedui* in the process. Now, believing themselves powerful enough to control the whole system, they no longer needed their Roman allies, but required one final show of strength to solidify their standing to the other units. Despite the *Aedui*'s relative position of strength compared to the other Gallic tribes, the command of the Gallic army ultimately remained with Vercingetorix. The *Aedui* had not managed to secure a leadership position for themselves at the head of their peers.⁴⁷⁵

Of all the states to rebel against Rome, two did not attend the general convention summoned by the *Aedui*: the *Remi* and *Lingones*. It is important to note that the *Treviri* were absent as well, because they were fighting against Germanic invaders, and could not dedicate attention or resources to the rebellion.⁴⁷⁶ The latter shows that a state's survival is at the forefront of its priorities; while the rest of the Gallic tribes were uniting against the Romans, the *Treviri* were forced to look after their own interests and were unable to join in on the system-wide conflict.

As a result of the general convention, Vercingetorix consolidated his command on the vast majority of the Gallic tribes and began levying troops from all his allies. Aware of his numerical advantage, Vercingetorix ordered that the tribes of Gaul wage war against the Romans throughout the entirety of their territory.⁴⁷⁷ Again, we see Vercingetorix's ability to adapt to Caesar's strategies to "divide and conquer" by pressuring the Roman hold on the territory from multiple fronts.

After several cavalry skirmishes while Vercingetorix's army was pressing Caesar's. The latter's Germanic cavalry proved itself, time and time again, superior to its Gallic counterpart. Eventually forcing Vercingetorix's cavalry into a full rout and forcing his army to seek refuge in the nearby *oppidum* of Alesia.⁴⁷⁸ Having cornered the Gallic commander into the town, Caesar surrounded

⁴⁷⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 63.

⁴⁷⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 63.

⁴⁷⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 64-65.

⁴⁷⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 65-68.

the *oppidum* with siege works to blockade it. The events that followed are now as famous as the Caesar himself. Unfortunately, the siege of Alesia, and Caesar's ultimate victory over Vercingetorix provides no additional information with regards to the anarchic system with one exception:

In their final moments, as the whole of Gaul supported Vercingetorix, for a brief amount of time, almost the entirety of the Gallic system was united against the Romans. The anarchy and incessant interstate conflicts which had first caused Caesar to intervene in the system, the general animosity between the Gallic units, was interrupted, leaving way for interstate cooperation against a mutual enemy. Never had the anarchic Gallic system been united in such a way before, nor would it be again. Vercingetorix's rebellion marked a definitive paradigm shift within the system, where all its units rose against a mutual enemy creating a bipolar situation that we could no longer define as an unapologetic realist anarchy. While individual selfish ambitions (*Aedui*, Vercingetorix) still permuted the actions of the individual tribes, it was no longer a systemwide anarchy. With Vercingetorix's ultimate defeat at Alesia, Gaul lost its last hope at a Gallic hegemon, creating a palpable power vacuum that was once filled by proud Gallic *civitates*. A power vacuum that now only the Romans could fill as the last remaining undisputed masters of the system. With Caesar's final victory, he had managed to successfully bring hierarchy to Gaul with the Romans at the top of the pyramid. Now, all other units in the system were in a clientelist relationship with Rome which Caesar had been slowly forging for the past 7 years through careful interventions, cautious political maneuvers, and the systematic elimination of his enemies.

Conclusion

After having spent the first chapter of this thesis establishing the state of anarchy in Gaul, this second chapter delved into Caesar's commentaries of the *Bellum Gallicum*. Through a detailed analysis of the seven books of his commentaries, this chapter was able to show how Caesar took full advantage of the pre-existing anarchy in Gaul, to shift its balance of power paradigms through his interventions, creating power vacua along way, vacua which would be filled by the Romans themselves through their interference in Gallic political and societal affairs. Time and time again, Caesar successfully defeated the most powerful units in the system, slowly replacing them as Rome claimed its hegemony. The chapter focused on highlighting the various instances where Caesar's interactions showed evidence of the realist anarchy in play, and the Roman consequences at a system-wide level. When the *Aedui* petitioned Caesar for his intervention against the *Helvetii* in 58 BCE, they had unknowingly altered the Gallic reality forever. Spurred by realist motivations, the *Aedui* thought only about the power and prestige their singular unit could gain from bandwagoning with the Romans. Little to no attention was paid to Rome's systemic subjugation of the territory as its hold on Gaul grew. The selfish ambitions of Gallic tribes who had invited dangerous outside forces into their system had forever changed its fate as the balance of power tilted ever more in the favour of the *Germani* and Romans. Although the Gauls realized the folly of their selfish actions, and the terrible danger it posed to their states, this realization came too late. The Bandwagoning states abandoned the Romans to join Vercingetorix's balancing attempt, but to no avail. Caesar was victorious, securing Rome's hold on *Gallia* until its downfall.

With the realist anarchy clearly established prior to Caesar's interventions, and his opportunistic conquest of the territory demonstrated. The following chapter will focus on highlighting the instances of aggressive diplomacy, and the direct invitations submitted by the Gauls to Caesar to demonstrate the theory of "Empire by invitation

Chapter 3 – Empire by Invitation and Aggressive Diplomacy

Introduction:

The final chapter of this thesis will discuss two separate aspects of the *Bellum Gallicum*: the possibility and instances whereby Caesar was directly asked to intervene, and thereby invited into the system, as well as the instances where diplomacy between the Romans and Gauls was used aggressively, further propagating the system's bellicosity and aggressivity. Before proceeding with the chapter, it is important to recapitulate the last chapter's findings.

Chapter 2 delved into a detailed analysis of the instances of realist anarchy in Caesar's commentaries through a brief summary of its entirety. Throughout this analysis, several recurring themes were observed:

- Caesar's introduction, and subsequent interventions in the system, changed its balance of power, incurring several consequences for all its units.
- The shift in the balance of power resulting of the Roman interventions rearranged the Gallic units into status quo vs. revisionist states. In other words, between those that chose to bandwagon alongside Rome's growing power, and those who sought to balance against it.
- The Roman interventions took advantage of the pre-existing anarchy and submitted several defeated tribes to Rome. (Through the *deditio in fidem* which bound the subdued tribes into a clientelist relationship with Rome.)⁴⁷⁹
- Rome was not the only systemic outsider to be asked to interfere, the Gauls had appealed to Germanic tribes long before they appealed to Caesar. This was made evident by Ariovistus' rise to power and the heavy presence of Germanic mercenaries on both sides of the conflict.

⁴⁷⁹ See "Introduction".

- All Gallic units within the system were acting based on their own selfish interests, regardless of past allegiance, promises made, or agreements entered. This is true of both the status quo and revisionist states.
- Despite repeated Roman victories, there remained incessant rebellions and conflict for eight years, highlighting the volatility and bellicosity of the system.
- It was established that Gallic society was an honour society, and as such, extremely bellicose as per Eckstein's arguments.
- Lastly, the Gauls demonstrated their adaptability and affinity for rapid learning through their prolonged war and exposure with the Romans.

While the previous chapter demonstrated Caesar's opportunistic use of the systemic anarchy to slowly become the ruling hegemon, this chapter will focus on showing the viability of the "Empire by invitation" concept along with Caesar's use of aggressive diplomacy.

As such, having already summarized the relevant events of Caesar's commentaries, this chapter will take a thematic approach discussing each theme individually, starting with the "Empire by invitation". However, it is important to note that in my previous chapter I was forced to take Caesar at his word to construct my arguments. While his writings are subject of rhetoric and have ulterior motives, the lack of other sources meant that an analysis of the conquest of Gaul required the liberal use of his writings with limited criticism. In contrast, this chapter will be more critical of his works, and will highlight the shortcomings of his writings when appropriate.

1. Empire by invitation: when opportunity knocks

The first part of this chapter will highlight the specific instances in the *Bellum Gallicum* where Caesar was invited into the conflict in Gaul. Analyzing these instances is important for two reasons: firstly, it allows Caesar to conduct *bellum iustum*, preserving the *pax deorum* but also allowing him to defend his actions against his political opponents in Rome, many of which accused him of conducting an illegal war in Gaul. Thus, being invited into the conflict politically protects his motivations. Secondly, showing the specific instances where Caesar was asked to interfere at the behest of certain tribes will underline one of this thesis's main arguments: that Caesar opportunistically filled a power vacuum left behind by his own interventions. As such, it is

paramount to show that Caesar was in fact invited into the system, so that the “Empire by invitation” can hold true. To that effect, I will concentrate my efforts on highlighting and analyzing all the direct invitations Caesar (and other units⁴⁸⁰) received throughout the Gallic Wars. Indeed, there exists a possible precedent to Rome’s *Imperium* being acquired through invitation. Cicero himself claimed that Rome had conquered *Latium* and the whole of Italy by defending its allies⁴⁸¹, and not for glory or power.⁴⁸² So, for the Romans, being invited into a conflict, and subsequently gaining territory from it, was seen as a completely legitimate reason, and outcome, of war. Subsequently, allowing us to examine similar circumstances between Caesar and the Gauls. Additionally, since this thesis argues that Caesar opportunistically increased Rome’s *imperium* rather than through premeditated imperialism, the concept of *deditio*/surrender will play a pivotal part in the argument. Recalling Bellini’s article on *deditio* and the surrender rituals, it will be understood, for the purposes of this section, that through surrender, the Gallic tribes are entering into a subservient relationship with Rome.

The first instance where Caesar was invited into Gaul was at the very start of his campaign, during the Helvetian war. Because of their migrations, and Caesar’s own refusal to allow the *Helvetii* to pass through the Roman province, they were forced to go through the lands of other tribes, including the *Aedui*. It was the latter, due to their long-standing relationship with Rome, that first petitioned Caesar for his interference. The *Helvetii* were too powerful for the *Aedui* to handle alone; therefore, their request for Rome’s aid is to be understood as a form of balancing within the system itself. As such, Caesar’s invitation to the Gallic system came, at first, as a balancing measure to protect the weaker states against the *Helvetii*’s alleged migration. While the *Aedui* were the first to petition Caesar’s help, the *Ambari* and *Allobroges*, being in a similar situation as the former, also did the same. As such, with a total of three tribes asking Rome for assistance, Caesar had “no choice” but to interfere at their behest.⁴⁸³

⁴⁸⁰ This term was defined in the Introduction and we will continue using it as such. See page 35.

⁴⁸¹ Cicero, *De re publica*, Book 3. 35. “*Noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus est*” taken from Marcus Tullius Cicero and Clinton Walker Keyes, *Cicero: in twenty-eight volumes. 16: De re publica*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 213 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2006).

⁴⁸² Marcus Tullius Cicero and Walter Miller, *Cicero: in twenty-eight volumes. 21: De officiis*, Reprinted, The Loeb classical library 30 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005). Book 1. 38.

⁴⁸³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 11.

The starting conditions of the *Bellum Gallicum*, with three individual tribes requesting Caesar's intervention, can be compared to Rome's conquest of Italy, whereby Capua had requested its help against the Samnites. Fearing annihilation, the former asked Rome for its protection and in exchange offered *deditio*.⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸⁵ While there is no direct mention of the *deditio* ritual in Caesar's text, it is possible for these tribes to have unknowingly entered into such an agreement with Rome. To that effect, it is important to remember that Caesar wrote his commentaries for Roman readers, which would have easily recognized these acts of surrender as *deditio*, while the Gauls lacked the habit to do so. Eckstein and Bellini make it clear that *deditio* was a common practice in Roman international relations and was often imposed on otherwise unsuspecting units.⁴⁸⁶ So, while Caesar does not directly mention this ritual, that does not mean that the three tribes, by asking for Rome's intervention, had not, per Rome's customs, entered *de facto* into such an agreement. Although this Helvetian episode marks the start of the Gallic Wars, Caesar's invitation into the conflict, was in line with Roman international law, and the conducting of *bellum iustum*. So for the Roman public, Caesar did not enter the war illegally; this is an important fact to remember.

Given his resounding success against the *Helvetii*, several other tribes came to Caesar to congratulate him, thanking him for his intervention.⁴⁸⁷ The gratitude of the Gallic tribes reinforces Caesar's invitation into the system, rather than only demonstrating opportunistic bellicosity from the Roman general. While not altogether as important as the previous invitation, the perceived gratitude of the Gauls helps show Caesar's actions as welcomed by several of the system's units. Yet, as previously mentioned with *deditio*, there may have been some confusion as to the consequences of these invitations. Caesar may have seen this as long-term gratitude, while the Gauls (due to their rash nature, volatility of allegiance, and untrustworthiness) may have seen the agreements with the Romans as short-term pragmatic solutions to their immediate geopolitical security concerns. Regardless, from this gratitude, came Caesar's second invitation: Diviciacus, speaking on behalf of numerous tribes, informs Caesar of Ariovistus's own invitation into the

⁴⁸⁴ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 141.

⁴⁸⁵ Livy, Book 7. 31. 4-5. "*itaque populum Campanum urbemque Capuam, agros, delubra deum, diuina humanaque omnia in vestram, patres conscripti, populique Romani dicionem dedimus, quidquid deinde patiemur dediticii vestri passuri*". Sub haec dicta omnes, manus ad consules tendentes, pleni lacrimarum in vestibulo curiae procubuerunt." Taken from Livius, *Livy*, 2002.

⁴⁸⁶ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 142. and V. Bellini, "Deditio in Fidem," *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger* (1922-) 42 (1964): p. 454-457.

⁴⁸⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 30.

system, and how he had since then acquired power.⁴⁸⁸ Beseeching Caesar for help, Diviciacus warns that if Ariovistus is not stopped, all the Gauls will be forced to migrate just as the *Helvetii* had attempted to do. Thus, providing Caesar with ample reason to interfere, essentially giving him just cause, and incapable of interfering themselves (because of the hostages Ariovistus held), once again Caesar had “no choice” but to interfere lest Ariovistus, left unchecked, invites more Germans to cross the Rhine.⁴⁸⁹

In this situation, the Gauls are inviting Caesar deeper into their system by asking him to fight against Ariovistus, because they deem the Romans to be a lesser threat than the Germanic tribes. Therefore, they perceive that it is in their best interest to use the Romans to rid themselves of the threat posed by Ariovistus. Once again, this is akin to the situations described by Eckstein’s assessment of the geopolitical situation of the Greek polities in the 2nd century BCE. The free Greek cities perceived Antiochus III and Philip V as greater systemic threats than the Romans, and thus they invited the latter to intervene as a balancing power, with the result being that the Romans eliminated the greatest powers within the system, and opportunistically usurped their position as the systemic hegemon.⁴⁹⁰ Twice now, the Gauls had invited the Romans to act as balancing agents within their system,⁴⁹¹ twice would the Romans interfere and eliminate some of the system’s most prominent powers, only to leave a power vacuum in their wake, a vacuum that the Gallic tribes hoped they would naturally fill, as per the rules of the system. However, they did not take into consideration Rome’s own ambitions and aspirations as prescribed by a realist anarchy and underestimated the dangers of inviting Rome so deep within their system.

While Caesar was invited by the Gauls to fight Ariovistus, he saw an opportunity to pre-emptively strike against another powerful warlord who would doubtless have invited more Germans to cross the Rhine, and eventually threaten Rome. Indeed, Ariovistus and the other *transrhenanus* tribes often interfered as external actors in the system’s various shifts in balance of power and were therefore constant systemic threats. Thus, given that a preemptive war was argued by Cicero to

⁴⁸⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 31.

⁴⁸⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 32-38.

⁴⁹⁰ Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 113. And Arthur M. Eckstein, *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC* (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2008). p. 342.

⁴⁹¹ This term was defined in the introduction. See pages 23-24.

always be a just cause,⁴⁹² in addition to Caesar's invitation by the Gauls; his conflict against Ariovistus, a "friend" of Rome, was legitimized and *bellum iustum* could be conducted.

The Bellum Iustum:

While the literature on *Bellum Iustum* is vast, and since this thesis does not focus specifically on this topic, this section will refer to the works of Edwin S. Ramage who summarizes this complex Roman concept and the related rituals while directly analyzing the topic within the subject of *Bellum Gallicum*.⁴⁹³ With regards to this concept, two ancient authors are paramount for our understanding of the concept: Livy and Cicero. The first, argues that the "just war" is a mix of matters between injustices (dealt to Rome), duties, and failures to fulfill said duties which the Romans viewed as owed to them. If Rome demands things, and they are not received, such as "pay debts, reparations, failing to hand over things" then the people behaving in this manner against Rome, are perceived to have committed an offence (*iniuria*) against it. By doing so, and after having consulted the Senate, war is seen as a duty that must be declared against the offending party.⁴⁹⁴ On the other hand, for Cicero "No war is just (*nullum bellum esse iustum*), unless it is waged for things sought or demanded back (*rebus repetitis*)". As with Livy, Cicero also highlights the importance of the formal declaration of war (*indictum*) which follows a formal warning (*denuntiatio*).⁴⁹⁵ Thus, war cannot be "just" without cause, and he only perceives two causes that can be considered "just": Revenge, and repelling the enemy (survival).⁴⁹⁶ Indeed the concept of *iustitia* is integral to the philosophy of the *bellum iustum*.⁴⁹⁷ Yet, *iustitia* and *iustus* are rarely mentioned in Caesar's commentaries, with "*bellum iustum*" never being mentioned at all. For

⁴⁹² Cicero, *de provinciis consularibus*, 32-34.

⁴⁹³ For further readings on the specific topic of the *Bellum Iustum* refer to: Elena Gilberti, "Aspetti Giuridici Della Guerra Nel « De Bello Gallico », " *Apollinaris : Commentarius Instituti Utriusque Iuris* 76, no. 1-2 (2003): 503-14. and Helga Botermann, "« Gallia Pacata - Perpetua Pax » :: Die Eroberung Galliens Und Der « gerechte Krieg », " in « *Res Publica Reperta* »: *Zur Verfassung Und Gesellschaft Der Römischen Republik Und Des Frühen Prinzipats : Festschrift Für Jochen Bleicken Zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Jörg Spielvogel, Hermes. Sonderband (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 279-96.

⁴⁹⁴ Edwin S. Ramage, "The Bellum Iustum in Caesar's De Bello Gallico," *Athenaeum* 79, no. 1 (2001): 145-70. p. 145.

⁴⁹⁵ Ramage. p. 146.

⁴⁹⁶ Ramage. p. 145.

⁴⁹⁷ Ramage. p. 148.

Ramage, this is due to the nature of Caesar's commentaries, it is a narrative of historical events, and not a philosophical, political, or ethical treatise.⁴⁹⁸ As such, Caesar does not go into the philosophical intricacies of *bellum iustum*, but rather directly demonstrates it to his readers via his actions.⁴⁹⁹ So while there are no direct mentions of *iustitia* there is enough evidence in the commentaries to show that these principles had a place in Caesar's thinking.⁵⁰⁰ Examples of this can be found when Caesar refers that the Aedui's long-standing close relationship with the Romans was "based in justice (*quam veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis*)".⁵⁰¹ Another example of this occurs when Caesar is dealing with Ariovistus; while talking to his men, Caesar uses the terms "*aequitate condicionum*" inferring his fair treatment of the warlord.⁵⁰²

Furthermore, Livy mentions that these regulations are established traditions⁵⁰³ leading Ramage to "reasonably" assume that generals such as Caesar were naturally aware of them, despite none of the concepts being directly referenced in his commentaries.⁵⁰⁴ However, it is important to note here that while these concepts may have been known to Roman generals, it is unlikely that the Gauls were familiar with such processes. Thus, allowing Caesar to use the Gauls' ignorance of these concepts against them, while he himself may properly justify his actions to the Roman Senate by acting "appropriately". This, of course, hearkens back to the arguments in the Introduction that no two cultures have the same protocols for war, which the Romans exploited to gain an advantage through their *deditio* rituals. While not exactly akin to unknowingly surrendering your sovereignty to Rome in defeat, or by asking for their assistance, the Gauls's lack of knowledge concerning the *bellum iustum* may have inadvertently thrown them into conflicts against Caesar simply by their lack of understanding of the Roman *modus operandi*.⁵⁰⁵ While these things may have been

⁴⁹⁸ Ramage. p. 165.

⁴⁹⁹ Ramage. p. 165.

⁵⁰⁰ Ramage. p. 147.

⁵⁰¹ Ramage. p. 147. And Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 43. 6.

⁵⁰² Ramage. p. 147. And Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 40. 3.

⁵⁰³ Titus Livius, *Livy: In Fourteen Volumes. Book I and II*, trans. Benjamin O. Foster, Reprinted, The Loeb Classical Library 172 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002). Book 1. 32. 14.

⁵⁰⁴ Ramage, "The Bellum Iustum in Caesar's De Bello Gallico." p. 145.

⁵⁰⁵ I do not know if the Romans consciously exploited their own rituals when applying them to foreign cultures, but they were exceptional at giving the resemblance that all their wars (and conquests) were done so via defensive wars. Caesar's creative use of the Roman rituals to goad the unaware Gallic tribes into conflicts, while also allowing him to justify his actions to his Roman audience can be seen as a tool used by the Roman general to gain an opportunistic advantage against his enemies. Eckstein in his analysis never disputes Roman exceptionalism, he fully acknowledges it, and stressed it. However, for Eckstein, Roman exceptionalism was not in their militarism or bellicosity, but rather in their ability to integrate foreign peoples into their Empire, while also possessing the ability to harness greater

unknown to the Gauls, it is evident that Caesar's Roman readers would have clearly understood how Caesar indirectly highlighted *bellum iustum* in his commentaries. Indeed, throughout his article Ramage explains how Caesar uses rhetoric to bolster the idea of *bellum iustum*, using drama to further his point.⁵⁰⁶ A fact, which Ramage believes played an important part in the *Imperator's* propaganda;⁵⁰⁷ which included legitimizing actions to his Roman critics.

How then did Caesar make his case for *bellum iustum* to his Roman readers? For Ramage, Caesar uses Book I as a template for the rest of his commentaries which will all follow the same established themes, outlining his case for *bellum iustum* in what Ramage refers to as "repeated episodes".⁵⁰⁸ All these episodes followed the same lines which can be summarized to: "working for the *populus romanus*, preserving and promoting the Empire, protecting Rome's friends and allies, combatting the machinations of the Gauls and Germans, rejecting the hybris of the enemy...and meeting immediate problems head on".⁵⁰⁹ By following strict guidelines found throughout his interactions in Book I, Caesar clearly shows his readers how the situation will lead him to war, gives ample warning to his enemies alongside conditions on how to avoid violence (often by demanding reparations).⁵¹⁰ By doing so, Caesar is fulfilling all the requirements of a "just war" and making his actions irreproachable, even to his critics in Rome.

The next instance of Caesar being invited to a conflict comes at the start of Book II where after mobilizing his legions against them, the *Remi* surrender to Caesar, asking him to enter into his protection, and for aid against the other Belgic tribes.⁵¹¹ Beyond the *casus belli* that the *Remi* provided Caesar by inviting him to the conflict against the *Belgae*, their surrender in good faith, expressed in the term "*in fidem*"⁵¹² to the Romans is once again akin to the Capuan surrender. As

resources for war than their enemies. See Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*. p. 33-34. In a realist anarchy, all units try to gain as much power to ensure their own survival, at any cost and by using any tools at their disposal. In this case, the tools being used are aggressive diplomacy and the complex Roman war rituals regarding *Bellum iustum*, which Caesar opportunistically uses to gain any advantage he can. As such, the creative use of this tool, exceptional as it may be, does not contradict our realist interpretations.

⁵⁰⁶ Ramage, "The Bellum Iustum in Caesar's De Bello Gallico." p. 161,

⁵⁰⁷ Ramage. p. 170.

⁵⁰⁸ Ramage. p. 166-177.

⁵⁰⁹ Ramage. p. 170.

⁵¹⁰ Ramage. p. 166.

⁵¹¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 3. 2. "*qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra populum Romanum coniurasse*"

⁵¹² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 2. 3. 2.

was the case with the other tribes, it is unlikely that the *Remi* understood the full consequences of their surrender in faith to the Romans. As was seen in this thesis's Introduction with the Roman capture of *Aegina*, surrendering to Rome implicitly subjugated the surrendering party to Roman authority. As such, while Caesar does not directly mention "*deditio*" it can be inferred by their surrender to faith, that the *Remi* now found themselves subservient to Caesar's authority, a fact exacerbated by their request for help, which saw Capua become subservient to Rome in a similar situation. It is important here to remember Bellini's arguments that the surrender rituals of Rome stemmed from its clientelist traditions, making this hierarchical relationship between both parties quite "normal"⁵¹³. Burns even argues that Caesar's entire conquests of Gaul was a widening of clientelist relationships between Caesar (the patron) and the subdued Gauls (his new clients).⁵¹⁴ By affirming that Caesar's entire conquests were a series of clientelist relationships, Burns helps advance the argument that the surrenders found in the *Bellum Gallicum* are enforced through *deditio*, for which clientelist relationships were a key aspect. However, because of the possibility that the *Remi* may not have understood their subjugation to the Romans as a result of their surrender, it allows us to argue that Caesar grew Rome's *imperium*, opportunistically rather than by design.

It is important to note that instead of seeking Rome's assistance to balance the system, the *Remi* were bandwagoning alongside the Romans to defeat the rest of their kin. Through this first occurrence of bandwagoning the *Remi* show that they believed the Romans to be more powerful than the rest of the *Belgae*, therefore, making Caesar one of the most powerful units in the system right from the onset of Book II. Furthermore, while the *Remi* might not have known the full extent of their surrender, they remained one of Caesar's most loyal allies throughout the Gallic Wars, with Caesar citing them, along with the *Aedui*, as his only trustworthy allies during the events of Book V.⁵¹⁵

Subsequently, the events of Book II and III unfold without another instance of Caesar being invited to a conflict. This only would occur during the events of Book IV, where Caesar, for the first time, crossed the Rhine and into the lands of the *Ubii*. The latter came to the Romans asking them for

⁵¹³ See "Introduction" and Bellini, "Deditio in Fidem." p. 450.

⁵¹⁴ Burns, "Chapter 3: Through Caesar's Eyes." p. 88-130.

⁵¹⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 54. 4.

help against the *Suebi* and their oppression.⁵¹⁶ Through the *Ubii*, Caesar had gained entry into the *Germania*. While his stay in *Germania* was short-lived, by beseeching Rome for help, the *Ubii* had ensured that Caesar would have a stable *casus belli* to enter its theatre again, through these newfound allies. Although ethnography is not the centre of this thesis, it is important to note that there exists a historical debate as to the cultural identity of the *Suebi* and *Ubii*. Older scholarship references these tribes as “*keltische-germanische Mischstämme*”, meaning that they were mixed tribes between Celtic and Germanic cultures.⁵¹⁷

Following his excursion in *Germania*, Caesar set his eyes towards *Britannia*, where he sent Commius to petition the states and tribes of Britain in the hopes that some would deliver themselves to the protection of Rome.⁵¹⁸ Rather than wait for emissaries be sent to him, requesting his aid, Caesar proactively sent his own envoy to the Britons in the hopes that he could persuade them to ask for his protection. Caesar’s use of the words “*fidem*” alongside the context of bringing a tribe into his protection could mean that Caesar wants us to believe that those tribes that choose to request Rome’s help are formally requesting *deditio in fidem* which would enter them in a subservient relationship without their knowledge.

⁵¹⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 8 and 16.

⁵¹⁷ For further information on the subject refer to: Emily Allen-Hornblower, “Beasts and Barbarians in Caesar’s *Bellum Gallicum* 6.21-8,” *Classical Quarterly* 64.2 (2014): 682–93. and Herbert 1905-1990 Jankuhn and Johannes 1865-1949. Hoops, *Reallexikon der germanischen Altertumskunde*, 2., völlig neu bearb. und stark erw. Aufl. unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Fachgelehrter. Hrsg. von Herbert Jankuhn [et al. (Berlin): De Gruyter, 1900). and Malcolm 1939- ... Todd, *The Early Germans*, 2nd ed., *The Peoples of Europe* (Malden (Ma.): Blackwell, 2004). and Bruno Bleckmann, *Die Germanen: Von Ariovist Bis Zu Den Wikingern* (München: Beck, 2009). and Jean Loicq, “D’où César Tenait-Il Sa Doctrine Du Rhin, Frontière Gallo-Germanique ?,” *Revue Des Études Latines* 85 (2007): 66–80.

For the *Ubii* specifically, refer to Johannes. Heinrichs, “Ubier, Chatten, Bataver : Mittel- und Niederrhein ca. 70-1 v. Chr. anhand germanischer Münzen,” *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität : Germania inferior am Beginn und am Ende der römischen Herrschaft : Beiträge des deutsch-niederländischen Kolloquiums in der Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (27. bis 30. 06. 2001) / hrsg. von Thomas Grünewald und Sandra Seibel. - Berlin [etc.] : de Gruyter, 2003, 266–344.* and Francesca Lamberti, “Gli Ubii e Roma. Notazioni su una dialettica feconda,” in *Etrangers dans la cité romaine: actes du colloque de Valenciennes (14 - 15 octobre 2005)* “‘Habiter une autre patrie’: des incolae de la République aux peuples fédérés du Bas-Empire,” ed. Rita Compatangelo-Soussignan, Collection “Histoire” (Colloque “Habiter une autre patrie,” Rennes: Presses Univ. de Rennes, 2007), 201–20.

⁵¹⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 21. 8. “*Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet*”. While at first glance this event may seem counter-productive to my arguments, in the sense that Caesar was actively looking to be invited into Briton by sending envoys. It could also be seen as a way for Caesar to prod the civitates in Briton and seeing if an opportunity presents itself. It has been established in this thesis that the Celtic tribes were not necessarily aware of the complexities of Roman foreign affairs. As such, perhaps the tribes in Briton were unaware they could petition Caesar for protection against their allies. By sending Commius, Caesar is attempting to create an opportunity to enter British system. It still highlights opportunism, and the creative use of tools at the disposal of the Roman general within the realities of the system he found himself in.

Interestingly, Caesar admits to having appointed Commius as the *rex* of the *Atrebates*, after having subdued them.⁵¹⁹ Their defeat, a direct consequence of his interventions, created a power vacuum amongst their leadership. Here, Caesar is filling the void in power, in a subdued state, after having interfered, with a client king, that would follow his commands. It was Commius' loyalty⁵²⁰ to Caesar which saw him appointed as king, and the reason why the *Imperator* sent him to Briton to petition tribes at his behest. While Commius is indeed loyal to Caesar, he is not so indispensable to his campaigns that they would be hindered if the Britons were to kill or detain Commius. On the contrary, such action would automatically provide Caesar with a *casus belli* in Briton for his *bellum iustum* since Commius is an "ally" of Rome.

Next, after the invasion of Britain and upon reaching the lands of the *Trinobantes*, Caesar brought them into his protection. Earlier, Mandubracius, the king's son, came to Caesar for protection after Cassivellaunus had murdered his father.⁵²¹ This event, and Mandubracius, served to help justify Caesar's interventions in Britain and legitimize his presence there. As we discussed in the previous chapter, Caesar never received a direct invitation into Britannia by one of its *civitates*; instead, Caesar used the *iniuria* caused to him by the abduction of Commius to justify his *bellum iustum*. To that effect, by bringing the *Trinobantes* into his protection, Caesar had additional leverage to justify his actions.⁵²²

The surrender of this tribe into Caesar's protection caused a chain reaction which saw several other tribes do the same thing.⁵²³ However, with Mandubracius and the *Trinobantes* under Rome's protection, Caesar had a means to intervene in Britain on a regular basis. The protection of an ally is a well-established *casus belli* for his wars and interventions. While Caesar had managed to find a reason to invade Britain, he now cemented his grip over the conquered lands by demanding hostages and yearly tribute from all the surrendered states.⁵²⁴

⁵¹⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 21. 7. "eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat"

⁵²⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4 .21. 7. "cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit."

⁵²¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 20.

⁵²² Upon doing additional research on Commius, the only scholarly work found was Robert H. Chastney, ed., "Commius the Atrebatian," *Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity* XXXI (1938): 158–60. Which only featured a biography of the man, bearing no relevance for this thesis.

⁵²³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 21.

⁵²⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 22. 4.

However, it is important to note that Caesar was not the only external unit to be invited into the conflict. On more than one occasion, the Gauls had invited the Germans to interfere within their system as in the case of Ariovistus. Interventions, which as with Rome, had systemwide consequences. While Ariovistus had been invited prior to the events of the *Bellum Gallicum*, Indutiomarus invited Germanic tribes to cross the Rhine and help him fight the Romans during Ambiorix's rebellion. While no Germans crossed the Rhine to aid Indutiomarus, his appeal for their aid is telling. The Gauls, had no problems inviting external forces into their system, despite these external forces becoming more powerful than its units. This was the case with Ariovistus, who after having been invited to shift the balance of power, had carved himself an *imperium* (sphere of power) through conquest at the detriment of those who had invited him. Another case could be made with regards to the *Belgae* who according to our source were Germans that crossed the Rhine long ago and had settled in Gallic lands after forcing its original inhabitants to flee. Yet again, while Caesar may have been invited into Gaul as a balancing agent, he was now asserting himself as the dominant unit within the system and carving himself a large empire through the steady surrender of the Gallic units, while also subjugating them through *deditio in fidem*.

The final invitations in the *Bellum Gallicum* occur in Book VII after Caesar's victory at Avaricum. With the winter letting up, Caesar took this as a sign that very seasons were "inviting" him to continue the war.⁵²⁵ In Roman culture, seasons were linked with the divine so with winter ending earlier than expected, it is not the seasons, per se, that are inviting Caesar to pursue the war, but rather the divinities spurring him on. Indeed, according to Rosenstein, it is imperative not to underestimate the importance of religion in the Roman republic. For the Romans, the success and prosperity of the Republic stemmed directly from the favour they received from their divinities. To that effect, it was paramount for the Romans to maintain a "healthy" relationship with their divinities in what they referred to as the *pax deorum* or, the "peace of the gods". Religious belief was so important for the Romans that the ultimate reason for military victory (or defeat) was due

⁵²⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 32. 2. "*Iam prope hieme confecta cum ipso anni tempore ad gerendum bellum vocaretur et ad hostem proficisci constituisset*"

to the religious rituals they performed, and the preservation of the *pax deorum*. So long as the “apparatus of the public cult was operating properly, success on the battlefield would follow”.⁵²⁶ While all previous instances of Caesar’s invitation into the conflict had come from units within it, this is the first time that Caesar alludes to the gods sanctioning his war. While finding pertinent *casus belli* to conduct the *bellum iustum* has been imperative to this section’s argument, it is important to remember why the Romans had strict warfare rituals: under no circumstances could they wage an illegitimate war, lest they broke the *pax deorum*, incurring the wrath of their gods. Therefore, through winter ending, Caesar is being “invited” by the gods to pursue his war, granting him legitimacy and ensuring the conflict would not break the *pax deorum*.

While in Avaricum, Aeduan emissaries will beseech the *Imperator* to intervene before civil unrest erupts in their state.⁵²⁷ The *Aedui* found themselves divided by factionalism as pro and anti-Roman sentiment amongst its elite grew. Vercingetorix’s rebellion had systemwide consequences as all the units found themselves forced to choose a side, to either balance against the Romans by joining the Gallic rebellion, or bandwagon alongside the Romans to achieve greater standing within the system (i.e., the *Remi* and *Aedui*). Faced with the possibility of losing his staunchest supporters, those who had invited him into the system from the onset of the wars, it was fortunate for Caesar to receive an invitation to mediate the growing dissent. Through this invitation, Caesar could secure Aeduan loyalties, in turn ensuring the rightfulness of his interventions. The loss of Aeduan support would symbolically deprive Caesar of their very first invitation, the one that started it all, subsequently stripping him of the legitimacy of all his actions both in Gaul and in Rome.

The final episode when Caesar was invited into the system remains in Book VII, chapter 39 where Eporedorix a young Aeduan noble, reported Litaviccus’ treachery to Caesar, and asked him not to allow his people to forsake their friendship with Rome.⁵²⁸ While Caesar had already taken steps to ensure the loyalty of the *Aedui* because of the previous event; Litaviccus’ had managed to rouse to

⁵²⁶ Nathan Rosenstein, “Military Command, Political Power, and the Republican Elite,” in *A Companion to the Roman Army*, ed. Paul Erdkamp, Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 132–47. p. 140.

⁵²⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 32. 2. “*legati ad eum principes Aeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario tempore civitati subveniat*”

⁵²⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 7. 39. 3. “*Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavicci consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem defert; orat ne patiat civitatem pravis adolescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi Romani deficere*”

consolidate the anti-Roman elements convincing them to take action. Through Eporedorix, Caesar once again had a means of entering the conflict against Litavicus and bring the *Aedui* back into the fold, through force if necessary. Eporedorix, representing the pro-Roman element, gave Caesar just cause to conduct a war against his former allies, by formally requesting his involvement to help “save” them.

All of these instances demonstrate how Caesar was able to defend and justify his interventions, both to the units within the system, and to his enemies in Rome. From the onset of the Helvetian war, to the final confrontation with Vercingetorix, Caesar was repeatedly invited to several of the system’s theatres of war (Gaul, Belgae, Britannia, and Germania). While the Gauls may have seen the Romans as the lesser threat to their system’s sovereignty, this mistake would prove their downfall. As Caesar was being steadily invited to eliminate his allies’ enemies, he naturally filled the power vacuum in his wake through surrender rituals, entering tribes into his protection, or even appointing client kings, forcing those who submit to him to deliver countless hostages, and pay annual tribute. The imposition of these conditions, perhaps to the unknowing determinant of the tribes, helped solidify Caesar’s grasp on the system, as he slowly integrated it into the sphere of the vaster Roman *Imperium*.

The underlining characteristics of Caesar’s invitations into the Gallic system, are comparable to Eckstein’s own arguments regarding Rome’s conquest of the Italian peninsula and Greek polities. The Gallic *civitates*, at first, didn’t understand the intricacies of Roman international relationship customs, and the long-term consequences of their invitations, because these were foreign to them. However, as time went on, and Caesar’s influence and power grew within the system the Gauls attempted to balance against the Roman influence through Vercingetorix’ rebellion. While this shows that in the end, the Gauls understood the ramifications of the Roman interventions, it proved to be too late. As such, this sub-chapter shows that Caesar slowly edged his way to become the system’s hegemon by being slowly and progressively invited ever deeper into the system, only to control it all in the end. While these invitations, and the *Bellum Gallicum* as a whole certainly helped Caesar achieve great personal glory and prestige obviously helping to serve his own ambitions; it does not automatically reinforce long-standing theories that attribute Caesar’s success uniquely to premeditated Roman bellicosity and aggressivity. Instead, we can argue, by using both these invitations and the system’s pre-existing anarchy, that Caesar manipulated the units within,

to slowly eliminate the greatest challenges to Roman supremacy while positioning himself as its absolute authority.

The final section of this chapter will thus focus on these manipulations to show how Caesar, using diplomacy, played the system's own bellicosity and anarchy against itself, opening a path to further conflicts for which he could be invited.

2. Aggressive Diplomacy: A tool for war:

While it was already demonstrated that the Gallic system was extremely bellicose, with its anarchy and honour culture providing it with incessant warfare, warfare which would have doubtless provided Caesar with countless opportunities to be invited into the system. However, as we have seen, these invitations, although legitimate, were sparse⁵²⁹; even prompting Caesar to send emissaries to Briton to petition for invitations. To that effect, this section will show the instances where Caesar used diplomacy in tandem with the anarchy to promote bellicose behaviour, encouraging further conflicts and aggressivity so that he may delve deeper into the system.

The first such instance comes from the very onset of the *Bellum Gallicum*, when *Helvetii* emissaries approach Caesar to negotiate the peaceful crossing of their people through the Roman province. The Roman forces were not ready to engage such a large Celtic host, so Caesar used this opportunity to stall for time. This is why, Caesar deceitfully told the emissaries that he would need time to consider their proposal.⁵³⁰ Yet, he had no intentions of allowing such a war band to cross the province, adding that the *Helvetii* had already caused Rome *iniuria*⁵³¹ giving him a *casus belli* (in addition to the invitation) against them. By telling the emissaries that he would consider their offer, it gave Caesar enough time to gather his forces, and secure a defensive position. Using

⁵²⁹ Even though there is little evidence of "Empire by invitation", the examples given are nonetheless pertinent. Moreover, it makes sense for Caesar to use the tools at his disposal, including aggressive diplomacy, to gain an advantage in the realist system he found himself in. By creating his own opportunities, rather than only waiting for those that presented themselves. We can suggest in this case that Caesar wants to show that he was a pro-active statesman rather than a passive statesman.

⁵³⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 7.

⁵³¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 7.

diplomacy aggressively from the onset of the *Bellum Gallicum* allowed Caesar to gain a decisive advantage against the *Helvetii*, culminating in their utter defeat, and granting Rome its first victory and foothold within the system.

After defeating the *Helvetii* a first time at a river crossing,⁵³² Caesar once again met with the Celtic envoys and would offer them peace.⁵³³ However, the terms he offered were very unfavourable, forcing the *Helvetii* to deliver hostages and pay tribute. Rather than to agree to these conditions, the *Helvetii* opted to continue their conflict with the Romans,⁵³⁴ leading to their eventual defeat. It can be argued that in this instance, since Caesar had not yet achieved total victory, he offered unfavourable terms to force the *Helvetii* to continue the war. While the war itself having been justified, the *Helvetii pagi* remained powerful units within the system. By eliminating them, Caesar would gain for himself and his legions great prestige, insuring his foothold in the system. By defeating the Tigurine canton at the Arar (Soane) river,⁵³⁵ Caesar fulfilled the mandates provided to him by his *casus belli*, as he had avenged the death of Lucius Cassius and his Gallic allies were no longer threatened. Yet, rather than actively resolve the conflict by seeking peace, Caesar diplomatically aggravated the Celts by giving them impossible terms, goading them into further conflict. Only then, could Caesar prolong his mandate, and legitimize further action against them. Through these two events of aggressive diplomacy, Caesar was able to prolong the conflict to ensure total victory.

The defeat of the *Helvetii* was so complete that Caesar ordered the *Allobroges*, one of the victims of the former's raids, to help them resettle, and rebuild the townships they had themselves burned prior to their armed migration.⁵³⁶ Caesar feared that the uninhabited districts left behind by the *Helvetii* would be settled by opportunistic Germanic tribes; making them neighbours of the Roman province. Conscious of the *realpolitik* implications of these aggressive would-be neighbours, Caesar saw fit to command a victim to help its aggressor resettle their lands ensuring the creation of a buffer zone. In other words, Caesar was conscious of the realist implications of leaving such

⁵³² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 12.

⁵³³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 14.

⁵³⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 14.

⁵³⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 12.

⁵³⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 28.

large swaths of land unoccupied, anticipating that there would be an opportunistic unit, intent on its own survival, left to colonize the unclaimed land. Thus, he used his diplomatic status with the *Allobroges* to serve his own long-term goals and avoid the settlement of a potentially even more bellicose unit at the borders of the Roman province.⁵³⁷

Ariovistus: Rex Germanorum

The next instance Caesar's use of aggressive diplomacy will come during his qualms with Ariovistus. Once again, Caesar will negotiate with Ariovistus, and will impose "impossible" terms for peace. Rightfully, Ariovistus will argue that Caesar's interventions are unlawful, since the territory he rules over was acquired legitimately through conquest and war. Therefore, being the victor, it is Ariovistus's right to impose his will on the defeated, just as the Romans were accustomed to do.⁵³⁸ While Ariovistus's arguments are completely sound and justified in a realist anarchy, Caesar sets impossible terms, and warns that any insults would be met with fierce retaliation. As Caesar expected, Ariovistus could not accept Caesar's terms, or meet his ultimatum, giving Caesar the legitimacy of a retaliatory *casus belli*. Similar to the previous example of aggressive diplomacy, Caesar, knowing the deficiencies of his claim to legitimacy, uses his diplomatic tools to corner Ariovistus into a conflict. It is evident that Caesar had no intentions of finding a peaceful resolution with Ariovistus and was determined to wage war against the Germanic warlord. While he had received pleas for help from several tribes, giving him potential just cause, the legitimacy of his actions was difficult to defend given Ariovistus' "rightful" claims. However, were Caesar to act defensively, his position would be bettered; after all, a defensive war is always *bellum iustum* in the eyes of the gods. Despite Ariovistus's perceived "legal" advantage over Caesar, quoting the illegitimacy of the Roman's actions, while reasserting his own rights, the very nature of the anarchic system, void of supranational institutions and enforceable international law,

⁵³⁷ Caesar may have written this section as a means to convince his readers of the German threat and to justify his subsequent crossing of the Rhine. However, this interpretation depends heavily on the context of creation of the *Bellum Gallicum* and whether it was written episodically, or as one piece of literary work written after the events it depicts and Caesar's conquest of the territory. Since we sided with Riggsby, Welch, and Wisemann in Chapter 1, and believe that the Caesar's commentaries were written serially on a yearly basis, it is logical for us to make these interpretations. For further readings see: Loicq, "D'où César Tenait-Il Sa Doctrine Du Rhin, Frontière Gallo-Germanique ?"

⁵³⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 32-37.

means that military strength alone can dictate territorial outcomes, and systemic supremacy. “Legitimacy” in these instances, are firmly within the eye of the beholder, with Caesar caring so much about his own, in order to defend the legality of his actions to his opponents in the Roman senate. Therefore, the speech exchanged between Caesar and Ariovistus, serves as a hypothetical debate in the Senate between Caesar and his opponents.

While the previous paragraph contained my initial analysis of this now famous head to head between the Roman general and the German warlord; once we delve deeper into the interactions between the two and take into account Caesar’s rhetoric and destined audience, these events can be examined in a completely different light. First and foremost, Ariovistus’s speech outlining his claims over Gaul was a part of Caesar’s rhetoric tools, as it was common for Roman and Greek authors to include speeches of the sort in their literary genre.⁵³⁹ Therefore, it is possible that the whole affair is a machination of Caesar’s who is using the warlord as a mouthpiece for his own ends. The actual speech itself is fiction, and most likely never took place.⁵⁴⁰ Nevertheless, this speech gives us insight at how Caesar shows to portray his adversary to his readers to try and convince them. According to Adler, Roman historians included powerful speeches from their enemies because Rome’s rivals lacked the ability to speak for themselves in Roman historiography. By doing so, they would compile their enemies’ imagined grievances against Rome, allowing their readers to determine their efficacy for themselves.⁵⁴¹ As a result, according to Fowler, the mere incorporation of these speeches is significant and comprises an “ideological act” meaning that Roman historians often chose to include these speeches that appeared to be convincing to their readers.⁵⁴² However, the fact that the arguments found within these speeches are still considered persuasive and “trenchant” by modern readers speaks to the power of these rethorical creations by the Roman historians.⁵⁴³ And indeed, From our modern points of view, it is easy to see how Ariovistus’s claims could be legitimate, after all, he was behaving similarly to the Romans. However, from a Roman’s point of view, he had no legitimate claim over Gaul because he lacked

⁵³⁹ Burns, “Chapter 3: Through Caesar’s Eyes.” p. 113.

⁵⁴⁰ Burns. p. 113.

⁵⁴¹ Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians Enemy Speeches in Roman Historiography*. p. 13-14. Here, Adler is leaning on the following work: Don Fowler, “Deviant Focalisation in Virgil’s ‘Aeneid,’” *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, no. 36 (216) (1990): 42–63.

⁵⁴² Fowler, “Deviant Focalisation in Virgil’s ‘Aeneid.’” p. 57.

⁵⁴³ Adler, *Valorizing the Barbarians Enemy Speeches in Roman Historiography*. p. 13-14.

iustitia.⁵⁴⁴ Caesar is using this event to carefully craft a case against Ariovistus which revolves around three main points⁵⁴⁵:

- 1) The persecution of the Gauls.
- 2) The threat from the Germans.
- 3) And the role of the Roman people.

For the first point, Caesar listens to Diviciacus who comes to make his plea on behalf of all the Gauls. They have been made the slaves of the Germans, who torture them in their cruelty. On his point, Caesar will demand that Ariovistus makes things “right”.⁵⁴⁶ To which, Ariovistus will remind Caesar of his rights by conquest over the Gauls. Here, Caesar is slowly building his case for *bellum iustum* to Roman readers, by showing them that this situation cannot be resolved peacefully because Ariovistus refuses to do so.⁵⁴⁷ The first of Caesar’s arguments in the matter hinge on the justice that the Gauls are owed through the injustice the Germans had subjected them to.

Caesar’s second point eludes to Gaul’s general security against the ceaseless tide of Germanic migrations. Because of these constant mass migrations, the Germans pose a threat to the whole system, and would eventually threaten Italy and Rome itself.⁵⁴⁸ In addition to painting the picture of this overwhelming looming Germanic threat, Caesar paints a pejorative portrait of the Germanic warlord (through Diviciacus) as being a cruel, impetuous, rash, impatient barbarian whose contemporary stereotypical characterizations are confirmed by the warlord’s actions.⁵⁴⁹ Indeed, Ariovistus is made cruel and directly responsible for the injustices against the Gauls by his demand for Gallic noble children as hostages, whom he supposedly enjoys torturing.⁵⁵⁰ Furthermore, Ariovistus is shown as arrogant and obstinate with a defiant personality, who will continue to bring in Germans against Caesar’s wishes, thus, becoming an immediate problem for the general.

Lastly, Ariovistus rejects the legitimacy of Rome in Gaul and dismisses both his, and the Aeduan’s friendship with Rome as a “sham”. Through this discourse, the warlord is directly insulting the

⁵⁴⁴ Ramage, “The Bellum Iustum in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico.” p. 148.

⁵⁴⁵ Ramage. p. 155.

⁵⁴⁶ Ramage. p. 156.

⁵⁴⁷ Ramage. p. 156.

⁵⁴⁸ Ramage. p. 157.

⁵⁴⁹ Ramage. p. 157.

⁵⁵⁰ Ramage. p. 157-158.

populus Romanus, which Caesar cannot allow to stand.⁵⁵¹ You see, while Ariovistus was proclaimed a “friend of Rome”⁵⁵² it meant that he held a clientelist relationship with the *Senatus Populusque Romanus*.⁵⁵³ While not a sign of submission from the client unto the patron, or a sign of specific support, this status gave these “friends” preferential status and an “inside track” for political support, trade, and hospitality.⁵⁵⁴ This *amicitia* was a clear sign of friendship, that could create strong bonds between the clients and patrons.⁵⁵⁵ It is these honours and this friendship that Ariovistus renounces when he firmly rejects the legitimacy of Rome’s presence in Gaul, which to a Roman reader would have been perceived as a great insult.⁵⁵⁶

Indeed, Ariovistus’s claims on Gaul were based on *ius belli* (rights and privileges of war). Thus, he felt that his claims on Gaul, and the actions taken against them were legitimate. As a result, he perceives the Roman people to be harsh and unfair (*iniquos*) in intervening in his jurisdiction.⁵⁵⁷ Ramage argues that the problem with the *ius belli* is that it “makes him [Ariovistus] a law unto himself giving him the prerogative to do the many things for which he is criticized and provides him with another reason for rejecting the *populus Romanus*”⁵⁵⁸ It is these arguments which are based on *ius belli* which are misleading to our modern understandings. Yet, the warlord’s arguments are precisely why he is so negatively seen from a Roman point of view.

While Ariovistus argues using the *ius belli*, Caesar’s arguments will revolve around *iustus* and *iustitia*. For the Romans, this affair is about justice. Caesar will argue that since the bonds between the Roman people and the Gauls are tightly bound by justice, it is in his jurisdiction as appointed governor to defend his allies and cannot overlook the injustices caused by Ariovistus to the Aedui.⁵⁵⁹ For Caesar, “it is a short step to move from *causae iustae necessitudinis* and *iustissimum imperium* to viewing the war against the Germans as *bellum iustum*.”⁵⁶⁰ So while Caesar’s arguments revolve around completely different concepts than Ariovistus’s, what about his claims that he had been invited into Gaul by its people? Afterall, Caesar had already shown the importance

⁵⁵¹ Ramage. p. 160.

⁵⁵² Meier, *Caesar*. p. 238.

⁵⁵³ Burns, “Chapter 3: Through Caesar’s Eyes.” p. 97.

⁵⁵⁴ Burns. p. 97.

⁵⁵⁵ Burns. p. 97.

⁵⁵⁶ Ramage, “The Bellum Iustum in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico.” p. 160-161.

⁵⁵⁷ Ramage. p. 161.

⁵⁵⁸ Ramage. p. 161.

⁵⁵⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1. 35. 4 and 1. 36. 6. “*Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum*”

⁵⁶⁰ Ramage, “The Bellum Iustum in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico.” p. 161.

of being invited into the conflict in terms of legitimacy. Simply, for Caesar and the Romans, their legitimacy in Gaul was established by the fact that they had been in the territory first, before the arrival of Ariovistus and his mercenaries, thereby giving them the initiative to act, while superseding the legitimacy of his *ius belli*.⁵⁶¹

Obviously, Caesar was using his commentaries and rhetoric to advance his own political messages and propaganda to his Roman audience. And while Ramage does discuss the rhetorical aspects of Caesar's commentaries, it is Tsitsiou-Chelidoni that helps us to better understand the *Imperator's* rhetoric in his interactions with Ariovistus. She believes that Caesar was using rhetoric prior to his conflict with Ariovistus to set up his upcoming defeat to his audience. He portrays the German warlord negatively, making him dismiss his friendship with Rome in an insolent manner. Every offence Ariovistus lashes against the Romans, is mirrored by Caesar's immaculate morality (*umbfleckte Moral*).⁵⁶² These actions, the warlord's ungrateful and despised friendship with Rome, serves to show him as nonsensical, acting insane, which serves only to embolden Caesar's troops in return.⁵⁶³ Subliminally, Caesar is using Ariovistus as a mirror for his political enemies in Rome. In the confrontation with Ariovistus, Caesar is representing the Romans, he is associating himself with Rome and its people. With this in mind, anyone who goes against Caesar, whether internal or external, is going against Rome. Here Ariovistus serves a mimic of Caesar's political enemies in the capital, who are immediately exposed as Rome's enemies.⁵⁶⁴ Contrarily to the barbarians (Gauls and Germans) who have time and time again been represented negatively throughout the *Bellum Gallicum*, Caesar himself appears only bearing positive qualities, with only the interests of the Roman people and their allies at heart.⁵⁶⁵ Indeed, that is the claim Tsitsiou-Chelidoni wishes to advance that the goal of Caesar's commentaries was to show him as serving the Roman people as a whole, and not as a greedy conqueror. This, of course, comes in stark contrast to the depictions of the barbarian leaders who are selfish and greedy, Ariovistus and even Vercingetorix included.⁵⁶⁶ While Caesar used his rhetorical ability to underline historical truths, and the *Bellum Gallicum* remains an irreplaceable contemporary primary source, he knew that history was not just about facts, but also about words. There is power behind rhetoric, and Caesar's commentaries are

⁵⁶¹ Ramage. p. 160.

⁵⁶² Tsitsiou-Chelidoni, "Macht, Rhetorik, Autorität." p. 132.

⁵⁶³ Tsitsiou-Chelidoni. p. 132.

⁵⁶⁴ Tsitsiou-Chelidoni. p. 134.

⁵⁶⁵ Tsitsiou-Chelidoni. p. 149.

⁵⁶⁶ Tsitsiou-Chelidoni. p. 150.

evidence on how a speech can spur its audience into action in a certain way.⁵⁶⁷ Caesar knew how to balance rhetoric and truth to mark his audience and leave them convinced. Through his narrative, and the careful weaving of the two, Caesar appears as the guarantor of historical truth.⁵⁶⁸

Having better understood Caesar's use of rhetoric and speech to his advantage, and while keeping his propaganda in mind, we can continue with the analysis of the instances of aggressive diplomacy in Gaul, while being confident that we have a much firmer grasp on key concepts regarding Roman legitimacy and way of thinking. The subsequent example of Caesar's use of aggressive diplomacy will be during the events in *Britannia*, and his sending of Commius hitherto.⁵⁶⁹ This very act, can rightfully be called "aggressive diplomacy". If Commius was successful in convincing Briton units to accept Rome's protection, Caesar would have a legitimate reason to invade. However, were the tribes to reject Commius' proposals, and in turn kill or detain him, this would be a great political affront, once again providing Caesar with a reason to invade. The sending of Commius to the Britons was no accident, with Caesar placing himself in a "no-lose" situation for his *bellum iustum*. In the end, Commius was arrested by the tribes in Briton, giving Caesar his diplomatic affront and *casus belli* against them. Knowing the impetuous nature of the Celts, and the high likelihood that they would have given him his affront, shows Caesar was manipulating the other units, and cornering them into a conflict. He used diplomacy not as a peace-seeking tool, but rather to open a new theatre of war. It is through these acts of manipulated diplomacy that Caesar was able to stoke the fires of bellicosity within the system, prompting ever more conflict, in an already conflict laden system.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁷ Tsitsiou-Chelidoni. p. 151.

⁵⁶⁸ Tsitsiou-Chelidoni. p. 151-152. Here, Tsitsiou-Chelidoni highlights that even though the *Bellum Gallicum* is filled with rhetoric, Caesar strikes a balance between fiction and truth. Even though Caesar wants to appear as the guarantor of historical truth to his audience, he does so while depicting the historical events that took place with a sufficient degree of accuracy. So, while there is an element of propaganda to his writings, Caesar can still be considered a believable source.

⁵⁶⁹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 21.

⁵⁷⁰ Scholarly works on Roman diplomacy often discuss the general aspects of Caesar's negotiations without going through their intricacies in the wider aspects of the war. While they make it obvious that Caesar follows standard Roman protocols, the explanations given earlier regarding *bellum iustum* help explain Caesar's diplomatic stances. It is important to remember that Caesar faced heavy opposition in Rome, and his commentaries were an integral part of his propaganda. However, this does remove the merit of his diplomatic maneuvers to gain a tactical edge against his enemies. For more information on Roman diplomacy in Caesar's Gallic Wars see: Joachim Szidat, *Caesars Diplomatische Tätigkeit Im Gallischen Krieg*, vol. XIV, Diss. Berlin 1967 *Historia Einzelschr.* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1971). and its reviews by Flam-Zuckermann, *L'Antiquité Classique* XL (1971), Lasserre, *Erasmus* XXIII (1971): 561–63, and Raaflaub, *Gnomon* XLVII (1975): 262–72.

It is important to note that Caesar was not the only party to cleverly use diplomacy in this manner. Indeed, the *Usipetes and Tencteri* also sought to gain an advantage through its use during the events of Book IV. Caesar had decided to lead a preemptive war against these tribes, lest they permanently settled in Gaul, prompting even more Germanic tribes to do the same. With Caesar advancing on their territory, the *Usipetes and Tencteri* sent emissaries to Caesar in an attempt to negotiate peace...or so they claimed.⁵⁷¹ The Germans argued that they had a rightful claim to the conquered Gallic lands, and that they would welcome a friendship with Rome, but would not cower away from a fight.⁵⁷² To that effect, Caesar should either grant them land, or allow them to keep the ones they had conquered. Yet, men who were unable to defend their lands, could not claim the lands of others as just rewards, Caesar retorted.⁵⁷³ Instead, in light of their common enemy, the *Suebi*, Caesar would order the *Ubii* to take them in.⁵⁷⁴ Faced with Caesar's ultimatum, the Germanic emissaries inform Caesar that they will accept his offer, but would require three days to make the necessary preparations, during which time they asked him not to move his camp. However, Caesar was aware that, earlier, the Germans had sent their cavalry away on foraging raids and that the latter were merely playing for time.⁵⁷⁵ Therefore, refusing their request, Caesar continued his advance towards them, until his forward cavalry was ambushed by the Germanic cavalry, putting the Romans to rout and killing 74 of their *equites*.⁵⁷⁶ Following the engagement, Caesar decided that he would no longer accept deputations and emissaries from "tribes who sought for peace by guile and treachery, and then had actually begun war".⁵⁷⁷ The next day, the Germans sent a large deputation in order to explain their actions, and once again attempted to seek peace. As a show of good faith, the deputation was comprised of the tribes' most important men; which Caesar had imprisoned.⁵⁷⁸ With their leaders and nobles detained, the *Germani* were left without command, making it an easy victory for Caesar.

For further readings on Roman diplomacy see: Paul J. Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353-146 BC)* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Pr., 2011). and Claude Eilers, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World* (Leiden, NETHERLANDS: BRILL, 2008).

⁵⁷¹ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 7 and 8.

⁵⁷² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 7 and 8.

⁵⁷³ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 8. 2. "*neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare*"

⁵⁷⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 8. 3.

⁵⁷⁵ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 11.

⁵⁷⁶ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 12.

⁵⁷⁷ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 13. 1. "*Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent*"

⁵⁷⁸ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 4. 13.

This specific event shows that the Germans and Gauls were just as likely to use diplomacy in an attempt to gain a military advantage over their enemies. In an anarchic system, where unit behaviour is determined by its desire to survive, any and all tools can be used to extract an advantage. Caesar had already demonstrated his ability to use aggressive diplomacy, and now the Germans were attempting to follow suit, although less successfully. In line with other examples found in this thesis, Caesar appears a hypocrite to condemn the Germans for the very same action he had earlier undertaken. Did Caesar not under the guise of peace, seek war against the *Helvetii*? Telling them, he would consider their proposal, only to reinforce his position and conduct a surprise attack in their rear as they attempted to cross a river?⁵⁷⁹ Just as was previously explained, Caesar is allowed this hypocritical leeway because he is in a position of power in Gaul. With no supranational authority to punish state actions, Caesar can act unrestrictedly while punitively liming the other units for the very same actions. These are merely the geopolitical realities of the anarchic system.

Another example of the Gauls using aggressive diplomacy against the Romans, comes during Indutiomarus' revolt in book V where Ambiorix convinced Sabinus and his army to leave the safety of their camp, ensuing in the total destruction of said army.⁵⁸⁰ Using his well-established connections with the Romans, Ambiorix was able to convince Sabinus that he meant him no harm, even promising the Romans safe passage during the negotiations. Additionally, the Gallic leader admitted that he owed much to Caesar, and the sparing of this army would be one of the ways he could repay the *Imperator*. Here, Ambiorix used his familiarity with the Roman commander to lure him into an ambush. In other words, he used his status and diplomacy to gain a military advantage over the Romans in a clear example of aggressive diplomacy. Ambiorix further displays talents in aggressive diplomacy when he convinces the Roman commanders, after the ambush and amidst the battle, to join him in person to negotiate, removing them from the battle and leaving their troops without command.⁵⁸¹ Ambiorix, much like Caesar, used diplomacy as a feint in order to give himself a tactical advantage. He first lured the Romans away from their camp under false promises and had now stripped them of their leadership during the battle. The Romans were already hard

⁵⁷⁹ See Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 1.

⁵⁸⁰ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 27.

⁵⁸¹ Not unlike what Caesar had done when he previously imprisoned the leaders of the *Usipetes and Tencteri*.

pressed and in a precarious position, which was only made worse by the removal of their commanding officers. The result being a total Gallic victory, the first of its kind, over the Romans.⁵⁸² The veracity of these historical events, as they are brought to us in the commentaries notwithstanding, it is important to note that Caesar is responsible for the narrative that we are reading. In this instance, Caesar is scapegoating his commanders while reinforcing and perpetuating the *topos*, or stereotype, that the Gauls are rash and traitorous.⁵⁸³ Seeing this success, the *Nervii* would attempt the same thing against Cicero's camp, but the latter would not fall to the same ruse, or fate, as Sabinus and Cotta.⁵⁸⁴

The fact that the Gauls aggressively used diplomacy to gain a military advantage over the Romans shows that the latter were not "special" or "unique" (in this respect) but rather just a product of the realist anarchic world in which they lived. One of the key aspects to Eckstein's theory was the "non-exceptionality" of Rome, that Rome was behaving in a way completely normal for all units within a realist anarchy.⁵⁸⁵ Therefore, it is important to contrast these instances of aggressive diplomacy to outline that the Romans were not behaving in any exceptional way, but their behaviour was in line with those of the other units as demonstrated by the Gallic instances of aggressive diplomacy. To further show Roman "non-exceptionalism", we must show Caesar's. To that effect we refer to Goldsworthy who argues that although Caesar was an exceptional military commander, especially due to his "instinctive genius"⁵⁸⁶, he did not behave in a particularly bellicose or reckless way, nor was he particularly bold or fool hardy.⁵⁸⁷ Instead, both Caesar's campaigns, and decisions, were in line with traditional Roman military thought and doctrine.⁵⁸⁸ If anything, Caesar had an active command style which contributed to his many successes, but he was not special or an "outsider".⁵⁸⁹ While his commentaries allude and highlight Caesar as an ideal commander, by exaggerating his attributes (*virtus*, courage, tactical ability, etc.), they still represent

⁵⁸² Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 36-37. I was unable to find any scholarly articles pertaining to Ambiorix's use of aggressive diplomacy to cross reference my analysis. As such, my analysis seems unique in this regard.

⁵⁸³ See "Chapter 2". p. 94-95.

⁵⁸⁴ Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, Book 5. 41-53.

⁵⁸⁵ See "Introduction".

⁵⁸⁶ Adrian Goldsworthy, "'Instinctive Genius': The Depiction of Caesar the General," in *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments*, ed. Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), 193-219. p. 196.

⁵⁸⁷ Goldsworthy. p. 199-200.

⁵⁸⁸ Goldsworthy. p. 204.

⁵⁸⁹ Goldsworthy. p. 209-210.

the ideal behaviours and qualities a Roman commander should have.⁵⁹⁰ As such, while Caesar had succeeded where others had failed, he was not the only one to use aggressive diplomacy, and was certainly not an oddity within the Gallic system.

⁵⁹⁰ Goldsworthy. p. 210-211.

Conclusion

From the onset of this thesis, my purpose was to analyze the Gallic Wars through a new perspective using a novel approach pioneered by Arthur M. Eckstein. His approach sought to explain Roman expansionism, traditionally attributed to an innate bellicosity and warmongering, through the lens of the school of thought of “political realism”. By borrowing tools from political science, Eckstein opened new ways for the historical discipline to understand the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean from the 4th to the 2nd century BCE. As such, given the importance of his theory to this thesis, its introductory chapter was spent in an in-depth analysis of his work entitled *Mediterranean anarchy, interstate war, and the rise of Rome*. It is in the latter that Eckstein clearly defines his approach, namely using anarchy and the focus on the Greek *polis* which was at the heart of his analysis. In order to successfully apply his approach to Caesar’s *Bellum Gallicum*, it was imperative to highlight Eckstein’s methodology and the main staples of his arguments. Firstly, Eckstein uses a mix of neorealist and classical realist schools of thought to establish a clear Mediterranean anarchic system, where various entities referred to as “units”, while vying for hegemony, exist in a constant state of warfare to ensure their survival. From Eckstein’s framework, several key concepts were extrapolated such as “unit attribute theory”, “power transition crisis” caused by shifting balances of power, the “permanence of war”, the presence of polities and mercenaries, the classification of units between “status quo” and “revisionist units” i.e., “balancing” vs. “bandwagoning”, and finally the important link between “cultures of honour” and “bellicosity”.

Following Eckstein’s methodology, and by using Caesar’s commentaries as our primary source, the first chapter of the thesis demonstrated the viability of Eckstein’s model when transposed unto Gaul in the 1st century BCE. Indeed, after an in-depth exploration of *Gallia*, from its territorial to its social and political organization, several conclusions were made. Firstly, that our vision of the Gauls and Celts is heavily influenced by long-standing historical stereotypes propagated by ancient Greek and Roman authors which falsely portray their *topos* (the perpetual image of these “barbarians” perpetuated in literature and imaginations) extremely negatively and as the opposites to their Greek and Roman counterparts. Secondly, *Gallia* was artificially separated from *Germania* by Caesar who wanted to clearly define the limits of his conquests. While the latter may have

divided these people into two distinct *ethnos*, debate still rages on amongst historians as to the veracity of this ethnographic divide. As such, although Caesar may have separated these people for political and military reasons, it remains uncertain whether the Germans were part of the Celtic cultural and also political realm, or not.

Gaul itself, was home to a plethora of tribes referred to as “*civitates*” by Roman authors, with each *civitas* encompassing numerous fortified cities called “*oppida*”. These clusters of urbanized life housed complex social and political “institutions” allowing for the administration of their respective territories. While ancient authors and their stereotypical portrayal of these peoples may have led us to believe that they were simple barbarians crudely living in forests, the realities of the Gallic peoples were that they were far more developed than our collective imagination allows. In fact, Gallic artisanal wares and goods were in such high demand throughout the Mediterranean that the Gauls actively participated in the Mediterranean’s economic system through extensive trade. Moreover, Gallic proclivities went beyond simple craftsmanship, as they were renowned warriors throughout the ancient world; lending their highly lucrative and popular mercenary services throughout most (if not all) of the Mediterranean’s theatres of war. Although it was Carthage that first introduced the Gauls to the wider Mediterranean system, they were soon hired for their abilities in warfare by countless other powers. Their renown as great warriors did not come freely or without cause. The permanence of war in Gaul, be it from within due to the endless power struggles between aristocrats, wars between *civitates*, or be it from repelling ceaseless Germanic invaders, the Gauls honed their martial prowess and earned their fearsome reputation as warriors. However, this constant state of warfare also established the premise for our thesis by creating a state of anarchy in what was referred to as the “Gallic system,” whereby Gaul was an extremely bellicose, violent, and prone to war well before the arrival of Caesar. Thus, dispelling the theories that Caesar threw Gaul into chaos through his interventions and subsequently setting the stage for this thesis’s second chapter.

While the first chapter focused on Gaul, the second chapter chronologically followed the events of the *Bellum Gallicum* to highlight its instances of realist anarchy and argue how Caesar used it to his advantage and opportunistically filling the power vacua left in his wake. As Eckstein outlines in his book, the introduction of any outside force within a system will affect its balance of power. Caesar’s interventions were no exception, through his actions, and by aiding his Gallic allies,

Caesar affected the entire balance of power within the system, incurring irreversible consequences for all of its units. This shift in the balance of power forced the Gallic units to realign themselves based on “status” quo vs. “revisionist states”. In other words, forcing the *civitates* to either bandwagon alongside Rome’s growing power, or to balance against it. By taking advantage of the pre-existing anarchy, Caesar was able to submit several of the defeated tribes, binding them to a clientelist relationship with Rome through *deditio* rituals. Although Caesar’s arrival in Gaul shook the balance of power, he was not the only outside unit to be interfering in its system. Prior to his interventions at the behest of the *Aedui*, other Gallic tribes had extended similar requests for aid to Germanic mercenaries; namely, the warlord Ariovistus. The latter quickly rose as a prominent force in the system, turning against his allies, and subduing several tribes to his growing authority. These external interferences are made all the more evident by the constant presence of Germanic mercenaries throughout the entirety of the events of the *Bellum Gallicum*.

From Caesar’s commentaries, it was made evident that all the Gallic units within the system were acting based on their selfish interests, regardless of past allegiances, promises made, or agreements entered. Although this is true for both “status quo” and “revisionist” states, it merely exemplifies the presence of the realist anarchy in ancient Gaul. Alternatively, despite repeated Roman victories, there remained incessant rebellions and conflict for the full eight years Caesar was in Gaul. Naturally, highlighting the volatility and bellicosity of the system, once again reiterating the previous argument. While the “permanence of war” and its causes were explained in Chapter 1, the second chapter emphasized that Gallic societies were cultures of honour, and as a result, far more likely to be prone to war and violence. Finally, the second chapter demonstrated the Gauls adaptability and their affinity for rapid learning. Initially, they were completely caught off guard and outmatched by the Roman way of war; However, their prolonged exposure to them allowed them to quickly adapt, and by the time of Vercingetorix’s rebellion they were able to match the Roman strategies and tactics.

Lastly, the third chapter focused on a particular tenant of Eckstein’s approach: Lundestad’s “Empire by invitation”, while also expanding upon Caesar’s work through an in-depth look at his use of aggressive diplomacy. If Caesar opportunistically took advantage of the situation in Gaul to consolidate Rome’s power on the territory, then it is important to specifically examine the very opportunities that led to Rome’s hegemony. To that effect, Chapter 3 explored the specific

instances where Caesar was directly invited to intervene on behalf of Gallic tribes (*civitates*) against their enemies. While several such instances occur throughout Caesar's commentaries, it is important to note that these events were authored with ulterior motives from which the *Imperator* directly profited. Indeed, the concept of *bellum iustum* is integral to Roman warfare, as war could not be conducted unless it is completely justified lest it risked breaking the *pax deorum* (peace of the gods). As such, chapter 3 expands on the concepts of the *bellum iustum* that were briefly discussed in the introduction, while also contextualizing them to help understand Caesar's justifications for his actions to his opponents. After every success, more and more Gallic tribes saw Caesar as a means to change their fortunes and increase their standing within the Gallic system. Consequently, continuous invitations were provided for Caesar to intervene throughout his eight-year tenure in Gaul. By slowly and progressively inviting him ever deeper into their system, and by seeking their own interests, the Gauls inadvertently paved the way for Roman hegemony and the ultimate loss of their freedom. By the time the Gauls realized that by inviting the Romans to eliminate their rivals, believing them to be the lesser of two evils, they had already sealed their fate. Although the system's anarchy and the Gallic invitations helped Caesar establish a foothold in Gaul, it was his guile and clever use of diplomacy that created ever more opportunities for his interventions. Indeed, by expertly using diplomacy whether to stall for time, giving him a tactical advantage as was the case with the *Helvetii*, or to goad his enemies into causing Rome *iniuria*, as was the case with Ariovistus, in both cases it gave him *casus belli* for *bellum iustum*. Caesar's encounter with Ariovistus is a pivotal example of the *Imperator's* use of diplomacy in combination with rhetoric, to sway his readers in a certain way. At first glance, for our modern sensitivities, the German warlord's arguments appear as perfectly legitimate, with Caesar even being painted as a hypocrite, this encounter seems counterproductive to his commentaries. However, upon closer examination, with Caesar's propaganda and contemporary audience in mind, we realize that the once obvious slights and insults Ariovistus profanes are completely lost on us, but would not have been to the ancient Romans.

While the commentaries are filled with Caesar's aggressive use of diplomacy, the events with the *Usipetes* and *Tencteri* shows that this skill was not uniquely Roman and stresses what Eckstein referred to as the "non-exceptionality" of Rome.

What's next?

If anything is to be taken away from this thesis, it is that Eckstein's approach to Rome's conquests of the Mediterranean, one that combines political science paradigms and primary sources to provide novel ways of interpreting them, can be transferred to different systems given the proper conditions: i.e., the criteria conducive to a realist anarchy. Throughout the research for this thesis, it became overwhelmingly evident that this is an untapped form of historical analysis, with very scarce historiography. As such, applying this process, be it in the form of realism, or one of the other political science schools of thought, could provide a new lens with which to analyze ancient sources and ultimately change our understanding of long-standing, and perhaps overstudied, historical events. As was the case with Caesar's commentaries, which have been studied for the past two centuries, Eckstein's approach allowed us to peer into new insights and offer a new interpretation to the Roman conquest of Gaul.

As such, concerning Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*, while this thesis demonstrated that Caesar opportunistically conquered Gaul, its arguments were limited by the lack of additional primary sources. Unfortunately, the only and best historical source surrounding these events remains Caesar's own commentaries and given their political use as a propaganda tool for the *Imperator* they are exaggerated and embellished to positively portray him. And although, historians and archeologists have confirmed the historical authenticity of the events, they remain biased. As such, despite a new examination of Caesar's *Bellum Civile* or *Libri Incertorum Auctorum* following a similar approach are the most logical follow-ups to this thesis, they would be hindered by the same lack of sources, but one that I would be interested in following regardless. Alternatively, as Eckstein focused on the Greek east, a re-examination of the Punic Wars, and the conquest of Spain, could be an interesting new theatre for this approach.

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